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INTRODUCTION

The true test of any proposed model is neither its complexity
nor its novelty. It is, instead, whether the model explains more data
than the one that it is intended to supersede. The easiest way to
criticize a model, including one built upon economic analysis, is to
identify a point of reference, or datum, that the model fails to
explain. The more difficult-and more useful-way to challenge a
model, however, is to offer up an alternative that explains all the
data that the prior model explains, plus one. Indeed, any scientific
theory, including one based upon economic analysis, is valid only if
it is falsifiable.1 While it is invariably difficult to falsify any theory

ISee KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS:
THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("[T]he criterion of the scientific status of
a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."); see also 2 THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66-91 (2d ed. 1970) (stating that
inexplicable data create a crisis for a scientific theory and establish the need to devise
new paradigms that account for that data); infra note 72.
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grounded in a social science, perhaps the best we can do is to
embrace a credible theory-one that appeals to our intuition-until
an alternative credible theory that accounts for at least one more
datum is offered.
The lawyer faces a similar task. The effective lawyer learns to
blend the image that affords her client relief with a larger and more
compelling jurisprudential image composed of more points of
reference-or dots-than that offered by her opponent. She does so
by demonstrating that if the court grants her client relief, the
picture that she has painted will remain essentially unchanged or,
perhaps, even that its most important features will be sharpened.
The ineffective lawyer, rather than offering up a new, and hopefully
better, picture, simply tries to convince the decisionmaker that the
existing picture is wrong. Most scholars who have considered the
Supreme Court's standing doctrine have tried to demonstrate that
the picture-at least as painted by the Supreme Court-is wrong.
In this two-article series, I hope to demonstrate that the social
choice explanation of standing I offer accounts for more standing
and nonstanding case law, and for more of the history surrounding
standing, than do prior explanations. In Standing Back from the
Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice,2 I set out the theoretic
framework, parts of which I will further develop here, and in this
Article, I will present comprehensive empirical support to demonstrate that the social choice theory of standing meets the stringent
test set out above. Together, in these articles, I hope to demonstrate that the social choice model I offer better explains three
critical sets of data for assessing standing than does any prior
model. In the prior article, I explained how standing fits within a
larger jurisprudential framework and why standing is necessarily
distinct from associated justiciability doctrines and from the cause
of action inquiry.' In this Article, I further demonstrate that the
social choice theory of standing better explains, first, the anomalous
historical context in which the modern standing doctrine emerged;
and second, and perhaps most importantly, the standing cases
themselves. Without understating the difficulty of the assigned task,
I also hope to do more. I hope to demonstrate in these articles that
standing serves a critical, if rarely understood, purpose in furthering
2 Maxwell L. Stearns, StandingBackfrom the Forest: Justiciabilityand Social Choice,
83 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1995). Due to the simultaneous publication of
these articles, cross-references will be to parts rather than to pages.
' See id. part II.B.
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the separation-of-powers principles upon which our system of
government ultimately rests.
The task before us then is, in a sense, as lawyerly as it is
academic.
Scholarship explaining that the Supreme Court's
standing picture is wrong is abundant. Some of it has been written
by now-sitting Supreme Court justices.' In this Article, I will not
try to demonstrate what is wrong with this picture;' instead, using
social choice theory, I will try to offer up a better picture, one that
encompasses more data than has been captured in prior snapshots.
If I succeed, I will argue that it is because I have taken a sufficient
number of steps back, enough to embrace within my field of vision
the implications of the theory of social choice for standing. Social
choice is used here as a positive, rather than normative, tool. But
the analysis has significant normative implications for the constitutional separation of powers between the Supreme Court-and the
6
federal judiciary generally-and Congress.
In Part I, I provide an overview of the social choice literature
and framework as it relates to standing.7 Part II will place standing
in its historical context. In that Part, I will use the social choice
framework developed in Part I to demonstrate that, in contrast with

prior relevant Supreme Courts, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
8
were particularly prone to possessing multipeaked preferences. I
will then explain how and why the Court superimposed its threeprong standing test, initially created in the context of interpreting

4 See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 1094 (2d ed. 1985) (positing that, in cases involving reliance
upon a federal statute, the standing inquiry is inseparable from a determination on
the merits, a position not taken in the third edition of the casebook); Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrineof Standingas an EssentialElement of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (arguing that the constitutional foundations of standing
rest in part on the desire to insulate the executive branch fromjudicial interference).
' While I will criticize particular applications of standing, see infra part III.D (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)), 1 will argue that particular misuses do not undermine the critical functions that the standing doctrine serves.
6 The model is set out in detail in the predecessor article. See Stearns, supra note
2. Familiar readers can skip ahead to Part II of this Article, which will begin the
historical analysis of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Unfamiliar readers are invited
to read Part I, which will summarize the essential argument, and to refer to the prior
article, which is cross-referenced throughout, for greater detail.
" While Part I will largely summarize my prior work, it will also offer important
new insights on the difference between constitutional law and constitutional process,
which help to explain the separation-of-powers underpinnings of the modern standing
formulation. See infra part I.A.
' Multipeakedness is defined, see infra part I.A, and illustrated visually, see infra
note 17.
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section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act,' onto all federal
court claimants, even those relying upon the Constitution for their
substantive claims." Finally, Part III will provide a comprehensive
overview of the modern standing case law using the social choice
framework set out in the prior article and in Part I. Part III will
also explore the relationship between standing and other important
bodies of case law, most notably criminal procedure. I will conclude
by demonstrating that the social choice theory of standing better
accounts for the historical context in which modern standing
doctrine has emerged and the standing cases themselves than do
prior theories.
I. OVERVIEW: THE SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY OF STANDING
A. ConstitutionalLaw Versus ConstitutionalProcess
In Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciabilityand Social Choice, I
explained that standing has emerged as a logical and predictable
strategy employed by Supreme Court justices responding to interest
group *incentives to manipulate the critical path of decisionmaking
when the Supreme Court lacks a Condorcet-winning preference, or
alternatively stated, when the Court's preferences are multipeaked." The analysis stems from a critical insight drawn from
The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice,'2 that, as a result of the
obligation of the Supreme Court-along with virtually all appellate
courts-to resolve cases properly before it, the Court is unable to
employ a Condorcet-producing decisional rule.' 3
Instead, it
employs a decisional rule that, while not Condorcet-producing, is
capable of ensuring outcomes in all cases.' 4 Within particular

9 Ch. 324, § 10(a), 60 Stat.. 237,243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702

(1988)).

10 See infra part II.B.2.
n See Stearns,supra note 2. The twin concepts of Condorcet-winning preferences
and multipeakedness are explained below. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying

text.

12 Maxwell

L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE LJ.

1219 (1994).
's See id. at 1258-71.
'4 See id. A minor exception arises in cases that involve three or more remedies.
That category, which was the subject ofJohn M. Rogers, "I Vote This Way Because I'm
Wrong" The Supreme CourtJustices as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439 (1990-91), remains
indeterminate regardless of decisional rule. But case-by-case voting, a non-Condorcet
rule, cures the more common indeterminacy that would arise when the Court lacks
a Condorcet-winning option over the underlying issues in a case that requires the
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cases, the Court-along with virtually all appellate courts-employs
case-by-case, rather than issue-by-issue, decisionmaking. Case-bycase decisionmaking enables the Court to resolve all cases, even
those for which it lacks a Condorcet winner. 5 If the Court instead
employed a Condorcet-producing rule, for example issue-by-issue
decisionmaking, it would locate all available Condorcet winners, but
6
would cycle when no Condorcet winner is present.
To understand the nature of Supreme Court voting rules, we
will need to review briefly the Condorcet paradox. The paradox
reveals that in a group of three or more persons, each with
preferences that satisfy the condition of transitivity (referred to in
social choice as rationality), the group's preferences, when aggregated, may defy rationality. Three persons with the following
ordinal rankings: (1) A,B,C; (2) B,C,A; (3) C,A,B, will discover an
anomaly when they try to choose their preferred option through
some commonly employed voting techniques. If, for example, the
group's members try to select their preferred option using unlimited pairwise contests, they will soon discover that while they prefer
A to B and B to C, they simultaneously prefer C to A."7 .In the

binary choice to affirm or reverse. See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1266-67 n.176.
15 See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1270-71.
16See id. at 1258-71 (providing illustration).
The same group preferences can be depicted on a graph:
FIGURE 1

Utils 3 P3__________

P1

P2

A

B

2N\

C
Options

While social choice, as with economics generally, eschews interpersonal utility comparisons, see id. at 1249 n.106, for the limited purpose of illustrating multipeakedness
graphically, I have assumed that each marginal ranking is worth one util per person
and that interpersonal utilities can thus be compared. The options appear across the
horizontal axis and the utils appear across the vertical axis. Each person is identified
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language of social choice, a branch of economics that finds its
conceptual origin in the Condorcet paradox, 8 unlimited pairwise
voting leads to a "cycle" when the group lacks a Condorcet-winning
preference. A cycle arises when, for any proposed outcome, an
alternative outcome has the support of a majority in a pairwise
context.19 Because this holds true for any proposed outcome, no
outcome is stable under this voting regime.
With some sets of preferences, the same voting procedure can
lead to stable results even if there is no majority first-choice
candidate. Thus, if the group's preferences are instead (1) A,B,C;
(2) B,C,A; (3) C,B,A (note that only person 's preferences have
been changed), unlimited pairwise voting would produce a stable
outcome, option B.20 While option B is not the first choice of a
at the top of her utility curve. P1, for example, receives three utils if A is selected,
two utils if B is selected, and one util if C is selected. P2 receives three utils for B,
two for C, and one for A. The curve for P2 intersects the midpoint of the right wall
and resumes at the midpoint of the left wall. To complete the visual conceptualization, imagine cutting the graph into a rectangle, rolling it into a tube, and taping the
left and right walls together. The left and right walls would then be continuous. P3
begins at the upper left corner, representing C, after the walls are taped together.
As the visual depiction reveals, the group's preferences are multipeaked. For any
given outcome, an alternative has the support of a majority. Thus, at P3's preferred
option C, P1 and P2 would improve by one util each by moving to B. Majority
support also exists for moves from points B and C and, as a result, the group moves
from peak to peak to peak, but never rests. See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A.
is See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1221-25.
19 See id. at 1233-47 (illustrating cycles in market and legislative contexts).
In
game theory, a related branch of economics, a cycle is said to arise in the absence of
- .ore. SeeJohn S. Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 558
(1987).
20 The revised group preferences can also be graphically illustrated:
FIGURE

Utils 3

2
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2
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majority of the group's members, it will defeat either of the other
options in pairwise contests.
Option B is referred to as the
Condorcet winner.
While social choice theorists often evaluate voting rules based
upon their ability to ensure that available Condorcet winners
prevail, the decisional rules of some very important collective
decisionmaking bodies have evolved in a manner that thwarts the
Condorcet criterion."' Institutions that do not have the ability to
remain inert when faced with preferences that cycle employ rules
that, while they do not satisfy the Condorcet criterion, ensure a
collective outcome regardless of the group's preferences. 22 In The
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, I demonstrated that the
Supreme Court employs case-by-case voting, rather than issue-byissue voting, because the former rule, while it fails to satisfy the
Condorcet criterion, ensures a collective outcome in all cases. 23 In
Standing Back from the Forest, I extended the analysis to demonstrate
that while case-by-case decisionmaking prevents cycling in particular
cases, it cannot prevent intertemporal cycling, namely cycling that
occurs over time and across cases. 24 One commonly employed
voting rule that prevents cycling, including intertemporal cycling, is
a prohibition on reconsideration of defeated alternatives. 25 I

Again, each person is identified at the peak of her utility curve. In contrast with the
prior graphic, seesupranote 17 (demonstrating the absence, due to multipeakedness,
of a stable outcome), in this graphic, B, which provides P2 with three utils, and P1
and P3 with two utils each, is a stable outcome. Any move from B (to either A or C)
will improve the plight of only one player and thus fail to sustain majority support.
While B is not the first-choice candidate, it will defeat any alternative candidate in a
pairwise contest. B is known as the Condorcet winner. See Stearns, supra note 12,
at 1252-57.
21 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY ch. 2.1 (forthcoming 1996).
22See id. (illustrating non-Condorcet-satisfying rules used in appellate courts and
in elections).
22 See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1258-71. As stated above, see generally Rogers,
supra note 14, a minor exception arises in the context of three-remedy cases.
Another institution that by design employs a non-Condorcet voting rule is elections.
See STEARNS, supra note 21, ch. 2.1 (discussing the evolutionary significance of Condorcet and non-Condorcet rules in elections and in appellate court voting); cf. Saul
Levmore, ParliamentaryLaw, Majority Decisionmaking and the Voting Paradox,75 VA.
L. REV. 971, 979-81, 1015-17, 1031-35 (1989) (observing that, within legislatures,
which generally prefer Condorcet-producing rules, committee chairs are selected
through non-Condorcet plurality voting, with or without a runoff).
24See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A (illustrating intertemporal cycling and positing
its connection to the evolution of stare decisis); see also Bruce Chapman, The Rational
and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 41, 83106 (1994) (illustrating intertemporal cycling with English tort cases).
21 In a group with non-Condorcet preferences (1) A,B,C; (2) B,C,A; and (3) C,A,B,
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further demonstrated that in the Supreme Court, stare decisis
operates as a proscription on reconsideration of defeated alterna26
tives that prevents intertemporal cycling.
Social choice, and specifically Arrow's Theorem, reveals a
fundamental tension between five voting conditions-each of which
is ultimately grounded in a majoritarian norm, and each of which is
commonly associated with fair collective decisionmaking 27 -and the
condition of collective rationality, namely the ability to translate
three or more individually transitive orderings into a transitive
group ordering.28 Because no institution can simultaneously satisfy
the five fairness conditions and the condition of rationality, Arrow's
Theorem provides a critical set of criteria with which to evaluate the
evolution of decisional rules within collective decisionmaking
bodies. Stated differently, a corollary to Arrow's axiomatic proof
reveals that in any given collective decisionmaking institution that
is functional (meaning only that it issues collective decisions), at
least one of the five fairness conditions or the condition of
rationality must be sacrificed. 29 To ensure collective outcomes

any two pairwise votes will produce an outcome, but will do so by preventing a final
pairwise contest between the option defeated in the first round and the prevailing
option. With a prohibition on reconsideration of defeated alternatives, the following
voting path, A v. B (A wins); A v. C (C wins), produces outcome C even though B
would have defeated it, revealing a cycle. Alternative agenda setters could set voting
paths leading to their preferred outcomes, A or B. As explained below, see infra text
accompanying notes 31-32 and part I.0.1, this voting rule affords significant power
to the agenda setter.
26 See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A. For an illustration of how stare decisis
prevents intertemporal cycling, see infra text accompanying notes 54-65.
27 See infra part I.C.2 (describing range, universal domain, unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship).
21 See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1283-85.
' This explains the framework employed in The Misguided Renaissanceof Social
Choice, see Stearns, supra note 12, in evaluating proposals based upon Arrow's
Theorem to expand judicial review. In contrast with legal scholars who employ
Arrow's Theorem to demonstrate the incompetence of Congress in aggregating
preferences as ajustification for expanding the Supreme Court's decisional authority,
I argued that each institution is imperfect when compared with the Arrovian ideal
(namely the impossible institution that meets all five fairness conditions and the
rationality criterion) and that each institution should be evaluated based upon which
Arrovian criteria are met and which are relaxed to render those institutions
functional. See id. at 1257-85. Only after revealing each institution's Arrovian
deficiencies (and Arrow's Theorem proves that each institution that functions will
have at least one deficiency), and the significance of the identified deficiencies to that
institution's assigned tasks, can we evaluate whether to shift decisional authority from
one institution to another. As demonstrated below, see infra part I.C.2, the analysis
follows from a corollary to Arrow's axiomatic proof, namely that, for any collective
decisionmaking institution that functions, at least one of six Arrovian criteria must
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within individual cases, the Supreme Court employs a non-Condorcet voting rule, namely case-by-case voting."0 While that rule
compromises collective rationality, it ensures a collective outcome
in each case. In addition, to prevent intertemporal cycling, the
Court, by employing stare decisis, presumptively prohibits reconsideration of defeated alternatives.
While stare decisis reduces the doctrinal indeterminacy that
would arise over time and across cases if the Court's preferences
cycled, it does so at a cost. While a proscription on reconsideration
of defeated alternatives prevents cycles, it also provides tremendous
3
power to whomever is given the authority to set the agenda. 1
Because the combination of agenda-setting authority and a nonCondorcet voting rule affords the agenda setter with disproportionate influence over collective outcomes, the prohibition on reconsideration of defeated alternatives violates the Arrovian fairness
criteria, and because the proscription on reconsideration prevents
a pairwise contest between the initially defeated option and the
ultimate winner, someone must be afforded the authority to
determine which votes will-and will not-be taken. Stated differently, someone must be given the power to set the critically
important voting path. With a proscription on reconsideration of
defeated alternatives in place, the agenda setter has complete power
to determine the collective outcome. 2 In choosing the relevant
path, and thereby selecting the outcome, the agenda setter effectively thwarts the will of a majority of the group's members.
The phenomenon of path dependency can be demonstrated with
actual Supreme Court cases. In Standing Back from the Forest, I
demonstrated that the same two actual Supreme Court cases,
presented in different orders, would result in precisely opposite
outcomes in both cases if we assume that the Court adheres to stare
decisis3 3 In the Supreme Court, as in any appellate court, the

be relaxed.
so See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1270-71.
3' In a group with non-Condorcet-winning preferences, the agenda setter can
control the outcome if each group member votes strictly in accordance with his or her
ordinally ranked preferences. If the group members depart from those preferences,
the voting rules will depart from the Arrovian criterion of independence of irrelevant
alternatives. In legislatures, Arrovian Independence is generally relaxed. See id. at
1278-80.
s2 The discussion thus far assumes principled voting, meaning adherence to the
Arrovian condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and ordinal ranking.
I will discuss the significance of relaxing each of these assumptions below. See infra
part I.D.
"3See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.B; see also infra part I.C.1 (summarizing the
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doctrine of stare decisis affords those who control the order of case
presentation not only the power to determine the relative timing of
case decisions, but also and more importantly, the substantive
content of case decisions.3 4 Recognizing that stare decisis renders
the evolution of legal doctrine path dependent, Judge Easterbrook
has advocated relaxing stare decisis in constitutional cases.3 5 He
states: "[t]he order of decisions has nothing to do with the intent
of the framers or any of the other things that might inform constitutional interpretation." 3
As these articles reveal, however, in
evaluating the significance of stare decisis, one must distinguish the
substantive corpus of constitutional law from what I will refer to as
constitutional process."
By constitutional process I mean the
institutional structures and decisionmaking rules through which the
substantive corpus of constitutional law is made.
Judge Easterbrook is undoubtedly correct that nothing in the
substantive corpus of constitutional law grounds the outcomes of
case decisions in the fortuitous order of case presentations. But the
social choice analysis offered in these articles reveals that fortuitybased paths may well be grounded in important norms associated
with fair constitutional process. Briefly stated, my thesis is that
while a prohibition on reconsideration of defeated alternatives,
including, for example, stare decisis, produces path dependency, it
need not conduce to path manipulation."
As applied to the

analysis).

s For an illustration, see infra text accompanying notes 54-65. While Frank
Easterbrook has observed that stare decisis renders Supreme Court precedents path
dependent, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV. L. REV.
802, 819-20 (1982) (asserting that, with stare decisis, "everything depends on the
fortuitous order of decision"), these articles provide a critically different perspective
on stare decisis and its relationship to standing than has been offered in the literature

thus far.
" See Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 820.
36Id.
S7 For a more detailed response to Judge Easterbrook's analysis, see infra text
accompanying notes 89-98.
" Professor Saul Levmore has presented a similar hypothesis in distinguishing the
use of motion-and-amendment and succession voting in parliamentary procedure.
Both rules, because they prevent reconsideration of defeated alternatives, produce
path dependent results. Under motion-and-amendment, the committee chair, given
her power to recognize motions, can exert substantial control over the voting path.
See Levmore, supra note 23, at 1024-25 (observing that "well-informed and clever
chairpersons can manipulate motion-and-amendment voting by recognizing favored
members first so that their motions need not survive a great many votes," and that
"the chair's power is only increased by its ability to rule secondary amendments 'not
germane'"). In contrast, under succession voting, the body votes upon the motions
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Supreme Court, stare decisis ensures that the evolution of legal
doctrine will depend upon the order-or path-of case decisions. At
the same time, standing-by presumptively grounding the order of
case decisions in fortuitous factors beyond the control of the
litigants themselves-grounds the critical path of case decisions in
fair constitutional process.
In the last twenty-five years, standing has furthered those
critically important process-based norms in a manner that is not
replicated by any other Supreme Court doctrine.3 9 In the discussion that follows, I will explain why the Supreme Court-like all
appellate courts-employs non-Condorcet decisional rules that can
thwart the will of a present majority of its members within cases and
that inevitably produce path dependent results across cases. I will
then explain how stare decisis, operating together with standing,
helps to prevent path manipulation, thus improving both the
fairness and rationality of constitutional decisionmaking.
B. Cyclical Preferences Within a Single Case:
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.40 presented a challenge
to the constitutionality, under the dormant Commerce Clause, of an
Iowa law prohibiting (with exceptions) sixty-five-foot trailers on
highways within the state.4 1 The Court issued three opinions: a
plurality opinion, written by Justice Powell; a concurrence, written
by Justice Brennan; and a dissent, written by then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist. The three justices distilled the case to two issues: first,
whether the trial court should have applied the balancing test first
announced in Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice42 (instead

in the order in which they are made. Levmore explains that "since it is difficult for
the chair to judge the quantity of motions yet to be proposed, it is difficult to position
one's favorite correctly," under this procedure.' Id. at 1025. Thus, while succession
voting does not prevent the path dependency of outcomes, it may significantly reduce
the power of the committee chair to manipulate that path.
" The analysis in the text does, however, have significant implications for the
Supreme Court's otherjusticiability doctrines, including most notably, ripeness and
mootness. Each of these doctrines can be explained as presumptively prohibiting
persons or groups from controlling the critical path of case decisions by presenting
cases in a manner not dictated by factors largely beyond their control.
40 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
41 See id. at 669.
42 434 U.S. 429, 433 (1978) (noting that the "inquiry under the Commerce Clause
[does not end] ... without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the
degree of interference with interstate commerce").
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of a mere rational basis test), and second, whether the trial court
had properly considered evidence introduced for the first time at
trial or, instead, whether the court should have limited itself to the
evidence that the state legislature actually considered."
The
anomaly of Supreme Court voting rules can be demonstrated by
considering each of the Court's three opinions. Justice Powell, for
a plurality, held that the Iowa statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause." He determined that the appropriate test is the
Raymond balancing test and that the court below had correctly
considered trial evidence.
Justice Brennan, in concurrence,
would have ruled, instead, that the appropriate test is a rational
basis test and that the trial court should have considered only that
evidence presented in the legislature. 6 Finally, Justice Rehnquist,
in dissent, would have upheld the statute, applying a rational basis
test and considering evidence admitted at trial. 7 Assume, as is
consistent with all three opinions, that if the trial court had
employed the more lenient rational basis test and considered more
rather than less evidence with which to find a rational basis,
including that admitted at trial by the state's attorneys, the result
would have been, per Justice Rehnquist, to uphold the statute.4
Now consider what would happen if the Court were to use issueby-issue voting, which has the benefit of identifying available
Condorcet winners, rather than case-by-case voting. 9 On the first

" See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671-76.
44 See id. at 678-79.
45 See id.
41 See id. at 680-82 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47 See id. at 689-96 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
" Otherwise, the Court's resolution of the two legal issues presented would not
affect the outcome of the case.
49 It is not my position that the Kassel Court missed a Condorcet winner, but
rather that Kassel illustrates why the Court employs a non-Condorcet voting rule.
Over the three relevant questions, the two underlying legal issues and the binary
choice of outcome, the preferences of thejustices cycle, demonstrating the absence of
a Condorcet winner. Stated differently, the Court's three relevant majorities (recall
that any two namedjustices represent at least five votes), one for applying the rational
basis test (Brennan & Rehnquist, JJ.), one for admitting trial evidence (Powell &
Rehnquist,JJ.), and one for striking the Iowa statute (Powell & Brennan,JJ.), cannot
simultaneously be satisfied. See infra note 62. In my discussion of Kassel in The
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, I gave a mistaken impression on this issue.
After explaining that issue-by-issue voting produces the dissenting result, I stated,
"[t]hus Supreme Court voting procedures did not identify the Condorcet winner in
this case." Stearns, supra note 12, at 1257. I should have stated instead that the
absence of a Condorcet winner (or the presence of a cycle) in Kassel helps to explain
the Court's choice of a non-Condorcet rule.
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issue, which substantive test to apply, Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist win two to one over Justice Powell, in favor of the
rational basis test. On the second issue, whether to allow trial
evidence not considered by the state legislature, Justices Powell and
Rehnquist win two to one over Justice Brennan, holding that such
evidence should be admitted. But if the Court employs a rational
basis test and permits the trial court to consider evidence introduced by the state's attorneys, then based upon the assumption
stated above, the result is to affirm, rather than to reverse, which is
Justice Rehnquist's position in dissent. The anomaly is illustrated in
50
the table below:
Substantive

Permissible

Preferred

Standard

Evidence

Ruling

Powell

balancingtest

trial evidence

reverse

Brennan

rationalbasis

no trial evidence

reverse

Rehnquist

rationalbasis

trial evidence

affirm

Issue-by-issue outcome
(hypothetical)

rational basis

trial evidence

affirm

Case-by-case outcome
(actual)

reverse

TABLE 1: Kassel v. ConsolidatedFreightways Corp.
The question then arises why the Court has issued an opinion
that on an issue-by-issue basis thwarts the will of a majority of its
members. In The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, I demonstrated that the Court employs case-by-case rather than issue-byissue voting because the latter rule, while capable of ensuring that
available Condorcet winners prevail, is incapable of ensuring a
collective outcome in the absence of a Condorcet winner. 1 To see
the problem that issue-by-issue voting would pose, consider the
three majorities in Kassel: (1) a majority endorsing a rational basis
test (Brennan & Rehnquist, JJ.); (2) a majority approving the

" The actual positions taken in the different opinions and the actual case outcome
appear in italics; the hypothetical outcomes based upon issue-by-issue rather than
case-by-case voting are in Roman typeface.
51See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1259-71 (providing examples and potential
outcomes under both types of voting).
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admission of trial evidence (Powell & Rehnquist, JJ.); and (3) a
majority striking down the Iowa statute (Powell & Brennan, JJ.).
Given these three majorities, if the Court employed a Condorcetproducing voting rule, such as an unlimited motion-and-amendment
procedure, the Court's preferences would cycle.52 Thus, a motion
to consider trial evidence would pass, as would a motion to employ
the rational basis test. The two-motion combination would appear
to produce Justice Rehnquist's dissenting outcome, except that a
third motion to strike the statute will also pass. The motion process
can then begin all over again, but, because there is no Condorcet
winner, the Condorcet voting rule has no stopping point. As a
result, employing an unlimited motion-and-amendment procedure
would not allow the Court to meet its collective obligation to resolve
those cases properly before it.53
To avoid this problem and to ensure that it can resolve all cases
properly before it, the Supreme Court, along with virtually all
appellate courts, employs case-by-case decisionmaking, even though
that rule, as in Kassel, sometimes thwarts the preferences of a
majority of the Court's members on an issue-by-issue basis. But,
while case-by-case decisionmaking avoids the problem of cycling in
particular cases, it does not avoid the problem of cycling altogether.
Specifically, case-by-case voting does not solve the problem of
intertemporal cycling, namely cycling that arises over time and
across cases.
C. Cyclical Preferences over Time and
Across Cases: Seattle and Crawford
The relationship between stare decisis and standing is best
illustrated by considering two companion cases issued on the same
day, Crawford v. Board of Education5 4 and Washington v. Seattle School
52 This holds true not only for motion and amendment, but also for any
Condorcet rule. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL

CHOICE 69 (1982).

Condorcet-producing rules all lead to the same place when a
Condorcet winner is available and to cycling when there is no Condorcet winner. See
id. at 67-69. In contrast, different non-Condorcet rules can lead to different
outcomes, whether or not the group has a Condorcet-winning preference. See id.; see
also Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A.
" Some readers might respond that standing itself avoids the Court's collective
obligation to decide cases. As these articles demonstrate, however, the avoidance
explanation of standing is both incomplete, see infra part I.C.1, and less robust than
the social choice explanation of standing.
458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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District No. 1. 55 In Crawford, the Supreme Court upheld against a
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause challenge a
California constitutional amendment preventing state courts from
ordering integrative busing unless the court first determined that a
federal court would have so required based upon the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In Seattle, the
same Court struck down on equal protection grounds a Washington
referendum that prevented local school boards from ordering
integrative busing unless the school board first determined that the
federal or state constitutions would so require. 7 Justice Marshall,
who alone dissented in Crawford, stated that he believed the two
cases were constitutionally indistinguishable. 58
In his Seattle
dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, Justice Powell also demonstrated that he believed that
the two cases could not be distinguished. 9 Setting aside the
substantive question whether the two cases are distinguishablewhich, in fact, does not matter for the analysis to follow-these two
cases reveal precisely the same anomaly that arose in Kassel. The
only difference is that here the anomaly arose across two cases,
while in Kassel it arose within a single case.
As before, there are three irreconcilable majorities: (1) a
majority to uphold the Crawford amendment; (2) a majority to strike
the Seattle initiative; and (3) a majority composed of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, to
decide the cases the same way regardless of whether the state laws
are upheld or struck down. Because these majorities arose across
cases, rather than within a given case, the case-by-case voting rule
did not operate to prevent the Court from revealing that its

5-'458 U.S. 457 (1982).
56 See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 529, 545.
57 See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 462-63, 487.
51See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 547-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I fail to see how a
fundamental redefinition of the governmental decision-makingstructure with respect
to the same racial issue can be unconstitutional when the State seeks to remove the
authority from local school boards, yet constitutional when the State attempts to
achieve the same result by limiting the power of its courts.").
" The only distinction thatJustice Powell cited between the two state laws was that
while the Washington initiative permitted integrative busing based upon either the
state or federal constitutions, the California amendment permitted integrative busing
only to remedy a violation of the federal constitution. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 490 n.3
(Powell, J., dissenting). That distinction, however, would appear to cut in precisely

the opposite direction of the two case results because it affords the Court with a
broader basis with which to uphold the Washington initiative than to uphold the
California amendment.
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preferences cycled. If the Supreme Court revealed that its preferences cycled over time and across cases, the state of the law would
be entirely uncertain. To prevent the doctrinal uncertainty that
would result if the Supreme Court revealed that its preferences
cycled over time and across cases-and, more importantly, to
prevent interest groups from opportunistically benefitting from the
resulting doctrinal uncertainty-the Supreme Court employs stare
decisis.6"
Social choice reveals that one device commonly employed to
prevent intertemporal cycling is a proscription on reconsideration
of rejected motions. To cycle, an institution requires as many votes
as available options.6 In Crawford and Seattle, the Court faced the
equivalent of three motions, each with majority support: (1) uphold
the Crawford amendment; (2) strike the Seattle initiative; and (3)
decide the cases the same way. To demonstrate that the Court's
preferences cycled (and that the three majorities could not be
satisfied simultaneously), the Court would have needed to take the
equivalent of three pairwise votes. With only two votes and three
options, the institution will achieve a stable outcome, although the
outcome will be arbitrary in that the order in which the votes are
taken, or the voting "path," will fully determine the substantive
outcomes. With only two votes and three options, the outcome will
inevitably thwart the will of a present majority of the Court's
62
members.

o Because the Crawford and Seattle cases were decided on the same day, stare
decisis did not operate as a constraint that prevented the Court from revealing that
its preferences cycled. But because of the Court's voting rules, the two cases did not
produce doctrinal uncertainty; instead, they produced a highly attenuated distinction,
one embraced by only a minority of the Court. Under the Crawford and Seattle
rulings, states can retreat from integrative busing when the facts resemble those in
Crawford, but they cannot do so when the facts resemble those in Seattle. If that
seems odd, given that a majority of the Court rejected the significance of any factual
distinction between these two cases, that is the point. Because the Court employs a
non-Condorcet voting rule, its rulings will sometimes thwart the will of a majority of
its members. While the simultaneous rulings in these cases reveal that the Court's
preferences cycled, the cycle has no legal significance. Instead, the distinction drawn
in the two cases, however attenuated and even if embraced by only a minority of the
Court, becomes the law. Worse yet, it becomes constitutional law. While revealed
cycles have no doctrinal significance, as these articles demonstrate, they have
tremendousjurisprudential significance in explaining the Court's use of stare decisis
and standing.
61 See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A.
62 If the. cases are decided the same way, one of the majorities in Crawford or
Seattle will find its will suppressed; if the cases are decided differently, the majority
favoring sameness will find its will suppressed.
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In the Supreme Court, intertemporal stare decisis, meaning the
presumptive obligation of the justices to adhere to precedents of the
Court, operates as a proscription on reconsideration of rejected
motions. 61 In turn, stare decisis provides substantial power to
whoever is authorized to determine the path in which cases are
presented to the Supreme Court. Consider, for example, what
would have happened, with a stare decisis rule in place, if Crawford
and Seattle were decided a year apart instead of on the same day.
If Crawford had arisen first, the majority who thought the two cases
indistinguishable would have upheld the Seattle initiative, with the
result that both state laws would have survived the equal protection
challenges. If, instead, Seattle arose first, the majority who thought
the two cases indistinguishable would have struck the Crawford
amendment, with the result that both state laws would have been
struck down. In short, the person or group who controls the order
in which these two cases are decided would fully control the
64
outcomes in both cases.
This analysis reveals that stare decisis, a doctrine that ameliorates the doctrinal uncertainty that arises in the absence of
Condorcet-winning options over time and across cases, creates a
problem of its own, namely the power of interest groups to control
the substantive outcomes of cases by manipulating the order of case
presentations. Stated differently, while stare decisis inevitably
renders Supreme Court doctrine path dependent, the question
remains whether it inevitably renders Supreme Court doctrine
subject to path manipulation.
With stare decisis in place, the second case will present the
question whether the first case governs. Assuming that they adhere
to stare decisis, those justices who think that the two cases are
constitutionally indistinguishable will not consider the question of
63 See Stearns, supra note 2, part L.A (explaining stare decisis in social choice
terms); see also id. (distinguishing intertemporal stare decisis (the presumptive
obligation of members of the same court to adhere to precedents issued by that court
as a whole) from hierarchical stare decisis (the obligation of lower courts to adhere
to precedents issued by higher courts) and horizontal stare decisis (the obligation of
panels or judges within a given court to adhere to precedents issued by prior panels
orjudges on the same court)); id. part 11.B (explaining that intertemporal stare decisis
is a presumptive, rather than absolute, obligation).
"To anticipate an early objection, one could argue that in the Supreme Court,
the Rule of Four governing petitions for writ of certiorari affords the Court control
of its voting path. As demonstrated below, see infra part I.C.1, however, absent a
barrier to justiciability in the form of standing, the Rule of Four would be of only
limited value in preventing path manipulation in the Supreme Court.
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how the second case, had it come to the Court first, should be
resolved.6 5 That inquiry will be suppressed in precisely the same
manner that a proscription on reconsideration of rejected motions
suppresses a final pairwise contest between a defeated option and
the ultimate winner. Had Crawford and Seattle been decided a year
apart rather than on the same day, stare decisis would have
prevented those justices who viewed the cases as constitutionally
indistinguishable from considering in the second case those
arguments that would have led them to rule differently had the
second case arisen first. In preventing reconsideration of those
arguments that, but for the order of cases, might have led to a
contrary result in the second case, stare decisis renders the order in
which cases are presented critical to the substantive outcomes of
both cases. At the same time, the rule requires that someone be
afforded the authority to consider which two votes for the three
options-uphold or strike the Crawford amendment; uphold or strike
the Seattle initiative; decide the cases in the same manner or
differently-will actually be taken. Regardless of the order of case
presentations, however, one of the three majorities will find its will
ultimately suppressed.
1. Agenda Control: The Power of Certiorari and
Intra- Versus Inter-Circuit Stare Decisis
If presumptive adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis renders
the evolution of legal doctrine path dependent, the question then
arises who, ultimately, has the authority to set the Supreme Court's
agenda. The Rule of Four governing decisions to grant petitions for
writ of certiorari6 6 affords a minority of the Court substantial
agenda-setting authority. The social choice analysis set out in these
articles, however, demonstrates that the Court's own power of
docket control may be less significant in preventing litigant path
manipulation than it first appears. In fact, without the standing
65 In Arrovian

terms, stare decisis operates as a restriction on the range of those
justices who believe that the two cases are constitutionally indistinguishable.
For an analysis of the Rule of Four, see Richard L. Revesz &Pamela S. Karlan,
Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068-1109 (1988)
(explaining the genesis and operation of the rule, including its potential for conflict
with "majority rules governing other aspects of the Court's business"); see also ROBERT
L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 162-222 (7th ed. 1993) (providing a

detailed explanation of how and when the Supreme Court grants certiorari); Stearns,
supra note 12, at 1281 (discussing the Rule of Four in relation to the "nondictatorship" criterion of Arrow's theorem).
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doctrine in place, interest groups would retain substantial effective
control over the critical path of cases in the Supreme Court even
with the Supreme Court's nominal power of docket control. To see
why, we will first need to imagine a regime in which the Court has
no discretion over its docket and in which it imposes no barriers to
justiciability. We will then introduce the power of certiorari and
demonstrate that it alone is insufficient to prevent litigant path
manipulation. I will again use Seattle and Crawford as illustrations.
In a regime with neither Supreme Court docket control nor
barriers to justiciability, an interest group dedicated to furthering
the authority of the states to use busing for integrative purposes
would first present the Crawford case and obtain a favorable
decision, and then present the Seattle case and also obtain a
favorable decision. Alternatively, an interest group dedicated to
neighborhood education would employ the opposite strategy, with
the opposite results." Absent any barrier to justiciability and with
a nondiscretionary Supreme Court docket, we would experience a
race to the bottom in which interest groups would try to force cases
onto the Supreme Court's docket in the most favorable order to
affect the substantive evolution of legal doctrine.
Assume now that the Supreme Court has the power to control
its own docket, but has no doctrinal barrier to justiciability in the
form of standing.
In this regime, the same interest groups
identified above could effectively force a circuit split, or a split
among the states' highest courts on whether a state, having initiated
integrative busing, has the power to cut back on it. The resulting
67One might object that litigants do not know thejustices' positions on the issues
that they are litigating until the justices issue their actual opinions. Again, it is
important to bear the nirvana fallacy in mind. While interest groups certainly lack
complete or perfect information concerning the preferences of the various justices,
published opinions provide such groups with a substantial amount of information
with which to make educated guesses in developing arguments and in developing
case-presentation strategies. We would expect well-informed interest groups to
identify those justices who are least likely to be sympathetic to their position, those
justices who are most likely to be sympathetic to their position, and thosejustices who
are most likely to be subject to persuasion. Informed lawyers will try to direct their
briefs and arguments to the last group of justices after closely analyzing whatever
information, based primarily on written opinions, is available about that group's
members. Thus, across a range of cases in a given area of law, written opinions
provide a stylized and piecemeal form of ordinal rankings. See infra part I.D; see also
Stearns, supra note 2, part II.A ("The publication of written opinions providesjudges
with an opportunity to criticize colleagues and allows members of the bar and
academics to criticize sitting judges who fail to abide by their own stated principles
in future cases."). Written opinions thus provide interest groups with substantially
greater information than they would otherwise have.
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split on this important question of federal law would substantially
68
raise the cost of denying certiorari in the Supreme Court.
Without standing, therefore, the Court's nominal power of docket
control would be largely illusory.
In addition, stare decisis renders the evolution of legal doctrine
on a multimember appellate court path dependent. 9 The same
phenomenon not only applies at the circuit court level, but is likely
to be even more pronounced there than in the Supreme Court. In
contrast with the Supreme Court, which decides cases as a court of
the whole, circuit courts decide cases in panels of three, which bind
the entire circuit absent overruling by the court en banc or by the
Supreme Court. Within a given circuit, the possibility of path
dependent iterations created by panels that do not reflect the
composition of the court as a whole is therefore substantially
greater than it is on the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court
recognizes that the evolution of legal doctrine within the circuits is
sometimes the arbitrary product of path dependent iterations, it has
a twofold incentive.7" First, it will seek to ensure that the doctrine
of stare decisis is adhered to within but not among the circuits.
Intra-but not inter-circuit stare decisis avoids the indeterminacy that
would result from cyclical preferences within each circuit. At the
same time, the regime ensures that path dependent iterations, which
produce arbitrary bodies of law within a given circuit, are not
replicated among the circuits. Second, to ensure multiple path
dependent iterations from which to choose-which provides an apt
economic definition of issue percolation 7 -the Court would want

' Similarly, if litigants could present the claims of third parties, an organization
dedicated to expanding the reach of the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights,
by locating convicted criminals who have failed to raise their potential claims in
collateral attacks, could present cases that would create the necessary circuit splits to
effectively force ultimate Supreme Court resolution of the underlying substantive
legal issues. For a discussion of this standing case category, labeled "no right to
enforce the rights of others," see infra part III.A.

69 See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.A; see also Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 820
(suggesting abandonment of stare decisis in certain situations as "[t]he best way out
of the trap of path dependence"). For a discussion distinguishing my position on the

significance of social choice for the evolution of stare decisis from that of Judge
Easterbrook, see Stearns, supra note 2, part II.B (explaining that, by failing to
recognize how stare decisis and standing, operating together, improve the overall
rationality and fairness of Supreme Court decisionmaking, and thus arguing for
relaxed stare decisis in constitutional cases, Judge Easterbrook has committed the
isolation fallacy).
70 See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.B.
71 See id.
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the power to decide when to resolve particular issues, rather than
to be forced to decide issues based upon a fixed rule. If, for
example, the Supreme Court were obligated to resolve cases
whenever a circuit split on a question of federal law arises, then
interest groups could readily create circuit splits to force Supreme
Court decisionmaking. In fact, all three of these features, each
explained by the social choice framework set out in these articlesintra-but not inter-circuit stare decisis, the Supreme Court's power
of docket control, and standing-are reflected in actual practice. 2
2. Arrow's Theorem Revisited: The Axiom, the Corollary,
and Standing's Fairness Foundation
As set out above, stare decisis creates opportunities for litigant
path manipulation within circuit courts, which lack the power of
docket control. In turn, intra-circuit stare decisis raises the cost to
the Supreme Court of denying certiorari when circuits split on
important questions of federal law. While standing does not cure
the path dependency that results from presumptive adherence to
stare decisis on the Supreme Court and within the circuits, standing
ameliorates path dependency's most damaging effects by rendering
path manipulation substantially more difficult. To fully understand
the relationship between stare decisis and standing, we need to
recast these doctrines in social choice terms.
While stare decisis ameliorates the doctrinal uncertainty that
would arise in a court with cyclical preferences, either at the
Supreme Court or appellate court level, it also renders the evolution
of legal doctrine path dependent. In the language of social choice,
path dependency and its byproduct, path manipulation, create a
fundamental problem associated with fair collective decisionmaking.
In social choice, "fairness" is a complex term of art, ultimately
grounded in the majoritarian norm. Kenneth Arrow, in his famous
impossibility theorem for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Economics, 7 3 proved that no method of aggregating collective
72 While the empirical support for the main thesis presented in these articles is by
no means complete, the breadth of phenomena that the analysis thus far explains is
informative. As Mancur Olson has explained: "The persuasiveness of a theory
depends not only on how many facts are explained, but also on how diverse are the
kinds of facts explained."

MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 13 (1982); see also POPPER,

supra note 1, at 36-37 (outlining the elements which determine the "scientific status"
of a theory).
" See Norman Macrae, The Brusque Recessional, ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1978, at 45,
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preferences can simultaneously satisfy five conditions commonly
associated with fair collective decisionmaking and ensure collective
rationality. As stated above, 74 rationality in social choice means
the ability to aggregate individually transitive orderings into a
transitive collective ordering. The Arrovian fairness conditions 5
are:
(1) Range: All decisionmakers must be able to rank all
available options in any order.
(2) UniversalDomain: No aggregate outcome can be held
off-limits for the group as a whole.
(3) Unanimity: The group must move from the status
quo to any position that improves the lot of at least one
member without harming another member (the Pareto
criterion).7 6
(4) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives:

In

given

pairwise contests, the group's members must choose based
solely on the merits of presented alternatives, without
considering the future agenda.
(5) Nondictatorship: No member of the group can select
outcomes for the group as a whole.
51 ("Professor Kenneth Arrow won a Nobel Prize in economics by trying to discover
a'social welfare function,' designed to be useful in guiding the planning authority for
a society-and then discovering to his surprise and chagrin that it is logically
impossible for any such function to exist.").
7 See supra text accompanying notes 21-32; see also Stearns, supra note 12, at 125052 (discussing rationality as stated in Arrow's theorem).
7' The following terms, which are widely used in the social choice literature, vary
somewhat from the original formulation in KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22-33 (1951). Arrow subsequently endorsed them in the revised
edition of his book. See KENNETH ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
105 (2d ed. 1963). The formulation has been attributed to the authors of Murray
Kemp & A. Asimakopulos, A Note on "Social Welfare Functions"and CardinalUtility,
18 CANADIAN J. EcON. & POL. SCI. 195-200 (1952), and William Vickrey, Utility,
Strategy, and Social DecisionalRules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507, 507-09 (1960). See DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 386 (1989).
I have provided detailed definitions of each of these criteria previously and
explored the implications of each for the thesis to follow. See Stearns, supra note 2,
part I.C; Stearns, supra note 12, at 1247-50. Without repeating that analysis, I will
provide the essential argument and refer interested readers, where appropriate, to the
prior-more detailed-works.
" As set forth below, the Arrovian unanimity condition is perhaps best thought
of as the "Pareto criterion, with a twist." See infra note 118 (explaining that satisfying
Arrovian unanimity can inhibit rather than maximize economic growth, thereby
resulting in a Pareto inferior aggregate result, if the relevant universe of participants
is defined as the legislators).
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Many, if not most, legal academics assessing the significance of
Arrow's Theorem forjudicial decisionmaking have concluded either
that because the Supreme Court does not employ unlimited pairwise
voting 7 or because the prospect of collective irrationality in the
Supreme Court is too bleak,7 8 the theorem offers little or no
guidance for assessing the decisionmaking of the Supreme Court (or
other appellate courts). Others have largely ignored the collective
features of decisionmaking by appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, and concluded that Arrow's Theorem, because it is
damning for legislatures, including Congress, justifies a significant
v9
expansion of constitutional judicial review.
In The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, I addressed these
and other claims, first, to demonstrate that Arrow's Theorem
provides a critical framework for assessing Supreme Court voting
rules and, second, to demonstrate that the results of a thorough

7

See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modelling Collegial Courts. I. Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L.

ECON. & ORGANIZATION 441,455-57 (1992);see also Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence

G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE LJ. 82, 109 n.37 (1986) (discussing
Easterbrook's application of Arrow's Theorem and the authors' disagreement with
Easterbrook over the usefulness of the theorem for analyzing judicial decisionmaking); Revesz & Karlan, supra note 66, at 1094 n.120 (criticizing Easterbrook's
decisional model as inaccurately portraying the mechanism by which justices decide
on legal rules because "U]ustices are not asked to consider competing rules
pairwise ... [but rather are] simply asked to select.., the single rule that they deem
most desirable").
' Consider, for example, the following comments by Daniel Farber and Philip
Frickey:
In a sense, the Riker/Easterbrook thesis [demonstrating the possibility of
legislative cycling] proves too much. If chaos and incoherence are the
inevitable outcomes of majority voting, then appellate courts (which invariably have multiple members and majority voting rules) and even the 1787
Constitutional Convention are equally bankrupt. As a result, the Riker/
Easterbrook thesis is bereft of any implications for public law, since it tells
us to be equally suspicious of all sources of law. If we accept the thesis as
to legislatures, we are left with nowhere to turn.
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP B. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 55 (1991).
79
See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-7, at 12
n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (positing that Arrow's Theorem "[a]t the very least... puts the

burden of persuasion on those who assert that legislatures (or executives) deserve
judicial deference as good aggregators of individual preference"); Lynn A. Stout, Strict
Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquity into Fundamental Rights and Suspect
Classifications, 80 GEO. LJ. 1787 (1992) (advocating a broad expansion of judicial
review based upon insights drawn from social choice for statutes that burden
fundamental rights or invoke suspect classifications by arguing that, under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, an independentjudiciary could protect society
from the welfare losses that result from legislative failure). For a detailed critique of
the Stout thesis, see Stearns, supra note 12, at 1225 n.18.
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Arrovian analysis of Supreme Court and congressional decisionmaking is substantially less bleak than most scholars realize. 0 For
present purposes, the critical insight is that Arrow's Theorem
demonstrates that in evaluating the competence of any collective
decisionmaking body, it is critical to avoid the nirvana fallacy,
through which scholars erroneously compare a real world institution
against an ideal institution that never has existed and that may be
impossible to create." Arrow's Theorem, which is an axiomatic
proof, demonstrates what the ideal institution is. Because no
institution can satisfy the five Arrovian fairness conditions and
simultaneously ensure collective rationality, the ideal institution,
which is both nonexistent and impossible to create,8 2 would satisfy
all six of these criteria. But the insight that no institution can
satisfy all six criteria does not prove that real world collective
decisionmaking institutions cannot and do not function. To assess
the significance of Arrow's Theorem for the evaluation of institutions and rules, however, we must focus not on the axiom itself, but
rather, upon a corollary to be derived from the axiom: For any
given institution that does function, at least one fairness condition,
or rationality, must be compromised. 3 Avoiding the nirvana
's In that article, I demonstrated that most authors considering the implications
of Arrow's Theorem for the Supreme Court and Congress have committed at least
one of three conceptual errors: the nirvana fallacy, the isolation fallacy, and the
composition fallacy. See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1229-33. When each of these
fallacies is properly exposed, the constitutional division of powers between the federal
judiciary and Congress is both more rational and more fair, as those terms are
understood in social choice, than it first appears. Scholars commit the nirvana fallacy
when they hold real world institutions against the standard ofan ideal institution that
has never existed and may never exist and then, based upon identified deficiencies,
conclude that the real world institutions are either inefficient or otherwise illequipped to handle their assigned tasks. See id. at 1231-32; see also Ronald Coase, The
Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON. 183, 187 (1981)
(discussing the nirvana fallacy); Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (same); Stearns, supra note 12, at 1230 n.33
(excerpting referenced works); infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (explaining
the isolation and composition fallacies).
81See supra note 80.
s Arrow's Theorem proves axiomatically the inability to create such an institution.
s In The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, I employed the six criteria set out
in Arrow's Theorem as benchmarks with which to compare real world institutions,
namely the Supreme Court and Congress. See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1257-86. By
evaluating which Arrovian criteria are relaxed (and adhered to) within each institution
in light of that institution's assigned tasks, I was able to evaluate proposals to shift
power from one institution to the other, for example, to shift what has traditionally
been viewed as legislative authority to the federal judiciary through expandedjudicial
review, without committing the nirvana fallacy. The analysis demonstrated that most
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fallacy, then, requires a full analysis, based upon this corollary, of
which of the six conditions are adhered to-or relaxed-in each
institution, or for each rule, under review.
In addition, many legal scholars relying upon Arrow's Theorem
have committed the isolation fallacy.14 Specifically, they have
failed to recognize that the (inevitably imperfect) institutions that
they are evaluating were not intended to operate, and have not
operated, in isolation. s5 Instead, the institutions under review-the
Supreme Court and Congress8 6--have always operated in an
inherently complementary fashion. 7 When viewed as operating in
conjunction, these institutions appear both more rational and more
fair than when viewed in isolation. In Standing Back from the Forest,
I extended this analysis to demonstrate that institutions not only
improve their collective fairness and rationality by operating in
conjunction, but also that the combination of more than one
decisional rule may improve the fairness and rationality within any
given institution.88 Specifically, while stare decisis improves the
Supreme Court's rationality, standing improves the Supreme Court's
fairness. Just as the Supreme Court and Congress cannot be
meaningfully evaluated in isolation, neither can either of these

proposals to rework the constitutional balance of powers based upon social choice
would undermine the rationality and fairness of the affected institutions. See id.
' See id. at 1242-44 nn.85-88.
s See id. at 1230.
Previously, I demonstrated that markets operating in conjunction with lawmaking institutions, courts and legislatures, produce results that are more rational and
more fair than if either markets or those institutions operated in isolation. See id. at
1233-47.
"' The composition fallacy, while closely related to the isolation fallacy, is
nonetheless distinct:
The isolation fallacy is the failure to recognize that a particular institution
that cycles might not cycle if it works in conjunction with another institution. The fallacy of composition is the failure to recognize that, even if two
separate institutions cycle, collectively they may reduce cycling. The two
remain distinct because (1) the decisionmaker that prevents a given institution from cycling may be a single person, thus implicating the isolation
fallacy, but not the composition fallacy; and (2) there may be circumstances
in which two institutions cycle in the same manner and in response to the
same factual phenomena, thus preventing the institutions from having a
positive synergistic effect in reducing cycling when operating together. Both
fallacies come into play when the two decisional bodies each have multiple
members, such that [they] are capable of cycling, and when the factual
phenomena that cause one to cycle do not cause the other to cycle.
Id. at 1230-31 n.35.
' See generally Stearns, supra note 2.
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doctrines when evaluating the federal judiciary's fairness and
rationality.
In a provocative article that first explored the implications of
social choice for Supreme Court decisionmaking, Judge Frank
Easterbrook committed the latter form of isolation fallacy in
evaluating constitutional stare decisis.8 9 Recognizing that stare
decisis renders the evolution of legal doctrine, and specifically
constitutional doctrine, path dependent, andfurther recognizing the
high barriers to overruling, Judge Easterbrook argued that stare
decisis should be relaxed in constitutional cases. He stated that:
"[t]he order of [case] decisions has nothing to do with the intent of
the framers or any of the other things that might inform constitutional interpretation. " " As these articles demonstrate, however,
while it is undoubtedly true that nothing in the substantive corpus
of constitutional law grounds the substance of case decisions in the
order of case presentations, the linkage of outcomes to order may
well be grounded in constitutional process-based norms. Stated
differently, the linkage of outcomes to the order-or path-of case
decisions is an inevitable byproduct in a legal regime that seeks to
prevent the doctrinal indeterminacy that would otherwise result
from intertemporal cycling. While stare decisis promotes doctrinal
stability and judicial rationality, it also creates a problem of its own.
Specifically, stare decisis compromises Arrovian fairness by
preventing the requisite number of pairwise contests to reveal
cycles, thereby rendering the evolution of legal doctrine path
dependent. In turn, stare decisis creates opportunities for nonCondorcet minority interests to control the substantive evolution of
legal doctrine. Such interest groups can exert disproportionate
influence on the creation of constitutional doctrine by manipulating
the path of case decisions. But, again, a proper analysis of stare
decisis requires that the doctrine not be viewed in isolation. As
these articles demonstrate, stare decisis operates in conjunction with
barriers to justiciability, including, most notably, standing.
While stare decisis ameliorates the problem of cyclical indeterminacy by preventing, at least presumptively, the requisite number
of votes relative to the number of options to reveal cyclical
preferences, it does so at a cost readily identified in Arrovian
terms. If interest groups were given unfettered power to control
the order of case presentations, non-Condorcet interest groups, who

See Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 814-21.
9Id. at 820.
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could not succeed in securing their legislative agenda in Congress,91 would have a strong incentive to try to achieve their
agenda in the courts through path manipulation. Because judicial
decisionmaking rules, in contrast with legislative decisionmaking
rules, are non-Condorcet-producing, 92 such groups have a substantially greater chance in the courts of having their agenda reflected
in doctrine. The incentive to manipulate the path of case decisions
is especially strong in a Court with preferences that are multipeaked, meaning that the Court typically lacks Condorcet-winning
preferences over the most controversial issues. While a multipeaked
Court invites interest group path manipulation, it does so at the
cost of suppressing the will of a present majority in Congress or on
the Court.
As stated above, the Arrovian fairness criteria are each ultimately grounded in the majoritarian norm.93 Restrictions on
range, universal domain, or nondictatorship,9 4 for example, each
have the effect of preventing the institution from taking the
95
requisite number of pairwise votes to reveal cyclical preferences.
In turn, such restrictions enable the institution to achieve transitive
collective orderings but at the cost of suppressing majority rule. By
proscribing reconsideration of rejected motions, stare decisis
operates as a range restriction. Judges (including Supreme Court
justices) who adhere to stare decisis are no longer free to rank all
available options in any order they choose. After an option is
defeated in an earlier round, for example, after the Court determines that the Crawford amendment should be upheld or that the
Seattle initiative should be struck down, justices who adhere to stare
decisis will then determine whether the second case is governed by
the first, rather than how they would have ruled in the second case
had the order of cases been reversed. Thus, if Crawford and Seattle
had been decided a year apart, stare decisis would have rendered
the outcomes rational-or internally consistent-but, at the same
time, it would have denied those justices who thought the cases
9 For an analysis demonstrating Congress's relative superiority of acting upon
Condorcet winners, see Stearns, supra note 2, part I.C; Stearns, supra note 12, at
1256, 1271-81.
' See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A.
93 See supra text accompanying note 27.
' See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1247-49 (defining these terms); Stearns, supra note
2, part .C (same).
' For a more detailed discussion, see Stearns, supra note 12, at 1258-76, 1281-83;
Stearns, supra note 2, part I.C.
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indistinguishable from considering whether they would have
achieved a contrary result absent an indistinguishable precedent.
As with all range restrictions, stare decisis promotes rationality at
the cost of path dependency. As stated above, however, not all rules
that create path dependency invite path manipulation. 6 Provided
that the critical path of case decisions is not governed by any
particular group or groups, but is instead a random byproduct of
events beyond our control, we may well decide that path dependency is an acceptable price to pay for stable legal doctrine. Stated
differently, we might accept a certain degree of arbitrariness in the
evolution of legal doctrine if the path is determined by fair process.
In short, it is my thesis that, operating in conjunction, stare decisis
and standing improve the overall rationality and fairness of
lawmaking.
In these articles, I have argued that the standing doctrine, as
formulated in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, while it does not
prevent path dependency, reduces path dependency's most
damaging effects. Standing, as presently formulated, presumptively
grounds the critically important path of case presentations in
fortuitous historic events beyond the control of the litigants
themselves.97 In turn, standing substantially reduces opportunities
for advertent path manipulation by non-Condorcet minorities. Thus
viewed, because standing furthers an important majoritarian norm
on which our system of government is based, standing is wellgrounded in fair constitutional process. That is not to suggest that
with standing, no path manipulation takes place.98 It is instead to

' See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Additionally, not all rules that lead
to path manipulation do so to the same degree.
"' Criminals certainly control the facts that give rise to their convictions and
sentences: They commit the underlying crimes. But they do not, at least in the
overwhelming majority of cases, do so with an eye toward eventually creating a novel
precedent on a cutting-edge issue of criminal law or procedure. Instead, when a
convicted criminal raises a challenge that requires a court to make law either in a
direct appeal or a collateral attack, she does so for one reason only-to obtain relief
from her conviction or sentence. See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.A.
" For a discussion of advertent path manipulation by Thurgood Marshall, for the
NAACP, on behalf of African-Americans, and by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, on behalf of
women, both of whom sought, with considerable success, to expand the range of protections under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, see Stearns,
supra note 2, part II.B. Again, it is important to remember that the critical inquiry
is not whether any path manipulation takes place with the standing doctrine in place.
Instead, as with any legal doctrine, we must focus on the effect of standing on the
margin: Is there less path manipulation with standing than there would be without
standing? These articles demonstrate that the answer to that question is almost surely

yes.
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suggest that with standing in place in its present form, there is
substantially less path manipulation than there would be if the
Supreme Court abandoned standing.
As this Article will demonstrate, standing is a set of substantive
legal rules governing the circumstances in which a case may be
presented in federal court. The standing ground rules ensure that
the critically important path of case decisions is primarily determined by fortuitous events beyond the control of the litigants
themselves, rather than by the litigants' desire to make law.
Although they have not been so presented by the Supreme Court,
each standing case category will be described below in the form of
a substantive ruling: (1) no right to enforce the rights of others; (2)
no right to prevent diffuse harms; and (3) no right to an undistorted
market. These substantive categories, especially the first two,
prevent interest groups from avoiding the presumptive requirement
that a set of fortuitous historic events affecting litigants in a fairly
direct manner, rather than the mere desire to control the substantive evolution of legal doctrine by manipulating the path of case
decisions, governs the order of case presentations within the federal
judiciary. If, instead, interest groups could identify persons (other
than themselves) or harms that, although pervasive and imperceptible to most individuals, can be said to affect the group's members,
then those groups could readily manipulate the path-and thus the
substance-of case decisions. The third category, which is analytically the richest, is something of a hybrid. It involves cases that
have features resembling both interest group litigation and
traditional bipolar litigation, and the Court's effort-often employing ill-fitting metaphors drawn from other legal contexts and
superimposed on its standing analysis-to categorize those cases in
one direction or the other.
3. Standing Between Litigation and Legislation
These articles further demonstrate that standing advances a
critical distinction that is often overlooked between adjudicatory
and legislative lawmaking. While both the federal courts and
Congress create positive law, often in code-like fashion and affecting
large numbers of people, and sometimes exclusively with prospective effect, social choice reveals a critical difference in the respective
lawmaking powers of these two institutions.99 Congress is empow-

9 This discussion is based upon Stearns, supra note 2, part

I.C.
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ered to make law with respect to any issue that it sees fit as a matter
of policy and is the master of its own timing. It can resolve issues
narrowly, and then expand the reach of its statutes, or it can initially
resolve issues broadly, with an eye toward refining its statutory
scheme in the future. 00 Congress faces only two constraints on
its lawmaking powers: (1) Congress requires an express or implied
constitutional delegation of authority; and (2) Congress cannot
violate any independent constitutional provisions. Otherwise, the
scope and timing of congressional lawmaking is for Congress alone
to decide.
In contrast, while the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
positive lawmaking powers, often affects as many people or institutions as does Congress-and often does so with prospective
effect-the two institutions do not thereby have lawmaking powers
that are equal in kind, although they may at times possess powers
that are equal in degree.0' Instead, the Court, because of two
" The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress and state legislatures control their own timing. Thus, the Court has refused, for example, to invalidate economic regulation on equal protection grounds where the legislature has
chosen to deal with a broad issue in incremental fashion. See, e.g., Bowen v. Owens,
476 U.S. 340, 348 (1986) ("Congress' adjustments of this complex system of [Social
Security] entitlements necessarily create distinctions among categories of beneficiaries, a result that could be avoided only by making sweeping changes in the Act
instead of incremental ones. A constitutional rule that would invalidate Congress'
attempts to proceed cautiously in awarding increased benefits might deter Congress
from making any increases at all."); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,489
(1955) ("The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,

neglecting the others.").
In nearly opposite fashion, the Supreme Court has rejected an equal protection
challenge to the public accommodations provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, based upon an argument that the statute failed to provide for case-by-case
determinations on whether the business subject to the statute affected interstate
commerce, instead creating a broad legislative classification. See, e.g., Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1964).
"' In contrast with the analysis offered in the text, Steven Winter has argued that
"[o]nce we recognize that legislation and adjudication are not dichotomous, but are
merely different points on a single normative spectrum, then we are free to assume
responsibility." Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1512 (1988). It is my position that standing
furthers a difference in kind (meaning thatjudicial and legislative powers are dichotomous), but not necessarily in degree, between judicial and legislative lawmaking
powers. Thus, I have explained:
[T]o determine the legitimacy of any area of constitutional case-law, one
cannot look at the aggregate level of detail. Instead, one must look, at the
level of each individual case, to determine whether judicial creation of
positive law was required to resolve the rights and obligations of the parties
before the Court. If, in deciding several-or several dozen-cases for which
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very different limitations on its lawmaking powers, has a much more
restricted lawmaking role. Unlike Congress, the Supreme Court
controls neither the scope nor the timing of its lawmaking powers.
Instead, at least in theory-and I hope to show in these articles that,
in large part due to standing, also in practice-the scope and timing
of the Court's lawmaking powers are presumptively determined by
historical fortuity, rather than by judicial preferences or litigant
path manipulation.
D. Informal Accommodations and FormalRules
The foregoing analysis suggests that the formal rulemaking
structures in Congress and in the Supreme Court afford each a form
of comparative advantage over the other with respect to particular
kinds of lawmaking. The relative competence of each institution is
enhanced by stare decisis operating in conjunction with standing.
With respect to the rational resolution of issues over which its
members' preferences cycle, Congress has the comparative advantage because, unlike the Supreme Court, Congress can remain inert,
thus defaulting to the status quo.10 2 Specifically, Congress is not
required to provide a collective outcome, which, absent a Condorcet
winner, would inevitably thwart the will of a majority."3
In

the answer to that question is yes, the Court creates a code-like body of case
law, one can only conclude that creating that body of detailed positive law
is a necessary part of the Court's job.

Stearns, supra note 2, part III.A.
102 See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1258-71;see also supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
...The analysis in the text is nearly the opposite of that offered in Professor
William Eskridge's recent book, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION (1995). Eskridge, relying upon the obligation of courts, including
the Supreme Court, to resolve cases, and the ability of Congress to remain inert,
states:
[T]he Court ought to consider voices suppressed in the political process,
and this suggests a meta-canon: decide close cases against the politically
salient interests and in favor of interests that have been subordinated in the
political process. Congress can, of course, override the Court's decision,
and indeed is more likely to do so if the loser is politically powerful.
Id. at 294. In contrast with Professor Eskridge's normative use of public and social
choice, in these articles and in The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, Stearns,
supra note 12, I have used social choice to provide a positive explanation of why the
Supreme Court employs non-Condorcet-producing rules and why Congress employs
Condorcet-producing rules, based upon the former's obligation to decide cases and
the latter's power of inertia. I have also argued that the Court's standing doctrine
substantially furthers the objectives that underlie that essential division of constitutional responsibility. Professor Eskridge would encourage the federal courts,
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contrast, with respect to issues over which a collective outcome is
required, for example, claims that underlie legal challenges
presented by convicted criminals or criminal defendants, the courts,
including the Supreme Court, have a comparative advantage. The
courts have a comparative advantage in the latter context because
they employ non-Condorcet decisional rules that ensure collective
outcomes, even if they have preferences that cycle.
The argument, as developed thus far, however, is incomplete.
The difficulty is that members of the Supreme Court could, if they
adopted certain informal practices, identify cyclical preferences.
Similarly, formal legislative rules in Congress appear to create
substantial agenda-setting power, and formal limits on reconsideration appear to promote path dependency." 4 The essential distinction between Condorcet-producing and non-Condorcet-producing
rules, therefore, must be further explained. In fact, important,
albeit informal, practices that have evolved in both institutions
further the essential distinction between the Supreme Court, as an
institution relatively ill-equipped to act upon Condorcet-winning
preferences, and Congress, as an institution relatively well-equipped
to act upon such preferences. I do not intend to suggest that no
exceptions to this general dichotomy can be identified. In law, as
in life, divisions are relative, which is why I have suggested that the
relevant standard for analysis is one of comparative-not absoluteadvantage. In the Supreme Court, I have assumed that the justices
are aware of, and vote in accordance with, their ordinally ranked
preferences. These assumptions (which I have labeled ordinal
ranking and principled voting),"0 5 even if they are only adhered to
in imperfect form, are essential to my thesis that, in contrast with

including the Supreme Court, to deliberately render congressional inertia sufficiently
costly such that, by remaining inert, which is often the most rational legislative
response when faced with non-Condorcet preferences, Congress would effectively
thwart the will of a present majority of its members. In Professor Eskridge's
suggested regime, Congress could not help but defy Arrovian rationality precisely
because it would lose its option to remain inert in those instances in which it lacks a
Condorcet winner. For my more thorough critique of Professor Eskridge's book, see
Maxwell L. Stearns, Review of William N. Eskridge,Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
(1995), 86 PUB. CHOICE (forthcoming Mar. 1996).
'o See William H. Riker, The Paradoxof Votingand CongressionalRulesfor Voting on
Amendments, 52 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 349, 363 (1958) (positing that the limit on the
number of permissible amendments to proposed congressional bills creates
opportunities for path manipulation). For my critique of Riker's thesis, see Stearns,
supra note 2, part I.C (illustrating that strategic voting, if permitted, creates a quasimarket solution to the amendment-limiting rule); see also id. part L.A (same).
I'- See Stearns, supra note 2, part L.A (describing these two assumptions).
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Congress, the Supreme Court is relatively ill-equipped to ensure
that available Condorcet-winning preferences prevail. It is therefore
important to determine whether these assumptions hold in the
Supreme Court.
The best way to test the validity of each assumption is to
consider the consequences of relaxing them.1"' Assume, first, that
we relax the ordinal ranking assumption, but still require a
collective outcome in the absence of a Condorcet-winning preference. Whoever is afforded the authority to set the agenda can
control the outcome of the case. But, because the Court's members
have not considered their relative ranking of relevant options, such
a regime would undermine the justices' ability to avoid arbitrary
outcomes. Relaxing the ordinal ranking assumption, therefore,
increases, rather than decreases, the irrationality associated with
employing a non-Condorcet decisional rule to resolve cases in which
the Court's members lack a Condorcet winner.'0 7
One might object that appellate courtjudges, including Supreme
Court justices, simply do not ordinally rank their preferences.
While that is true, opinion writing serves as an apt proxy, which
provides justices with a stylized and piecemeal form of ordinal
rankings.'
From a social choice perspective, opinion writing can
be viewed as a practice that evolved to ensure substantial or relative
compliance among justices with the ordinal ranking assumption.
Opinion writing serves this function by providing participating
justices-and members of the bar-with valuable information about
their colleagues' ordinally ranked preferences with respect to those
options presented for resolution in the cases before them.
Even if we assume that opinion writing ensures limited compliance with the ordinal ranking assumption, however, that does not
ensure that justices will necessarily abide by their ordinal rankings
in a given case. Regardless of formal voting rules, such practices as
logrolling or vote trading, if permitted in the Supreme Court, might
undermine principled voting. In effect, logrolling would create a
quasi-market solution to the formal stare decisis rule by allowing the
requisite number of iterations outside the formal voting process to
06 After demonstrating the irrationality that would result if each assumption were
relaxed, I will discuss the practices that promote substantial, albeit imperfect,
adherence to them.
107 See Stearns, supra note 2, part L.A (illustrating the effect of relaxing the ordinal
ranking assumption).
108
See id.
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reveal a cycle." °9 While the formal rule allows only n minus 1
pairwise contests for n options, one short of the requisite number
to reveal a cycle," 0 with logrolling there is no effective limit on the
number of informal iterations that can take place.
Publication of written opinions thus serves a dual function. Not
only does it provide a form of ordinal rankings, albeit in a stylized
and piecemeal form, but also it raises the cost to the justices of
employing such informal strategies as logrolling and vote trading to
depart from ordinal rankings."' Written opinions provide substantial fodder forjustices on the Court, academics, members of the
press, and practitioners, to criticize justices who fail to abide by the
content of their own ordinal rankings. I do not intend to suggest
that justices never render inconsistent votes. I am instead suggesting that the cost of inconsistency is relatively higher in a regime with
published written opinions than it would be in a regime without
such opinions. As a result, logrolling is substantially more costly
and more difficult for sitting justices than it is for members of
Congress. As before, it is important to bear in mind that the
relevant inquiry is not whether a particular institution is deficient
as against some ideal benchmark; rather, it is whether that institution, given its formal and informal decisional structures, is relatively
better or worse at its assigned task than is the counterpart institution for which decisional authority is proposed.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that case-by-case voting,
coupled with opinion writing and publication, affords the Supreme
Court a comparative advantage in issuing collective outcomes, even
over issues presented in actual cases for which the justices'
preferences cycle, for example, even in the absence of a Condorcet
winner. In contrast, Congress is relatively better equipped at
'o

See id. (illustrating circumstances in which logrolling leads to cycling).

110See id. (elaborating on the use of formal rules that prevent cycling by limiting

the number of pairwise contests relative to the number of options).
. In contrast, the Supreme Court justices rarely issue written opinions in
certiorari grants or denials. As a result, in the context of decisions to grant or to
deny petitions for writ of certiorari, we might expect a less principled set of decisional
processes, one that might include vote trading. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 140-215 (1991)
(discussing the extent of strategic behavior among several Supreme Courtjustices in
deciding whether to grant or to deny petitions for writ of certiorari); see also Revesz
& Karlan, supra note 66, at 1068 (positing that particular Supreme Courtjustices do
not apply criteria governing issuance of writs of certiorari or stay pending certiorari
in a consistent manner); Stearns, supra note 2, part L.A (discussing these cited sources
and distinguishing certiorari grants and denials from issuance of case decisions).
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remaining inert in the face of cyclical preferences because its formal
and informal decisional structures are better than those of the
Supreme Court at ensuring that available Condorcet winners prevail
and at revealing preferences that cycle.
While some congressional voting rules have features that appear
non-Condorcet, for example, setting formal limits on reconsideration,1n 2 vesting agenda-setting authority in particular members of
Congress, and using procedures such as "calendar Wednesday" and
the filibuster" 3 (each of which either provides disproportionate
authority to particular minorities within Congress or creates a form
of path dependency), a largely opposite evolutionary path for
informal practices has facilitated Congress's comparative advantage
at identifying both available Condorcet winners and preferences that
cycle." 4 While limits on reconsideration, for example, might
prevent the requisite number of formal votes relative to the
available number of options to reveal a cycle, the prevalent
congressional practice of logrolling or vote trading ensures that the
requisite number of iterations can occur outside the formal voting
process to reveal Condorcet winners or cyclical preferences."i 5 In
addition, having identified preferences that cycle, Congress has the
authority to avoid the irrationality that would result if it were forced
to act upon non-Condorcet-winning options." 6 Congress, unlike
the Supreme Court, can remain inert. Inertia allows the status quo
to govern, which is a rational strategy in the absence of a Condorcet-winning proposal to depart from the status quo. Furthermore, Congress sometimes achieves fair collective results by
112 See Riker, supranote 104, at 353-62 (explaining that limitations on amendments
to bills in both houses of Congress sometimes prevent those bodies from revealing
cyclical preferences).
"' For a discussion of these and other related legislative devices, see Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Public Choice CaseAgainst the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385,39798 (1992).
114 See Levmore, supra note 23, at 1012-43 (explaining the general convergence of
parliamentary practice in legislative bodies toward Condorcet-producing rules and
noting exceptions); see also Stearns, supra note 12, at 1265-66 & n.172 (linking choice
of Condorcet- versus non-Condorcet-producing rules to the issue whether the
institution in question needs to achieve a collective outcome or whether it can instead
remain inert).
115 See Stearns,supra note 2, part L.A (identifyinginformal legislative practices that
can overcome apparent limits in formal congressional voting rules in identifying
Condorcet winners); id. part I.C (further explaining Congress's ability to engage in
vote trading or logrolling, thereby revealing cycles and Condorcet winners outside the
formal voting process).
..See id. part I.C ("Congress enhances its collective rationality by employing
strategic voting.").
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deliberately thwarting the Condorcet criterion." 7 By trading votes
within and across bills, members of Congress, in contrast with
Supreme Court justices, are able to cardinalize, or place relative
weights upon, their preferences, rather than merely rank them
ordinally. In Arrovian terms, vote trading, which sacrifices the
alternatives criterion, enables
Arrovian independence of irrelevant
11 8
Congress to approach unanimity.
In addition, while agenda-setting authority has been criticized
by some legal academics as producing arbitrary and irrational
results,"' the same informal practices discussed above ameliorate
this tendency. While an agenda-setting member of Congress certainly has the formal authority to set a path leading to a place where
only she would like to go, that cannot be an effective long-term
120
strategy if she wants to logroll with her colleagues in the future.
Instead, the path is likely to become as much a part of the informal
12
bargaining processes as are the substantive bills and amendments. '
"" See id. (explaining that "[o]nce we recognize that not all legislators care equally
about each ordinal ranking, we can infer that some vote trades can achieve or at least
approach unanimity even while thwarting the Condorcet criterion").
18 See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1279-80 (discussing this ability of legislators to
reveal the intensity of their preferences through strategic voting and vote trading).
It is important to note that while vote trading allows the legislature to move toward
Pareto optimality, the result is not necessarily (indeed, it may not be in most instances) wealth maximizing. As I have previously explained, Arrovian unanimity is best
thought of as the Pareto criterion, with a twist:
This analysis is not intended to suggest that the outcomes of legislative
processes are Pareto superior in terms of wealth maximization. Instead, the
analysis demonstrates that legislative voting processes generally satisfy the
Pareto criterion, given the preferences of the legislators. The legislators'
preferences, however, if satisfied by legislative voting processes, may
produce outcomes that are actually Pareto inferior in that they frustrate
rather than enhance wealth maximization....
While it may appear counterintuitive that in achieving Pareto superior
legislation from the standpoint of legislators' preferences, the legislature can
achieve a Pareto inferior aggregate result in terms of frustrating wealth
maximization, this result is consistent with the insight from interest group
theory that Congressmen, in seeking to provide concrete legislative benefits
to their constituents to ensure reelection, engage in individually rational
trades that impose costs on everyone and that ultimately leave everyone
worse off.
Id. at 1277 n.220.
19 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 54748 (1983); see also RIKER, supra note 52, at 137-68 (positing an inevitable tension in
legislative rulemaking between path manipulation and strategic voting, which together
promulgate irrational and unpredictable collective outcomes).
10 For a more elaborate presentation, see STEARNS, supra note 21, ch. 2.
M Anyone who has ever been part of an organization in which all important
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In short, informal congressional practices not only limit the
institutional significance of formal decisional rules, but they also
provide members of Congress with substantially greater power to
prevent the adoption of non-Condorcet-winning preferences than
judicial counterparts possess. Of course, informal practices of the
sort discussed above have their costs. Thus, for example, while we
have some idea, based upon written opinions, of what to expect
from our justices, these very informal accommodations ensure that
decisionmaking among members of Congress will very often defy
both the ordinal ranking and principled voting criteria. In fact, it
is fair to say that, while we tend to criticize politicians for lack of
principles, formally principled decisionmaking-meaning consistent
adherence to previously announced ordinal rankings-is largely
inconsistent with the structure of legislative, as opposed to judicial,
decisionmaking.'2 2 Thus, in matters over which we would expect
principled decisionmaking to matter most, including, for example,
ensuring that legislative decisionmaking not thwart constitutional
principles, we might expect ultimate decisional authority to rest in
the federal judiciary. On the other hand, in matters over which
conflicting-and multipeaked-preferences are likely to be in the
greatest need of reconciliation, we would expect decisional authority
to rest, at least presumptively, in Congress.'2 3 We would expect

business occurs before formal meetings will recognize the argument in the text.
Notwithstanding the formal institutional rules, which include the requirement of
meetings, effective business people (by which I mean those who generally achieve
what they set out to achieve) are often effective because they relegate such rules to
the status of facade, engaging in important matters before such meetings take place.
Effective members of Congress, no doubt, engage in precisely the same strategy.
122That is not the case with all potential forms of government. Thus, in a
Rousseauian republic, we would expect participants, in subordinating their individual
wills to the benefit of society as a whole, to abide by a more consistent set of
preferences. In fact, the Marquis de Condorcet, who was strongly influenced by
Rousseau, proposed the Condorcet criterion with that in mind. In his decisional
scheme, the object of collective decisionmaking was not mutual accommodation, but
rather, a means with which to ensure that the collective decisionmaking body identified the best choice from available options. See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1250 n.108.
It is perhaps also not surprising that civilian systems, which have a stronger
republican influence than ours, provide all formal lawmaking powers to legislatures
and subordinate the courts to a far less prominent role. One feature of this subordinated adjudicatory role is the absence of a formal doctrine of stare decisis. For a
more detailed discussion, see Stearns, supra note 2, part I.B (observing that civilian
courts adhere to stare decisis as a matter of informal practice and accommodation).
123 In contrast with Professors Pildes and Anderson, who critique Arrow's
Theorem for the normative implications of strict adherence to the specified fairness
conditions, which, they suggest, provide little or no role for collective deliberation,
see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
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that provisional allocation, at least in part, because Congress has at
its disposal more rational devices for resolving irrational, or cyclical,
preferences-namely, resolution through commodification or
nonresolution through inertia-than does the Supreme Court.
The difficulty with this provisional allocation is that, as we
broaden the range of matters over which the Court exercises the
power of judicial review and afford litigants increased power to
present cases turning on such issues in the most favorable order, we
force the federal courts, including ultimately the Supreme Court, to
resolve issues that they are less well-equipped to address than
Congress is.' 24 One rational method by which the Supreme Court
could deal with such litigation is to devise a doctrine that enables

Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2202-

03 (1990) (asserting that "[s]ocial choice theory fails to take note of several features
of democratic institutions... [that] are essential for deliberation"); see also Stearns,
supra note 12, at 1229 n.30, 1251 n.115 (critiquing the Pildes and Anderson thesis),
this Article emphasizes the axiomatic, rather than normative, implications of Arrow's
Theorem. It does so by applying the corollary derived from Arrow's Theorem, see
supra text accompanying note 83 (stating the corollary that, in any institution that
issues collective decisions, at least one of the six Arrovian criteria must be relaxed),
to each institution under review. In turn, the analysis treats Arrow's Theorem for its
evolutionary, rather than normative, significance. This Article uses social choice
theory to demonstrate the evolutionary significance in legislatures, which are prone
to possessing multipeaked preferences, of deliberation and strategic voting. To be
clear, Professors Anderson and Pildes and I agree that deliberation is critical to the
functioning of legislatures. We disagree on how that observation relates to the theory
of social choice. I argue that social choice explains why legislative rules conduce to
deliberation and to strategic voting. Anderson and Pildes argue, in contrast, that
social choice, because it misconceives the concept of collective rationality, "is wholly
inadequate for evaluating democratic institutions." Pildes & Anderson, supra,at 2142.
But social choice is only "wholly inadequate" if one treats each Arrovian criterion for
its normative significance. In fact, the corollary to Arrow's Theorem developed in
these articles proves that all six Arrovian criteria cannot have equal normative
significance to all collective decisionmaking institutions. In these articles, I assume
that because no institution can meet all six Arrovian criteria, Arrow's Theorem is best
understood for its evolutionary implications. Thus viewed, social choice explains why
particular institutions relax-and adhere to-particular Arrovian criteria. Thus viewed,
the deliberative features of legislative decisionmaking fall squarely within the
framework of social choice.
" This distinction affords interest groups, and specifically non-Condorcet interest
groups, that are unable to secure legislative victories, with a strong incentive to seek
satisfaction in the federal courts by identifying a potential legal dispute-one that may
affect them tangentially or not at all-that requires for its resolution the very issue
that Congress, either advertently or through inertia, declined to resolve. See Stearns,
supra note 2, part III.A-B (asserting that courts' inability to maintain the status quo
in light of cycling preferences gives interest groups "an opportunity, through
litigation, to shift the burden of legislative inertia"); see also infra part II.A (demonstrating multipeakedness on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts).
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the Court to resolve formally and institutionally the cases before it,
while at the same time preserving Congress's power to address-or
not address-the underlying issues, at least until an appropriate
consensus has formed.125 Standing, thus viewed, is a rational
judicial response to litigant incentives stemming from the different
decisional rules employed in the Supreme Court and in Congress.
But these formal and informal decisional rules are surely not of
the recent vintage that we associate with standing. The questions
then arise why standing emerged during the New Deal and why it
was transformed into its present form and status during the Burger
and Rehnquist Court eras. The remainder of this Article will
address those questions.
II.

STANDING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

To understand why standing emerged as it did when it did, it is
first necessary to place the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which
developed standing into its present form, into their appropriate
historical contexts. To do so, I will use the social choice framework
set out above. The analysis will demonstrate that those Courts were
uniquely multipeaked with respect to the most controversial issues
of the day, and thus had a particular incentive to devise a doctrine,
like standing, that would reduce opportunities for advertent litigant
path manipulation. It is also necessary to consider the origin of the
modern standing formulation, which grew in large part out of the
Court's interpretation of section 10(a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act'26 in the landmark standing decision, Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.'2 7 That decision
began the continuing process of superimposing, for both statutory
and constitutional claimants, tort-based common-law conceptions of
injury, causation, and redressability as preconditions to standing.
The doctrinal history reveals that the Court increasingly relied upon
these common-law conceptions because they were particularly wellsuited to promoting paths of case decisions that were presumptively
governed by factors beyond the control of the litigants themselves.

.2.
An appropriate consensus could form if a Condorcet minority emerges in the
future, or if a non-Condorcet minorityjoins forces with a larger, successful coalition
through a strategic logroll.
126 Ch. 324, § 10(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1988)).
127 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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A. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts:
A Study in Multipeaked Preferences
One must, of course, be extremely cautious in summarily
characterizing any particular era of the Supreme Court. As with
standing, generalizations about the Supreme Court, and particular
historical periods on the Court, are largely worthless as such. 2 '
For any given generalization, exceptions abound. Fortunately, given
the analytic framework set out in Part I, we do not need a comprehensive history of the Supreme Court to place standing in its proper
context. At the same time, the social choice framework enables us
to go well beyond simplistic generalizations in seeking historical
support for this Article's thesis on the evolution of modern
standing. In fact, in several recent articles, critics of modern
standing have combed the history of the Supreme Court to locate
support for a public interest litigation model in early-American
128 Cf Data Processing,397 U.S. at 151 ("Generalizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as such."). For my analysis of this oft-quoted sentence, see Stearns,
supra note 2, part I.C (evaluating this statement in the context of meta-language).
Stated differently, it is important to avoid "history 'lite,'" see generally Martin S.
Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 523
(1995), and even "history 'lean,'" see generally Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The
Reconciliationof PrivatePropertyand RepresentativeGovernment, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 591
(1995). Professor Flaherty demonstrates that, through history lite, legal academics
tend to cull secondary and tertiary sources to support normative arguments that are
generally consistent with a one-sided view of a richer historical period that, properly
viewed, reveals a pervasive tension between two conflicting ideologies. Specifically,
modern constitutional historians have generally failed adequately to account for the
inevitable tension between republicanism and liberalism in the late eighteenth
century. See Flaherty, supra, at 546-49 (noting the "complexity of the Federalist
achievement" in "synthesi[zing] [these] different [and often opposing] traditions").
But see Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 601, 605-06
(1995) (positing that "[r]epublicanism... does not stand opposed to liberalism, and
indeed the opposition between republicanism and liberalism has been quite damaging
to the academic study of law (and to the profession of history as well)"); see also
Epstein, supra, at 592 (positing that, in constitutional interpretation, "history offers
us too much information without the means of sorting it out"). The principal
historical focus of this two-part series on standing, however, is not on the founding
period. Instead, these articles focus on the New Deal and post-New Deal periods
during which modern standing was created and transformed. See infra note 176 and
accompanying text. These articles avoid embracing a one-sided vision of these later
historical periods, however, by framing the analysis in terms of an inevitable tension
(closely related to that which Flaherty identifies, and which has persisted throughout
our history) between the conflicting desires to create institutions that promote fair
and rational collective decisionmaking. See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1278 n.222
(exploring the relationship between the theory of social choice and the theory of
republicanism); id. at 1233-47, 1287-88 (exploring the relationship between the theory
of social choice and the objective of wealth maximization).
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This literature, which for the most part reveals a

consensus that the federal judiciary embraced two models of
litigation (a public- and a private-interest model) in the early part of
our nation's history, has provided significant contributions to the
literature on standing. In particular, it has provided strong support
for arguments against limiting Congress's power to create novel
causes of action that have no antecedents in the common law.130
The purpose of this Article, however, is not to criticize modern
standing, but to explain it. To do that, we must consider two
anomalies of far more recent vintage: first, the creation of standing
as a justiciability barrier during the New Deal; and, second, the
transformation of standing into its present prominent role during
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
This subsection will demonstrate that in one peculiar respect,
which happens to be uniquely important in connecting the evolution
of modern standing to the social choice analysis discussed in Part I,
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts are strikingly different from prior
relevant periods on the Supreme Court. That might appear to some
readers to be a rather odd proposition. After all, most constitutional historians, if asked to identify a single period since the New
Deal, when the Court began to use standing, that fundamentally
altered the shape of the Supreme Court and its role within our
separation-of-powers scheme, would identify the Warren Court
era."3
During Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice from 1953 to

I have summarized the recent literature in Stearns, supra note 2, part I.C.
Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992) (rejecting the
notion that the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act conferred
standing upon a citizen to assert abstract "procedural" rights against the government
when the government's failure to allow the statutory procedure did not threaten a
separate concrete interest of the citizen).
" See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 630 (1991). Wells aptly
summarizes the Warren Court's influence as follows:
Led by ChiefJustice Warren, the Court struck down laws that maintained
racial distinctions and transformed the law of state criminal procedure by
incorporating almost all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights... such as
the Mirandawarning, to ensure their enforcement. Furthermore, the Court
breathed life into the equal protection clause, making it a powerful weapon
for combatting inequality across a wide range of issues. It tightened first
amendment restrictions on governmental regulation of speech, imposed new
procedural requirements on the denial of government benefits, and commanded the wholesale reapportionment of legislative districts across the
country. In sum, the Warren Court made the Constitution a far more
serious restraint on government than it had been before 1954.
Id. at 630-32 (footnotes omitted).
1
1
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1969, the Court fundamentally altered the nature of constitutional
criminal rights, reading broad protections into the Bill of Rights on
behalf of state and federal criminal defendants;8 2 that created,
seemingly from whole cloth, the fundamental right to vote in state
elections and the right to have one's vote weighted equally with
others,' thus intruding on what had been, for our entire history,
an exclusive state legislative function; that afforded Congress broad
regulatory power to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation,"3 4 with foreboding implications for the oncerestrictive state action doctrine;'3 5 and, perhaps most notably, that
handed down Brown v. Board of Education,'36 which not only

reversed nearly a century of post-emancipation, race-based segregation in the South, but also, in a single stroke of the pen, forever
pitted the notion ofjudicial restraint, founded upon originalism and
textualism, against the most fundamental notions of justice and
7
morality. And while the Burger Court issued Roe v. Wade,1
Justice Douglas's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,'3" issued
during the Warren Court, provided the necessary (if suspect)
132 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding criminal trials to
be a fundamental right); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (holding
that police must provide specified warnings prior to interrogation, including the right
to remain silent and to assistance of counsel, for those who cannot afford it); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (applying the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination to the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963) (holding
that indigent criminal defendants have a fundamental right to state-assisted counsel
under the Sixth Amendment).
"' See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 536 (1969) (extending the equal
population rule to congressional districts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,568 (1964)
(holding that equal protection requires that state legislative districts be equal in
population); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-29 (1962) (holding that an equal
protection challenge to a state's legislative redistricting is not a nonjusticiable political
question).
13 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(upholding application of the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to a motel which claimed that it did not operate in interstate commerce);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964) (upholding application of the
same provision to a restaurant which claimed that it did not operate in interstate
commerce).
135 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13, 26 (1883) (invalidating the public
accommodations provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act and creating the state action
doctrine).
'- 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place").
s' 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that "the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision").
381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (discussing the various zones of privacy created by
the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
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foundation, by distinguishing the fundamental right of privacy from
the discredited doctrine of substantive due process.'39
It would appear that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, if not
entirely successful in attempting to restore a once pervasive sense
of judicial modesty, simply harkened back to less noteworthy eras
in which the Supreme Court truly was the third-and perhaps least
dangerous 1 4 -- branch. In this historical context, it is perhaps not
surprising that some of the Burger Court's most notable opinions
can fairly be characterized as hybrids, representing a sometimes
difficult balance between the desire to adhere to precedents laid
down in a more liberal era, during the Warren Court, and the
contrary desire to infuse a greater notion of judicial restraint. 141
Thus, during Warren Burger's tenure as ChiefJustice between 1969
and 1986, the Court located for the first time, and then cut back
upon, a fundamental right to abortion;1 42 issued a hair-splitting
decision upholding a state medical school's use of race as an
admissions criterion, while invalidating the school's process of
Setting aside a specified number of places for candidates admitted
through affirmative action; 141 located, for the first time, an execu-

'9 For a more comprehensive list of landmark Warren Court precedents, see
Wells, supra note 131, at 630-32.
""This expression is taken from Professor Bickel's famous book, ALEXANDER M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITIcs at ix, 1 (1962), which in turn relied upon Alexander Hamilton's characterization of the federal judiciary as "least dangerous." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78

(Alexander Hamilton).
141The seeming ambivalence of the Burger Court is one of the overriding themes
in the well-known collection of essays, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
14 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93 (1983)
(upholding a parental notification provision for minors seeking an abortion); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1976) (upholding a state statute in which
a preset number of weeks was rejected for determination of viability and noting that
in Roe v. Wade the Court had recognized that "viability was a matter of medical
judgment, skill, and technical ability" and further noting that the Court wished to
"preserve[] the flexibility of the term").
Of course, the Rehnquist Court upheld substantially more restrictive abortion
laws. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819, 2822-29 (1992)
(upholding most provisions (except for spousal notification) of Pennsylvania's
restrictive abortion statute and concluding that abortion restrictions infringe upon a
protected liberty interest subject to a newly minted undue burden test rather than
upon a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 507-20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding several restrictions
on the right to abortion and suggesting the abandonment of the trimester
framework).
..
3 See Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315, 355 (1978) (holding that
"race-conscious remedial action is permissible" but that the school's "special admis-
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tive privilege, but then allowed a Special Prosecutor to overcome
that privilege by issuing a subpoena; 144 and upheld a literacy test
for the District of Columbia Police Department, notwithstanding
disparate race-based outcomes, because no purposeful discrimination was found 145 while, in extending the Equal Protection Clause
to require northern states to desegregate their de facto segregated
public schools, willingly inferred discriminatory intent to segregate an entire system based upon proof of segregative intent for
only a part of that system. 46 Because of the hybrid nature of
its rulings, the Burger Court's legacy is largely one of a transitional bridge between two more ideologically driven Supreme Court
1 47

periods.

sions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further
attainment of genuine diversity").
144 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (Burger, C.J.) (concluding
that "the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential
privilege").
145 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (White,J.) (noting that "the
disproportionate impact of [a particular literacy test does not] warrant the conclusion
that 46it is a purposeful device to discriminate").
1 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,213 (1973) (Brennan,j.) (holding
that a school system determined to maintain deliberate racial segregation in one
portion of a system "has the affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system").
147 In his recently published biography ofJustice Powell, Professor John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr. provides a similar account of the Burger Court as a prelude to characterizingJustice Powell, who served for most of that, Court and the first two years of
the Rehnquist Court, from 1972 to 1987, as the fulcrum holding the balance between
two often irreconcilable extremes. Not surprisingly, therefore,Justice Powell is widely
regarded as having had an unusually strong jurisprudential impact on the most
divisive issues of the day, including busing, affirmative action, and the rights of
criminal defendants. Professor Jeffries explains:
The Supreme Court in Powell's time was neither consistently liberal nor
dependably conservative, neither predictably activist nor reliably restrained.
It was an era ofjudicial balance. The periods before and after were of a
distinctly different character. In the liberal heyday of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, the Justices commanded an end to segregation, greatly expanded
the rights of criminal defendants, and zealously sought to reform many
other aspects of American society and law. After Powell retired, the
Supreme Court entered the conservative ascendancy associated with the
ChiefJusticeship of William Rehnquist.
In between lay a period-lasting for the better part of a generation-in
which neither liberals nor conservatives dominated the Supreme Court.
These were years of ideological stalemate and political pragmatism, of
conflict and compromise, of decisions that owed less to dogmas of the left
or the right than to a flexible search for justice, order, and decency in a
changing world. And this Court's most characteristic voice, the one that
proved most often decisive, was that of its most reluctant member, justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia.
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And if the Warren Court represented one ideological extreme,
surely the Rehnquist Court represents the other. Or does it?
Some members of the Rehnquist Court, most notably, the Chief
Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, even if sometimes disagreeing at the margins, undoubtedly share a common conservative
constitutional ideology. That ideology is largely associated with
substantially reducing the extent of the federal judiciary's policymaking role and leaving that function to Congress and state
legislatures. One might be inclined to label such an ideology as one
ofjudicial restraint, but that seemingly noncontroversial label itself
has profound normative underpinnings. Thus, academics have not
hesitated to point out that the process of "restoring" the Court to
a less influential policymaking role, in the face of precedents
tending in the opposite direction, requires its own form of judicial
activism. 14 Not surprisingly, therefore, one characteristic of the
present activism on the right is its call for reduced adherence to
149
the doctrine of stare decisis, especially in constitutional cases.

12 (1994). As explained
below, the mid- to late-Burger and early- to mid-Rehnquist Courts were characterized by three competing jurisprudential camps, none of which could predictably
dominate the Court: first, a liberal approach designed to keep the Constitution
attune with the times; second, a conservative approach designed to restore the
federal judiciary to a more limited role; and third, a moderate approach that
alternatively eschewed the ideologically driven approaches of the left and right in
favor of more individualized, "reasoned," and methodological judgments. In social
choice terms, these Courts can be viewed as possessing three irreconcilable peaks, see
supra note 17 and accompanying text (illustrating a group with multipeaked
preferences), thus preventing any of the three camps from assuming, with any
reasonable degree of confidence, that, if the Court were to issue a substantive
decision in a given case, it would not be relegated to dissatisfied minority, or even to
dissatisfied majority, status. As demonstrated below, this insight goes a long way in
explaining why standing evolved into its present form during this critical period on
the Court.
148 See, e.g., Cass R.Sunstein, What 'sStanding afterLujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 167 (1992) (arguing that Lujan is a form of
substantive due process from the right); cf. RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., Comment, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as ajudicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42
DUKE L.J. 1170, 1187, 1193 (1993) (arguing that Lujan, by restricting those injuries
for which a congressional grant of standing is permitted to those defined at common
law, promotes agency capture by the intended regulatory objects).
141 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2861 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing against rigid adherence to stare decisis in constitutional
cases, stating that "[e]rroneous decisions in . .. constitutional cases are uniquely
durable, because correction through legislative action, save for constitutional
amendment, is impossible"); see also id. at 2880-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing
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On the opposite side, until quite recently in any event, a liberal
bloc of comparable size, t15 consisting of Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall,' 5 1 demonstrated an equal commitment to
preserving, and expanding upon, the victories of the Warren and
early Burger Court eras. Again, not surprisingly, this bloc exhibited
a new-found admiration for the doctrine of stare decisis, albeit not
a consistent one, and did not hesitate to label the conservative
bloc's efforts to delimit the reach of their favored precedents as a
form of unfettered judicial activism. Finally, the so-called "centrist"
Republican appointees-Stewart (then O'Connor), Powell (then
Kennedy), and Souter (replacing Brennan)-forged a middle path,

striking a difficult, and certainly unpredictable, balance between the
objectives of restoring the judiciary to a less prominent role and of

respecting the high-profile precedents laid down in a more liberal
era. 152
Given the number of years that the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have spanned, it may be helpful to provide a graphic
depiction of the shifting coalitions from the beginning of the
Burger era to the present Court. For simplicity, I have divided
the history of the Supreme Court into four periods:

a vitriolic attack on the joint opinion's position that stare decisis requires continued
adherence to some manifestation of a fundamental right to abort).
'1 It is important to note that the actual size of Supreme Court coalitions,
as demonstrated by Justice Powell's disproportionate impact on the Court, see
supra note 147, is not important, provided there are no less than three coalitions, any
two of which contain the requisite five votes to form a controlling majority. See
Stearns, supra note 12, at 1256 n.137. For a more detailed presentation of the
composition of, and replacements on, the Court during the relevant periods, see infra
Table 2.
151 Although it is fair to describe Justice Stevens as enigmatic, see, e.g., William D.
Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions ofjustice Stevens,
1989 DuKE L.J. 1087, 1088 (observing that "Justice Stevens is widely viewed as
'enigmatic, unpredictable, [a] maverick, a wild card, a loner'"), for purposes of Table
2 below, he fits most comfortably in the liberal bloc.
152While it is perhaps too early to determine whether, with the exception of issues
related to "gender,"Justice Ginsburg will join the bloc in the middle or on the left,
and wherejustice Breyer will fit in this spectrum, I have placed them in the moderate
bloc based upon the limited voting record that is available.
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Liberal

Period
One

Black
[Powell 1972]
Fortas

1969
to
1972

Period
Two
1972
to
1986
Period
Three
1986
to
1994

Period
Four

Moderate

White
Harlan
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CONSERVATIVE

BURGER

[REHNQUIST 1970]

[BLACKMUN 1970]
Brennan
Douglas
Marshall

Stewart

Total: 5, then 4

Total: 3, then 2

TOTAL: 1, then 3

Blackmun
Brennan
Stevens
Marshall

White
Stewart
[O'Connor 1981]
Powell

BURGER
[REHNQUIST 1986]
REHNQUIST
[SCALIA 1986]

Total: 4

Total: 3

TOTAL: 2

Blackmun
[Breyer 1994]
Brennan
[Souter 1990]
Stevens
Marshall
[THOMAS 1991]

White
[Ginsburg 1994]
O'Connor
Powell
[Kennedy 1988]

REHNQUIST
SCALIA

Total: 4, then I

Total: 3, then 5

TOTAL: 2, then 3

Stevens
(Souter ?)

Breyer
Souter [?]
Kennedy [?]
O'Connor
Ginsburg

REHNQUIST
SCALIA
THOMAS
(Kennedy ?)

Total: 1 (maybe 2)

Total: 5 (maybe 3)

TOTAL: 3 (maybe 4)

1994
to
present

TABLE 2: Multipeakedness in the Burger
and Rehhquist Courts in Four Periods
I have employed the following conventions in the table: italics
indicate liberal justices; all capitals indicate conservative justices;

and ordinary typeface indicates moderatejustices. In brackets after
each justice who has been replaced appears the name of the
replacing justice, in his or her appropriate typeface, with the date
of replacement. Using appropriate brackets and parentheses, I have
indicated those justices whose classification is subject to question. 5 ' At the bottom of each box, I have listed the total number

...
The capital letters initially used forJustice Blackmun indicate that he started
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ofjustices that appear in the given category for the relevant period.
In periods one, three, and four, I have listed a range, suggesting
either the loss of a core member or ambivalence in classifying
particular justices. Assuming that my general classifications are
sound, the table demonstrates that in period one, coming out of the
Warren Court era, the liberals, while still in control of the Court,
were losing their reign. With only five justices, the liberal camp
could not afford any defections if it were to issue a predictable
ruling in a given case. In periods two and three, which represent
the mid- to late-Burger Court and the early- to mid-Rehnquist
Court, no single camp dominated the Court, and any two camps
could form a five-vote majority coalition. This period was most ripe
for the formation of the modern standing doctrine. In the current
period, period four, the Court has created a bare (and questionable)
majority moderate bloc and has gradually strengthened its conservative bloc. Depending upon the extent of moderate defections in
either direction, for example, if Souter votes with Stevens, the
remaining liberal, or if Kennedy, joined by another moderate, votes
with the conservatives, the results are again unpredictable. 5 4 In
as a conservative, but then moved to the liberal bloc in period two. Professor Riggs
has classified Blackmun first as a conservative, then as a moderate, then as a liberal.
See Robert E. Riggs, When Eveiy Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United States Supreme
Cour4 1900-90, 21 HOFsTRA L. REV. 667, 689-90 (1993). While I agree with Riggs's
more complex classification for Justice Blackmun, I have placed him in the
conservative, then liberal, blocs, based upon the category in which he was classified
for the longest duration within each specified period. Even if Blackmun is more
moderate for part of periods one and two, the analysis does not change because the
Court remains multipeaked. Moreover, as early as 1973, when Blackmun issued Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), he fit most comfortably within the liberal bloc.
Assuming Blackmun is best classified as conservative for the early part of his tenure
on the Supreme Court, the liberal bloc would then have lost its ability to control
controversial case outcomes when Blackmun replaced Justice Fortas. Upon later
acquiring Justice Blackmun as a member, thus regaining the lost Fortas vote, the
liberal bloc had already lost too many members (since Black had been replaced with
Powell, a moderate) to regain its majority status. It is worth noting that in classifying
justices as liberal, moderate, or conservative, Professor Riggs has implicitly assumed
a single, albeit graded, liberal-to-conservative ideological spectrum, rather than a
multipeaked spectrum.
1" Notably in periods two and three, Justice Powell was often the fulcrum, as
White, Stewart, and O'Connor (and with decreasing frequency, Souter), the other
moderates, often voted with the conservative blocs. See Lawrence C. Marshall,
Divesting the Courts: Breaking theJudicialMonopoly on ConstitutionalInterpretation,66
CHi.-KFNT L. REV. 481, 481 (1990) (explaining that "[i]n 1990, it appears that the
Court has a core conservative bloc of five (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy &
Souter), with one other (White) providing a rather consistent conservative vote");
David M. O'Brien, On Supreme Court Commentariesand Developing ConstitutionalLaw,
81 MICH. L. REV. 839, 845 n.53 (1983) (describing Justice Potter Stewart as the
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fact, we might expect the most defections from members of the
moderate bloc, given their less than absolute commitment to
ideological principles in deciding cases. If so, multipeakedness
extends into the present period.
While a social choice depiction of the preceding analysis will
certainly fail to capture the complexities that arise in any particular
case, it will, nonetheless, be helpful for the discussion to follow 55
Before proceeding, we will need to make a few assumptions. In
fact, in an effort to increase the number of potential cases captured
in the analysis, I will provide four paradigms, based upon four
different sets of assumptions.
In the end, however, all four
paradigms will illustrate the same point: The Burger and Rehnquist

Court's "second moderate conservative") (reviewing JESSE CHOPER ET AL., THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, VOLUME 3: 1980-1981 (1982)); Riggs,
supra note 153, at 697 (describing Justice White, since 1981, as the Court's sole
moderate, with a "continuing conservative tilt"); Linda P. Campbell,Justice White: The
Democrat Who Often Votes with Court Conservatives, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1993, at 18.
In period four, Justice Kennedy has become the fulcrum, but with a clear, and
doctrinally significant, shift to the right. See infra note 166; see also Joan Biskupic,
When Court Is Split, Kennedy Rules, WASH. POST, June 11, 1995, at A14 (noting that
Justice Kennedy "holds the decisive vote").
155 It is important to note that the paradigms set out below, which are intended
to demonstrate the possibility of cyclical preferences, are inevitably based upon
assumptions that cannot be proven using actual case results. The Court, for reasons
explained above and in Stearns, supra note 12, does not employ unlimited pairwise
voting, which would be needed to reveal cyclical preferences. Instead, the Court
employs case-by-case voting. This voting rule avoids cycles but sometimes creates
irrational, or arbitrary, results. The discussion to follow is intended to demonstrate
that the sometimes inconsistent results of case-by-case voting might be masking a
deeper pathology, namely cyclical preferences leading to irrational outcomes. That
pathology is likely to encourage rational justices to devise a doctrine, like standing,
which would enable the Court to avoid the irrationality of its own creation. While the
assumptions required to demonstrate the hypothetical cycles presented below cannot
be proved (or disproved), the presence of cases that reveal shifting majorities on
dispositive issues across separate opinions or across plurality, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in a given case, provide strong evidence that the Court was prone
to possessing cyclical preferences in periods two and three.
While Professor Rogers uses the term "shifting-majority" to describe cases in
which differentjustices' sign on to separate parts of the Court's majority opinion, see,
e.g., Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Rogers, supra note 14,
at 459-61 (collecting cases); Stearns, supra note 12, at 1271 n.191 (analyzing Bakke),
I have used the term instead to describe cases in which the Court issues a plurality,
concurrence, and dissent and in which there are two requisite issues to achieve the
Court's holding but where an issue-by-issue resolution of these issues produces the
result in dissent. See Rogers, supra note 14, at 443 n.9 (discussing similar cases). It
is also worth noting, as the Kassel hypothetical illustrates, see supra part I.B, that the
disputes over which the Court's preferences are likely to cycle need not be as political
in nature as those described in the text.
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Courts, at least until recently, were unable to ensure with any
reasonable degree of certainty that, in resolving particular cases,
especially the most divisive cases of the day, they would not thwart
the will of a present majority, thereby creating an arbitrary or
irrational result.
Assume that the Court is composed only of the three camps described above, which for ease of presentation, we will refer to as the
(A) conservative bloc; (B) liberal bloc; and (C) moderate bloc. For
the first paradigm, assume that the Court grants certiorari in a case
that provides an opportunity to reverse a liberal Warren Court precedent. The conservative bloc would most prefer to issue a strong
ruling that signals a retreat from the position established by the
Warren Court. If required to uphold the precedent, however, the
conservative bloc would prefer to do so on the basis of whatever
independent rationale the liberal bloc offers rather than to rely
upon the moderate bloc's rationale, which rests upon stare decisis.
While this might appear counterintuitive, assume the conservative
bloc members reason that a ruling that rests upon stare decisis
might limit their ability to reverse Warren-era precedents in future
cases more than a ruling that rests upon a set of principles, even
ones with which they sharply disagree. In that sense, the liberal
bloc's proposed ruling might be viewed as more narrow than the
moderate bloc's proposed ruling with respect to the particular facts
of the case. Based upon those assumptions, the conservative bloc's
preferences are (A,B,C). Assume that the liberal bloc would most
prefer to rule in accordance with its own principles. Failing that, it
would prefer upholding the precedent based on the moderate bloc's
stare decisis analysis to overturning the precedent based upon the
conservative bloc's analysis. The liberal bloc's resulting preferences
are (B,C,A). Finally, assume that the moderate bloc would most
prefer to rest an affirmance on the doctrine of stare decisis. Failing
that, it is more inclined to overrule based upon the conservative
bloc's principles, which, but for stare decisis, it agrees with, than to
uphold based upon the liberal bloc's principles. The moderate
bloc's resulting preferences are (C,A,B). The resulting preferences
are non-Condorcet, or multipeaked, and thus not capable of rational
resolution.155
"6 Of course, the Court would issue an opinion, but, in. doing so, it would
inevitably thwart the will of a majority of its members.
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For the second paradigm, consider the case of Bowers v.
Hardwick,'57 where the Court upheld the conviction of a man
charged with violating a Georgia statute prohibiting consensual acts
of sodomy. 5
The state had prosecuted on the basis that as
applied to heterosexual acts of sodomy, the statute was unconstitutional. As applied to the defendant, a gay man, the state maintained
that the act was constitutional. Thus, to reverse the conviction, the
Court would have had to expand the reach of the privacy cases to
15 9
include protection for consensual acts of homosexual sodomy.
Ruling in the defendant's favor would have required departing from
a nearly two-hundred-year history in which the constitutionality of
such statutes was assumed. This time, with respect to the rationale,
the moderate bloc aligns itself with the conservative bloc's members,
in favor of affirming the conviction. Its rationale is not an ideological commitment to the propriety of the underlying statute, or even,
necessarily to principles of federalism or a more limited judicial
role. Instead, the moderate bloc would rule on a much narrower
ground, one which might be viewed as a form of reverse stare decisis.
Members of the moderate bloc determine that the privacy cases, for
which they also lack an overriding ideological commitment, have not
extended sufficiently far to cover this case and that the history of
such state statutes suggests that their constitutionality has long been
assumed.
Assume that the liberal bloc would most like to reverse and issue
an opinion that expands the reach of the privacy cases. If required
to uphold the conviction, however, the liberal bloc members would
prefer doing so on the conservative bloc's rationale because the
moderate bloc's rationale-if generally employed to assume the
constitutionality of statutes that have long been on the books and
not challenged-might be more restrictive in future cases involving
rights expansions. 6 The liberal bloc's resulting preferences are
(B,A,C). Assume that the conservative bloc, which would most like
1-7

478 U.S. 186 (1986).

's

See id. at 195-96.

159In

Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court declined to reach the issue of
whether homosexuals are a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court will likely reach that issue in Romer v. Evans, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
160 Some members of the conservative bloc, for example, if free to assess each
claim on the merits, might, on occasion, employ natural law principles in future cases
to forge a coalition with the liberal bloc to expand rights in a particular case, a result
at odds with the more technical approach taken by the moderate bloc members.
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to issue a strong ruling suggesting that the Constitution does not
protect a generalized right of privacy, would next prefer upholding
the conviction based upon the moderate bloc's more limited
rationale than to reverse. The conservative bloc's resulting preferences are (A,C,B). Finally, assume that the moderate bloc, if
forced to choose between the liberal and conservative positions,
would prefer to reverse, based upon the liberal bloc's rationale, than
to uphold the conviction, thereby suggesting a wholesale rejection
of recently issued privacy cases. The moderate bloc's resulting
preferences are (C,B,A). The direction of this cycle is the opposite
of that in the prior example because the moderate bloc alignmentresting the case analysis on a technical narrow ground-is with the
conservative rather than the liberal bloc. Again, the resulting
preferences are non-Condorcet and multipeaked, thus preventing
16 1
the Court from ensuring a rational resolution of the case.
The third paradigm, which, in contrast with the prior two, does
have a Condorcet winner, is based upon the Supreme Court's recent
decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 16 in which three members
of the Court's moderate bloc, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and
Kennedy, issued a joint opinion striking several provisions of a
Pennsylvania statute that limited the right of a woman to have an
abortion. Assume that the moderate bloc would most prefer the
joint-opinion analysis, resting primarily upon stare decisis and the
desire not to overturn Roe v. Wade. Assume that, if forced to
choose between upholding the statute in its entirety, thus reversing
Roe, or affirming based upon the liberal bloc's preferred ruling,
which would more strongly endorse Roe, the moderate bloc
members would choose to rule with the liberal bloc. The moderate
bloc's resulting preferences are (C,B,A). Assume that the conservative bloc would most like to issue a strong opinion upholding the
abortion statute in its entirety and reversing Roe. Failing that, if
forced to uphold the statute, the conservative bloc members would
prefer signing onto thejoint opinion with the moderate bloc, which,
at the very least, suggests that Roe may not have been correct when
decided. This ruling might in the future provide a firmer foundation for reversing Roe. The conservative bloc's preferences are
261 The fact that the Court reached a result and upheld the conviction does not
disprove the thesis set out above. In fact, it tends in the opposite direction by
demonstrating that if the Court as a whole lacks a Condorcet-winning preference, it
will be forced to issue an opinion that a present majority of its members may disfavor
relative to an available alternative.

162

112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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(A,C,B). Finally, assume that the liberal bloc members would most
like to issue a strong opinion invalidating the Pennsylvania statute
in its entirety. Failing that, they would prefer signing onto the
moderate bloc's joint opinion, which at the very least does not
overturn Roe. The liberal bloc's resulting preferences are (B,C,A).
For these preferences, there is a Condorcet winner at C, represent-

ing the moderate bloc's joint opinion. In fact, the joint opinion in
Casey, resting primarily upon stare decisis, was the ruling in the
case. 163
The first two paradigms, which produced a cycle, depended

upon a seemingly odd alliance on a question of substantive law
between the liberal and conservative blocs, against the moderate
bloc, albeit for one of the two groups' second choices among three
approaches. The fourth and final paradigm rests upon a more
intuitive form of liberal/conservative alliance, which can also give
rise to standing. Over the past several years, the number of close

decisions, and especially five-to-four decisions, on the Supreme
Court has increased significantly.1 6 4
In these close cases, the
outcome has often turned on the view of one or more justices in the
moderate bloc, whose views on the underlying issue were not wellknown. Thus, in the Burger Court, Justice Powell often controlled
the outcome of politically volatile cases, although not in a predictable manner; 165 and, in the most recent terms on the Rehnquist
Court (period four in Table 2),Justice Kennedy has often controlled
equally unpredictable outcomes in close cases.' 66 While the liberal
163See

id. at 2803, 2806-16.

1" For an analysis of the increased prevalence of five-to-four decisions and

suggested root causes over the past several decades, see Riggs, supra note 153, at 676
(observing, based upon reviewed case data, that "one can easily discern a much larger
volume of single vote decisions in the last decades of this century than in the early
ones").
165 See id. at 697 n.86 (placingJustice Powell's agreement score-agreement with
the majority of the Court-at 71.3% from 1981-86).
'6 SeeJEFFRIES, supra note 147, at 556-57 (explaining how replacement ofJustice
Powell withJustice Kennedy likely altered outcomes in politically divisive cases from
1988 to 1989 and providing illustrations); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme

Court 1988 Term-Foreward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43, 44-45
(1989) (explaining that in his first full term, "[j]oining ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, and ScaliaJustice Kennedy supplied the critical fifth vote
in a series of conservative 5-4 decisions in cases concerning abortion, capital
punishment, civil rights, and criminal procedure"); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas

R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-PackingEfforts of PresidentsReagan and
Bush, 57 ALB. L. REv. 1111, 1119 (1994) ("Although Kennedy was a less controversial
choice [than Robert Bork], 'the Court's swing seat no longer functioned as a vote that
balanced the liberal and conservative blocs by siding with one or the other from case
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and conservative blocs likely possess opposite substantive preferences in the politically divisive cases that are prone to close margin
decisions, in the same cases they may well have one important
common preference. This common preference is the subject of the
fourth paradigm: Members of both camps might take the position
that it is better to wait until the Court is required to make a
decision by a set of facts that demands a substantive ruling of law
(and which may be more favorable to them) than to rush to
judgment now and hope that whoever controls the outcome, for
example Justices Powell or Kennedy, votes in a way favorable to
their side. Given this incentive to delay the resolution of close
margin and politically divisive rulings, the liberal and conservative
blocs create multipeaked preferences through an alignment based
not on the underlying issue of substantive law but rather on the
issue of standing." 7
In any event, the multipeakedness of the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, as illustrated in these hypotheticals, is noteworthy in two
critical respects. First, it ensures that the Court's members cannot
exert any reasonable degree of control over the Court's substantive
to case. Instead, Kennedy's vote most often served as a tie-breaker that could tip the
balance in favor of the conservatives.'" (quoting HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND
PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 361

(3d ed. 1992))); Joan Biskupic, Court's Conservatives Make Presence Felt: Reagan
Appointees Lead Move Rightward, WASH. POSTJuly 2, 1995, at Al, A17 (observing that
"[t]hejustice who was in the majority most [in the 1994-95 term] was Kennedy, 93
percent of the time"); Biskupic, supra note 154, at A14 (observing that Justice
Kennedy "casts the fifth-and deciding-vote and in recent years... has been in the
majority on important cases more than any other justice").
167 It is also worth noting that the prospect of a new judicial appointment
following the retirement or death of a sittingjustice can affect the incentives of the
remaining sitting justices on the question of standing. If a group ofjustices in the
liberal or conservative bloc anticipates the replacement of ajustice in the opposing
camp with one of its own, the incentive to delay issuing a substantive decision would
increase if the present expected outcome is either adverse to that camp's interests or
close. Alternatively, if a coalition anticipates losing a member to another camp, the
opposite incentive would arise. Personnel changes-and the incentives they pose for
litigants-may have influenced the development of the ripeness and mootness
doctrines even more than the standing doctrine, although no doubt it has influenced
all three. Absent ripeness and mootness, interest groups could constantly try to
manipulate well-settled rules without identifying a fortuity-based factual predicate by
repeating prior facts or anticipating future facts in a given case. In any event, while
this Article demonstrates that the Court's preferences can cycle over time with no
personnel changes on the Court, I do not intend to suggest that cycling depends
upon uniform personnel. Instead, intertemporal cycling is exacerbated when we
introduce personnel changes, especially changes that might alter the coalition
structure of the Court. Anticipating such changes will also contribute to the
incentives of at least somejustices to favor standing to a determination on the merits.
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rulings. Instead, the Court's members are only able to predict that
if a majority is unable to secure enough votes to resolve the case in
a particular manner, the Court's substantive ruling will reflect the
preferences of some minority of the Court, as in Kassel, Seattle, and
Crawford. The result, namely suppressing the will of a present
majority of the Court's members, will hold even if those members
have full knowledge of everyone's preferences in advance. The
possibility is increased when such preferences are not known.
Given its obligation to issue a ruling in all cases properly before it,
a multipeaked Court has but two options: It may either decline
certiorari in all controversial cases, 16 8 or it may devise a doctrine
that enables the Court to consider such cases but to reach a
collective outcome on something other than the merits, except when
absolutely necessary. The latter option would serve to minimize,
but not to eliminate, the Court's collective irrationality. This
intuition, that the Court employs standing to avoid ruling on the
merits, has led many scholars to suggest that standing is no more
than a means by which to avoid deciding difficult cases.1 69 While
that insight might contain more than a kernel of truth, it certainly
fails to capture the entire story, or even its most significant
elements. After all, the more obvious mechanism for avoiding
difficult cases is declining certiorari. Even then, however, only four
justices must agree to issue a writ of certiorari, while five must agree
on the outcome for the Court to issue an opinion in a given
case, 170 setting aside plurality opinions. But if the Court is able
to predict that non-Condorcet rulings will thwart the will of a
present majority, rather than effectively roll the dice, we might
expect fewer controversial cases to reach the Court's self-governed
docket than history suggests. The much larger difficulty with the
avoidance thesis is that the Court has never suggested that its
standing precedents apply only to itself and not to lower federal
courts. 171 And with good reason. Given the preceding analysis,

"6For a discussion of the practical limits of this approach, see supra part I.C.1.
Stearns, supra note 2, part I.C.
170 To be clear, five justices need not agree on the method of reaching that
outcome to issue a collective ruling; instead, they must only agree on the most often
binary decision to affirm or reverse. The preference aggregation problems arise in
attempting to coalesce the members' preferences around any given rationale. See
Stearns, supra note 12, at 1272 n.192 (explaining that "Supreme Court voting rules,
unlike legislative voting rules, impose virtually no consensus requirement beyond
agreement on binary choice of outcome" as a precondition to collective resolution of
169See

a case).

171 Cf

William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988)
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lower federal courts, which lack the power of docket control, are
even more susceptible to litigant path manipulation than is the
Supreme Court.
While operating indirectly, therefore, the application of standing
to the lower federal courts is a necessary condition of the Supreme
Court's effective power to control its own docket. Because the
lower federal courts cannot control their own dockets in the same
manner as can the Supreme Court, standing prevents litigants from
forcing circuit splits on important questions of federal law. Such
circuit splits, more than any other factor, increase the cost of
certiorari denials in the Supreme Court.'7 2 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the standing cases strongly suggest that they are
intended to apply to all federal courts.
In fact, if standing were actually intended to enable the Supreme
Court to avoid deciding difficult cases, the doctrine would quickly
backfire. Ideological litigants would happily take the avoidance
signal as an invitation to force judicial creation of positive law at the
district and circuit court levels. The resulting precedents, if
favorable, would be no less attractive within the affected circuits
than if decided by the Supreme Court, which will have signaled an
intent to keep them in place. And, if unfavorable, the precedents
would only invite further litigation elsewhere designed to create
circuit splits that render the Supreme Court's hands-off approach
unpalatable. The avoidance strategy, even if successful in the very
short term, would promote, rather than inhibit, ideologically based
federal court litigation. If so, in short order, the Supreme Court
would likely cut back upon, or perhaps even abandon, standing as
yet another example of a doctrine that has proved unworkable over
time. But the historical record is flatly inconsistent with that thesis.
Standing is alive and well, and thus in great need of further analysis.
Judicial multipeakedness is noteworthy in a second critical
respect. Multipeaked preferences attract litigants who seek to force
judicial creation of positive law, and specifically of positive law that
lacks majority or Condorcet-minority legislative support, for the very
same reason that multipeaked preferences create angst among the
justices who, in the aggregate, possess them. 173
Because the

(positing that "[a] true standing decision determines whether a plaintiff has a right
tojudicial relief in any federal court, notjust the Supreme Court") (citation omitted).

" See STERN, supra note 66, at 197-202 (discussing the importance of resolving
circuit splits on important questions of federal law as motivating grants of petitions
for writ of certiorari).
"73
As shown below, multipeakedjudicial preferences might also invite broad-based
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Supreme Court, given its decisional processes, is unable to ensure
any sense of collective rationality in processing multipeaked
preferences for decision, interest groups view the Court as a freefor-all in which such fortuitous matters as timing can lead to major
victories that would never have occurred in a legislative forum.
In any event, even assuming that both the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts possessed multipeaked preferences, thus inviting litigant
attempts at path manipulation, the question remains whether this
phenomenon began in the 1970s, when the modern standing
doctrine took its present form and status. Again, a complete history
of the Supreme Court is unnecessary for the task at hand. As stated
above, the modern doctrine of standing has its roots in the New
Deal expansion of federal and state regulatory authority. 74 In
fact, constitutional historians have largely agreed that standing
evolved to stave off unwelcome attacks by those harmed by
regulatory programs that were designed to combat the Depression.' 75 While traces of the doctrine can be found in much earlier
practice, 176 as an historical matter, the general wisdom is well

statutory conferrals of standing. See infra part III.D (discussing Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
174See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 225 (stating that the Supreme Court began to
develop this doctrine in the 1930s); Stearns, supra note 2, part I.C (stating that the
standing doctrine was developed by Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter to prevent
challenges to favored regulatory programs); Winter, supranote 101, at 1453 (arguing
that the rise of administrative agencies created the potential for more adjudication).
'" See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 225 (asserting that the standing doctrine arose
out of the litigation surrounding the growth of administrative agencies); Winter, supra
note 101, at 1453 (stating that the standing doctrine was developed as a result of the
litigation problems caused by the intrusion of administrative agencies into "previously
unregulated corners of society").
176 Steven Winter has documented extensively the early sitings of standing
language in the late 18th century equity practice in federal courts. See generally
Winter, supra note 101. Winter demonstrates that these early uses of standing
terminology were intended to limit the equitable powers of federal courts and not to
limit federal litigation to a single private rights model. See id. at 1446-47 (explaining
that beginning with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court began to
employ the early equity standing language to insist upon a single private-rights
litigation model). Numerous authors have corroborated Winter's thesis. In a recent
summary of the literature, Professor Gene Nichol stated:
In separate, major, and compelling efforts, Louis Jaffe in 1965, Raoul
Berger in 1969, and Steven Winter in 1988 have demonstrated that injury
was not a requisite for judicial authority in either the colonial, framing, or
early constitutional periods. TheJudiciary Act of 1789, like several contemporaneous state statutes, allowed "informer" actions. English practice
included prerogative writs, mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition, all
designed to "restrain unlawful or abusive action by lower courts or public
agencies," and requiring only "neglect of justice," not individual injury.
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supported.1 77 The question that these articles have failed to
address, and which constitutional historians have left largely
unexplained, however, is why standing assumed its present form and
status beginning in the 1970s. Briefly stated, my thesis is that the
presence of multipeaked preferences in the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts largely explains, in economic terms, the incentives of
litigants to force judicial codification of non-Condorcet-winning
preferences into law and the concomitant incentives of Supreme
Court justices to prevent litigant path manipulation by imposing a
standing barrier.17 Even assuming, however, that the presence of
multipeakedness on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts accounts for
the evolution of modern standing from its New Deal roots, the
question remains, then, whether the same incentives were present
at some earlier time between the New Deal, when the Court first
introduced standing, and the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, when
standing assumed its present form. The answer is almost certainly
no.
To see why, we need to consider the two major transitional
jurisprudential periods on the Supreme Court between the New
Deal and the Burger Court. The first period begins, of course, with
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's threatened Court-packing
plan and Justice Owen Roberts's famous "switch in time that saved
nine."' 79 The plan to add one justice for every justice over the age
of seventy who did not retire was intended to limit the influence of
the four conservatives who consistently thwarted FDR's New Deal
efforts:
Justices McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, and
Roberts's vote averted FDR's perceived need to
Sutherland.'
Stranger suits and relator practice countenanced the assertion ofjudicial
power without the existence of a direct personal stake in the controversy.
Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,Justice Scalia, Standing,and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE LJ.

1141, 1151-52 (1993) (citations omitted).
1"See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.C.
1781 also demonstrated in id. part II.B, based upon the social choice analysis, that
standing serves functions that are not replicated by the question whether a plaintiff
has a cause of action, or by the related justiciability doctrines of ripeness and
mootness.
17
1 See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also infra note 180.
" In addition to the "Four Horsemen," as the four conservative justices were
sometimes called, Justice Owen Roberts rather consistently sided with the conservatives against FDR's New Deal initiatives, thereby creating a majority in major cases.
As William E. Leuchtenburg states:
From the beginning of the Roosevelt era, Administration leaders had
worried about Mr.Justice Roberts. Their anxiety had eased when Roberts
had helped compose the majority in Nebbia, Blaisdell, and the gold clause
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pack the Court; in fact, FDR ultimately replaced virtually every
member of the Court during his long administration. 181 The
important point for our purposes is that, over a relatively short
period of time, FDR succeeded in replacing those justices committed to a constitutionally imposed laissez faire regime, under the
guise of substantive due process, with justices who were more
willing to allow government regulatory intervention consistent with
the objectives of the New Deal, and, critically, who shared a minimal
ideological commitment to respecting precedents that were adverse

to FDR's regulatory programs.

82

cases. But when Roberts joined the Four Horsemen in striking down the
Railroad Retirement Act, New Dealers recognized that the conservatives on
the Court, for the first time since FDR took office, had gotten the upper
hand. Furthermore, the language of Roberts's opinion led them to fear the
worst-that this was no temporary defection but a signal that Roberts was
permanently lost. In fact, in every important division on the Court for
almost all of the next two years, Roberts was to align himself with the
Conservative Four. The Rail Pension decision, then, loomed as far more
important than the particular legislation at issue. May 6 was to be looked
back on as the day of a historic shift of power on the highest bench.
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 42 (1995); see also id. at 168-74 (observing
that between 1935 and 1937,Justice Roberts consistentlyjoined the Four Horsemen).
The most famous single instance of the collective efforts of these justices to
thwart the New Deal programs, however, came after May 6, 1935. On "Black
Monday," May 27, 1935, the Court struck the National Industrial Recovery Act and
the mortgage moratoria in the Frazier-Lemke Act in LouisvilleJoint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), and issued Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935), which prevented FDR from removing a commissioner on the
independent Federal Trade Commission. For an analysis of Humphrey'sExecutor, see
infra note 183 and accompanying text. For an historian's recent review of this critical
Supreme Court period, see generally LEUCHTENBURG, supra. Justice Roberts's
defection in the 1937 case West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379, referred to as the "switch
in time that saved nine," turned the tide for FDR on the Supreme Court and
rendered his originally devised Court-packing plan unnecessary to the survival of his
New Deal initiatives. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra, at 142, 177.
181 From 1937 through 1941, FDR appointed 7 of the associatejustices: Black in
1937; Reed in 1938; Frankfurter and Douglas in 1939; Murphy in 1940; and Byrnes
andJackson in 1941. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 180, at 220. Justice Byrnes, who
resigned one year after his appointment, was replaced byjustice Rutledge, see id., the
only new associate with federal judicial experience prior to joining the Supreme
Court. See id. at 212. He had served for two years on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947, at 13
(1963).
182See Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,
24 GA. L. REV. 629, 638 (1990) (explaining that "[w]ithin
five years [of FDR's re-election], the victory of the liberal forces was consolidated as
Roosevelt appointed a number ofjustices who were both ideologically committed to

1995]

STANDING AND SOCIAL CHOICE

During the same period, the Court achieved two noteworthy
objectives beyond upholding New Deal programs. First, it began to
clear the way for the creation of what is now commonly referred to
as the "fourth branch." 8 3 The regulatory agencies created in the

New Deal were relatively modest in both scope"of authority and size
by more modern standards, but their creation and approval during
the New Deal Court proved critical for the regulatory expansion in
the Great Society program during the 1960s."8 4 During the latter
the New Deal and vigorously opposed to the judicial activism of the Lochner era"); see
also Riggs, supra note 153, at 682-84 (observing that when FDR elevated Justice
Harlan Stone to ChiefJustice in October 1941 (Stone was appointed AssociateJustice
by Calvin Coolidge), onlyJustice Stone and AssociateJustice Owen Roberts had more
than four years of experience on the Supreme Court).
" Ironically, while Humphrey's Executor,295 U.S. 602, which prevented FDR from
removing an officer of the Federal Trade Commission who did not share FDR's
political views, was viewed as a major setback to the New Deal, it ultimately helped
pave the way for numerous New Deal programs by establishing the power to create
independent federal agencies. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies
After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE LJ. 779. Verkuil explains:
The independent agency has existed for one hundred years, since the
formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission as the prototype. But
its "independence" did not become a matter of constitutional concern until
the 1930's, when the New Deal greatly expanded the number of agencies
and commissions. Ironically, President Roosevelt, the great spawner of
administrative government, was the victim as well as the beneficiary of the
independence concept.
Id. at 780; see also Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by
Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 149, 164 n.46 (1990)
(observing that "a host of independent agencies was created during the New Deal");
Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 441
(1987) (observing that, while such independent agencies as the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal Radio Commission
"were created well before the New Deal" and while many New Deal regulatory
agencies differed in that they "faced relatively clear legislative instructions," "the
enduring legacy of the [New Deal] period is the insulated administrator").
18" Professor Theodore J. Lowi explains:
Depending on who is doing the counting, an argument can be made that
Congress enacted more regulatory programs in the five years between 1969
and 1974 than during any other comparable period in our history, including
the first five years of the New Deal. It is possible to identify 130 major
regulatory laws enacted during the decade of 1969-79. Moreover, an even
stronger argument can be made that the regulatory policies adopted during
that period were broader in scope and more unconditional in delegated
discretion than any other programs in American history.
Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative

Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 298 (1987) (footnotes omitted); see also Richard J.
Pierce,Jr., PoliticalAccountability and Delegated Power: A Response to ProfessorLowi, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 391, 391-93 (1987) (confirming Lowi's historical analysis but
disagreeing on implications for the nondelegation doctrine).
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period, with the occasional-and exceptional-use of the now
moribund nondelegation doctrine to limit substantively the scope
of federal regulatory statutes, 85 Congress's authority to confer
substantial regulatory authority on independent agencies was largely
assumed based upon New Deal precedents.
Today, the once
limiting nondelegation doctrine poses virtually no barrier to
delegating broad-based regulatory authority to agencies. 186 In the
New Deal Court, the standing doctrine furthered the objective of
promoting a regulatory bureaucracy aimed at combatting the
Depression by limiting the potential class of plaintiffs entitled to
For that very reason,
challenge the regulatory expansion. 187
constitutional historians largely trace the origins of standing to the
88
New Deal.1
Second, in creating a Court more favorably disposed to
governmental regulation, President Roosevelt himself ultimately
created a second rift in the Supreme Court, which replaced the
former rift over the constitutional validity of economic substantive
due process. Having packed the Court sufficiently to ensure that

" See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theoy of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 17 (1982) ("The Court ... has never entirely abandoned the delegation
doctrine. It continues to live a fugitive existence at the edge of constitutional
jurisprudence."). The authors explain that in addition to occasional references by
individual justices, "[tihe Court sometimes refers to the doctrine ... when
interpreting broad statutes, using it in support of an otherwise tenuous effort to
narrow statutory construction." Id. at 12.
"' See id. at 12 (positing that in recent years, nondelegation has become
something of a "nondoctrine").
187 Steven Winter explains:
The liberals [including most notablyJustices Brandeis and Frankfurter] were
interested in protecting the legislative sphere from judicial interference.
Their goal was to assure that the state and federal governments would be
free to experiment with progressive legislation. The private rights model
was not just an available prototype, it was an ascendent prototype that
would serve their purposes well. By excluding the public rights model...
the liberals could preclude any dissatisfied private citizen from invoking the
Constitution in the courts to challenge the progressive programs enacted by
the polity.
Winter, supra note 101, at 1456-57 (citations omitted). While Winter's thesis helps
to explain the emergence of standing in the New Deal Court, it fails to explain why
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which were more skeptical of governmental
intrusion into private orderings, failed to abandon or cut back upon standing, rather
than to increasingly develop and employ it. For a discussion of this issue, see infra
part II.B.2. Using Winter's terminology, the question remains why the private rights
model was an ascendent prototype in an increasingly conservative Court that presumably wished to cut back upon liberal precedents that began in the New Deal and that
were expanded in the Warren Court.
" See Winter, supra note 101, at 1456-57.
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his regulatory programs would withstand due process challenges,
which were limited in number by the new standing doctrine,
President Roosevelt forged a Court that was sharply divided on the
jurisprudential framework for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause."8 9 While the Court was divided on the
question why economic liberties were not protected by the Due
Process Clause, the far more important division existed with respect
to locating those rights that the clause did protect. Because a
majority of the Court agreed that economic liberties were no longer
protected, and that prospective economic regulation was therefore
permissible, the different bases on that question were of little
concern.
But the different jurisprudential bases created an
increasingly important emerging rift over how to determine which
rights were protected, those deemed fundamental based upon
notions of natural rights or those set out in the Bill of Rights, and
what the protected rights entailed. After a long and often heated
debate between the so-called incorporationists and the so-called
fundamental rights camp, 90 which lasted from Chief Justice
...
See Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter,William 0.
Douglasand the Clash of Personalitiesand Philosophieson the United States Supreme Court,
1988 DUKE L.J. 71. The author explains:
Following the constitutional crisis of 1937, the personnel of the United
States Supreme Court changed rapidly as Franklin Roosevelt named new
Justices whom he believed committed to the modern views of the New Deal.
Roosevelt appointees constituted a majority of the Court by 1942, but
instead of harmony, the Court entered one of the most divisive periods in
its history. The economic issues which had dominated the Court's calendar
for nearly a half-century gave way to new questions of civil liberties and the
reach of the Bill of Rights, and these cast the jurisprudential debate between
judicial restraint and judicial activism in a new light.
Id. at 71.
1
' See Paul Bender, Is the Burger Court Really Like the Warren Court?, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 635 (1984). Bender explains:
[M]ost of [the] criminal procedure cases [issued by the Warren Court] were
manifestations of the Court's ultimate adoption of the doctrine of selective
"incorporation" of Bill of Rights guarantees into the fourteenth amendment,
a slowly developing approach that Justice Frankfurter had staunchly opposed, with decreasing success, throughout his career on the bench, but that
had been consistently urged in dissent for many years byJustices Black and
Douglas. The Goldberg appointment tipped the balance here, and once

tipped, a solid "incorporationist" majority emerged.
Id. at 639 (footnote omitted). It is worth noting that, in fact, the Goldberg appointment did not have the impact that Bender suggests. Goldberg was appointed in 1962
and retired from the Supreme Court in 1965, when he was replaced with Abe Fortas.
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at lxxxiii (2d ed. 1991);JETHRO
K. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS RULED
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Vinson's New Deal Court through the Warren Court, the Court
eventually succeeded in imposing upon the states all but four
substantive protections set out in the Bill of Rights. 191 At the
same time, the Court succeeded in limiting the extent of federal
constitutional intrusion into state sovereignty, at least over criminal
procedure matters, according to the express terms of the Constitution's text. 19 2 As shown below, both transitions that began in

ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING 684 (1992). As late as 1965, Goldberg
reaffirmed his opposition to incorporation in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("Although I have not accepted the view that
'due process' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the first eight
Amendments, I do agree that the concept of liberty protects those personal rights
that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights."
(citation omitted)). Bender cites Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), for the
proposition that the Goldberg appointment forged a solid incorporationist majority,
on the ground that onlyJustices Harlan and Stewart dissented from that decision, see
Bender, supra,at 639 n.11, which incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to ajury
trial in criminal cases via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149. But that would suggest that the appointment of Fortas in
1962, rather than Goldberg in 1965, tipped the scales in favor of incorporation.
191 William E. Leuchtenburg explains that the debate over the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause betweenjustices Frankfurter and Black
surfaced most prominently in the 1947 decision Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,
which held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not afford
criminal defendants the right not to testify at trial. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note
180, at 252; see also Adamson, 332 U.S. at 63-68 (Frankfurter,J., concurring) (agreeing
that the Fifth Amendment should not apply to the states). But see id. at 71-92 (Black,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment should apply to the states). The
incorporation/fundamental rights debate continued for years and did not settle
doctrinally until well into the Warren Court. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 180, at
252-58. By the early 1960s, see, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)
(applying the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment to the states),
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the
states), Leuchtenburg explains that "the Warren Court was breaching the wall
separating the Fourteenth Amendment from the first eight amendments at a
breakneck pace." LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 180, at 255. He goes on to observe,
"Almost every year in the 1960s brought a new victory for the incorporationists." Id.
at 256.
While the incorporationists overwhelmed the fundamental rights camp in this
period, Justice Black's total incorporation approach ultimately gave way to partial
incorporation. Thus, the Second Amendment, the Third Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment requirement of indictment by a grand jury, and the Seventh Amendment, have not been incorporated. See STONE ET AL., supra note 190, at 784 (discussing the extent of the incorporationist victory); Stearns, supra note 2, part II.B (same).
192
See PHILIP BOBBrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982). In explaining the significance and power ofJustice Black's incorporation
approach, Bobbitt states:
Black developed the textual argument, and a set of supporting doctrines,
with a simplicity and power they had never before had. His view was that
the Constitution has a certain number of significant prohibitions which,
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the New Deal, the first, from a laissez faire Court to a Court that
largely ratified broad-based regulatory programs, and the second,
from a fundamental rights jurisprudence to an incorporationist
jurisprudence, were critically different in social choice terms from
the transitional period represented in the Burger and early to midRehnquist Courts. That difference largely explains why, although
the modern standing doctrine has its roots in the New Deal, its
trunk and branches took form in the 1970s and 1980s.
The second period, as stated above, was the Warren Court
expansion of fundamental rights, which extended well beyond the
more literalist approach taken in part by the New Deal Court.
Whereas President Roosevelt had succeeded in creating a Court
through threat and force, appointing nine justices during his
presidency, the circumstances giving rise to the Warren Court era
were more fortuitous. President Eisenhower, who appointed Earl
Warren as ChiefJustice-albeit as part of a political compromise that
helped to land him the Republican nomination and, ultimately, the
presidency 193 -and Associate Justice William Brennan, with the
hope that both would help restore the Court to a less prominent
role associated with an earlier era, ultimately lamented both choices,
labeling them the biggest mistakes of his presidency. 194 Much of
when phrased without qualification, bar any extension of governmental
power into the prohibited areas. Ajudge need not decide whether such an
extension is wise or prudent; and as such a non-decider, he is a mere
conduit for the prohibitions of the Constitution. He is not, .as the realists
charged, enforcing his own views; indeed he may sometimes be in the
exquisite position of affirming legislation hostile to his own views.
Moreover, he is doing so on a basis readily apprehendable by the people at
large, namely, giving the common-language meanings to constitutional
provisions. This allowed Black to restore to judicial review the popular
perception of legitimacy which the New Deal crisis had jeopardized.
Id. at 31.
'9 As Donald Lively has observed, while President Eisenhower labeled his
appointment of Earl Warren as ChiefJustice a mistake, he "could not really claim
betrayal":

Eisenhower's nomination of Warren can be regarded both as a payback for
the latter's assistance in securing the Republican presidential nomination for
Eisenhower in 1952 and a shrewd tactic designed to defuse political warfare
between the more progressive Warren faction and the more conservative
Nixon elements of the California Republican Party.
Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional
Roles and Responsibilities,59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 555 n.30 (1986) (citing BERNARD B.
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF:

BIOGRAPHY

44 (1982)).
1

EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL

21-22 (1983), and G. EDWARD WHITE,

EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 139-

9 See RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 30
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the Warren Court's success in furthering policy objectives related to
racial equality, the rights of the criminally accused, the desegregation of public schools, and, with the help of Congress, places of
public accommodation, has been attributed to Chief Justice Earl
Warren's charisma and political acumen. 195 Through political
acumen, more than through intellectual force, Earl Warren
transformed the role of Chief Justice, at least for a time, from that
19 6
of co-equal jurist and administrator to that of majority whip.
At the same time, Associate Justice William Brennan provided
strong intellectual leadership on the left that lasted well beyond the
Warren Court era. 19 7 Indeed, while the Warren Court was marked
by politicization, the success of that politicization was due in very
significant part to the leadership's ability to bring even those who
doubted the propriety of a more activist Supreme Court into the
fold in major cases. Defections, therefore, signaled disagreements
on particular cases, rather than on the propriety of a more active
judicial role.

(1980); Michael Comiskey, Can a PresidentPack-orDraft-the Supreme Court? FDR and
the Court in the Great Depression and World War I1,57 ALB. L. REV. 1043, 1057 n.93
(1994);Joseph L. Rauh,Jr., An UnabashedLiberal Looks at a Half-Centuly of the Supreme
Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 230 (1990).
'9- See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 193, at 72-127.
"9In his well-noted biography, Bernard Schwartz describes Earl Warren's
transformation of the Chief Justice's role as follows:
Frankfurter once compared a great Chief'Justice's manner of presiding over
the Court with Toscanini leading an orchestra. And Warren brought more
authority, more bravura, to the ChiefJusticeship than had been the case
for years. TheJustices who sat with him have all stressed that Warren may
not have been an intellectual like Frankfurter, but then, as Justice Potter
Stewart puts it, "he never pretended to be one." More important, says
Stewart, he possessed "instinctive qualities of leadership." When Stewart
was asked about claims that Justice Black was the intellectual leader on the
Court, he replied, "If Black was the intellectual leader, Warren was the
eader leader." According to Stewart, Warren "didn't lead by his intellect
and he didn't greatly appeal to others' intellects; that wasn't his style. But
he was an instinctive leader whom you respected and for whom you had
affection, and.., as the presiding member of our conference, he was just
ideal.
Id. at 31.
197 As Bruce Ackerman explains: "While casting a 'swing vote' is important,
intellectual leadership is no less so: Earl Warren needed William Brennan." Bruce
A. Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1168 (1988). But
cf THE BURGER COURT, supra note 141, at 211 (positing that "the hallmark of the
Burger Court has been strength in the center [including Justices Stewart, White,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens] and weakness on the wings").
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In short, the two relevant periods, while marked by transition,
were not marked by the multipeaked fractionalization that the modern standing doctrine was designed to combat. Instead, during
the New Deal era, opponents of government regulation increasingly
became a minority, giving way to a newly forming majority that
shared, in significant part, a common jurisprudential vision, at
least with respect to what was almost certainly the most pressing
jurisprudential issue of the day. That is not surprising given that a
single president replaced those opposed to his policies on constitutional grounds and appointed nearly the entire Court. Most
notably, the Supreme Court that FDR appointed did not embrace,
on the basis of a neutral set of principles (including stare decisis),
a particular respect for precedents laid down in an earlier era with
which they disagreed, for example, the regime of Lochner."'8 As
demonstrated above, it is the presence of a third cohesive-but not

dominant-bloc that is governed by neutral principles, rather than
the dominant ideology of the two extreme wings of the Court, that
sets the stage for multipeakedness and that in turn explains the
Burger and Rehnquist Court's transformation of standing in a later
period. The transformation from one dominant framework to
another, for example, the rejection of Lochner in favor of a proregulatory regime, or the rejection of a fundamental rights due

process jurisprudence in favor of incorporation, is fundamentally
different in social choice terms than is the emergence of three

competing jurisprudential frameworks, none of which can ensure
that it *ill govern in a given case. While the Warren Court owes
its historic role to more fortuitous circumstances, it, like the
Court that FDR forged, was also typified by a newly formed majority coalescing around a single dominant ideology associated
with employing the federal courts to bring about desired social
change.
In translating the preceding analysis into social choice terms, the
following schematic will be helpful:

...
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Identified

Listed

Rights

Rights

Weak

Strong

\
1
2
3
4
Fundamental
Rights

5

4

3
2
1
Incorporated
Rights

Figure Three, which depicts a Supreme Court with preferences that
form a single valley at the intersection of two slopes, 9 ' is based
upon the divisive Supreme Court typified by the sharp debate
between Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter. Justice Black
believed that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause was
intended to incorporate all substantive protections in the Bill of
Rights and to apply them to the states."' Justice Frankfurter
believed that the same clause was intended to prevent states from
impinging upon fundamental rights irrespective of the substantive
content of the Bill of Rights.2"' The two vertical axes, the one to
the left for fundamental rights and the one to the right for rights
listed within the Bill of Rights, begin at the base with the strongest
rights and then include increasingly weak claimed rights as one
moves up from the base. For any claimed right, one would locate
its position on the vertical axis and then draw a horizontal line
connecting that axis to the slope representing those justices whose
framework is governed by that axis. The further one moves from
the base, whether based upon the fundamental rights or the
19 The schematic could also have been drawn with a single peak that descends in
two directions.
" See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(articulating the incorporation theory of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause).
' See id. at 63-68 (Frankfurter,J., concurring) (articulating the fundamental rights
theory of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and attacking Justice
Black's incorporation theory).
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incorporation framework, the fewer the members of the respective
jurisprudential camp that join in vindicating that right." 2
As stated above, the two approaches-fundamental rights and
incorporation-were both consistent with the rejection of a prior
dominant jurisprudential view, typified by Lochner v. New York, 2" 3
that prevented many forms of prospective economic regulation.
While neither the incorporationist camp nor the fundamental rights
camp continued to embrace the Lochnerian notion of economic
substantive due process, beyond that, the two camps took very
different approaches in trying to determine which claimed rights
were and were not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.
Unlike the legislature with a single-peaked curve and one
slope," 4 the members of this Court, when faced with a case
testing the outer limits of the Due Process Clause, did not share a
single view of the issue before them, and disagree only as to where
along a shared spectrum the Court's ruling should fall. Instead, the
two camps sharply differed in how they defined the issues in
controversial cases testing the boundaries of the Due Process
Clause.
Within each camp, however, the members' preferences did
resemble those in a legislature with a single peak and single slope.
Although the justices within each camp may not have entirely
agreed on which rights should be included as fundamental rights or
as listed rights (for example, the fundamental rights camp members
might have disagreed on which and how many rights are deemed
fundamental, and the incorporationist camp members might have
disagreed on whether all, or some, of the substantive provisions in
the Bill of Rights should have been incorporated 2 5 ), the justices
agreed on how to frame the legal inquiry, or, in social choice terms,
they agreed on the relevant political spectrum. 211 In other words,
202As demonstrated infra note 216, because the two camps exist on different
planes for some claimed rights, cross-camp coalitions will form while for other rights
only intra-camp coalitions will form.
203

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.B, tbl. 3.
205Stated differently, thesejustices may have disagreed on whether incorporation
was an absolute doctrine or if, instead, it operated as a presumption, and, if the latter,
how far the presumption extends. Indeed, the Court ultimately settled upon partial
incorporation. See infra note 211 (listing unincorporated rights).
206 As Professor Riker explains, "[t]his kind of agreement is precisely what is
lacking in a cycle [of voting outcomes], where voters disagree not only about the
204

merits of alternatives but even about where the alternatives are on the political
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while the members in each camp might have disagreed about where
along the spectrum a particular ruling should lie, they did agree
upon what the spectrum looked like.2 7 This intermediate paradigm, between the single slope curve and the multipeaked curve, is
critical in understanding the historical circumstances that rendered
the Supreme Court particularly conducive to creating the modern
standing doctrine beginning in the 1970s.
Historically, the relative size of the two curves, depicted in
Figure Three above, one representing the fundamental rights camp
and the other representing the incorporation camp, changed over
time as the number of justices espousing Justice Frankfurter's
fundamental rights view decreased and the number of justices
espousing Justice Black's incorporationist view increased. 0 '
Figure Three is therefore a static and somewhat stylized image,
depicting a single period in which four justices share Justice
Frankfurter's view that the relevant issue in cases involving the
substantive content of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause is whether the claimed right is fundamental and in which five
justices share Justice Black's view in the same cases that the
substantive issue is whether the claimed right should be incorpor20 9
ated by virtue of its status in the Bill of Rights.
Now consider a case in which a criminal challenges his conviction on the ground that the police questioned him in violation of his
right to remain silent. 210 The four members of the Frankfurter
camp might disagree as to whether, if proven, the claimed right is
of sufficient importance to warrant protection as a fundamental
right. But they do agree on one thing; the issue is whether the right
to remain silent is a fundamental right worthy of protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Similarly, the five
dimension." RIKER, supra note 52, at 128.
207 Professor Riker observes: "[s]ingle-peakedness is important because it has an
obvious political interpretation. Assuming a single political dimension, the fact that
a profile.., is single-peaked means the voters have a common view of the political
situation,
although they may differ widely on their judgments." Id. at 126.
2
1oSee supra notes 191-92.
2" This is roughly the Court that Professor Bender has described, albeit with the
appointment of Justice Fortas, rather than Justice Goldberg, tipping the scales in
favor of incorporation. See Bender, supra note 190, at 639.
2 The discussion to follow is based upon Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 46773 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
requires that police provide specified warnings to the accused prior to interrogation).
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members of the Black camp might disagree as to how far the
incorporation doctrine extends; Justice Black may view it as a near
absolute presumption while Justices Douglas and Goldberg might
instead view the presumption as somewhat less strong. But the
camp's members do agree that the relevant question is how far the
presumption-based upon inclusion of the identified right within the
211
Bill of Rights-extends.

This paradigm is different from both the single-slope and multipeaked paradigms. Unlike the single-slope paradigm, this paradigm
represents a Court that is sharply divided as to how to frame the
pressing issues of the day. With a single slope, a Court or legislature whose members each have a different preference can achieve
a rational outcome. 212 The single-valley, two-slope paradigm is
also critically different from the multipeaked paradigm. 213 As
demonstrated below, the relative sizes of the two camps and the
significant overlap of where each of the two different approaches
leads enabled the Court to achieve rational outcomes even in cases
that landed precisely on the Court's fault line. Unlike the multipeaked paradigm, this paradigm represents a Court that, notwithstanding its sharp division, was able to achieve stable outcomes,
even if it was unable to predict which framework would govern in
particular cases.
Even though the five justices in the Black camp constitute a
majority on the dominant approach, they are unable to control the
outcome unless all five agree on the particular right in question.
More typically, given the overlap in outcomes with respect to
particular rights among the two camps, depicted in Figure Four,
below, a cross-camp coalition consisting of some members of the
fundamental rights camp and some members of the incorporationist
camp will control particular outcomes.

"' As an historical matter, the Court ultimately settled on a partial incorporation
approach, under which all but four substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights-the
Second Amendment, the Third Amendment, the Fifth Amendment right to a grand
jury, and the Seventh Amendment-were incorporated. See STONE ET AL., supranote
190, at 784 (listing unincorporated rights).
212 See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.B, tbl. 3.
213 See id. tbl. 1.
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FIGURE 4

While the result in each case will depend upon the commonality of
outcomes across camps, in contrast with the multipeaked preference
diagram,2 14 the cross-camp coalitions that do form will be stable
because no present majority on the deciding Court favors an
alternative outcome, whether based upon a different substantive
framework or a set of neutral principles such as adherence to stare
decisis. To create cyclical instability, the Court would need no less
than three options, none of which carries a majority.215 In this
case, the Court has only two options-to vindicate or not to
vindicate the right in question-even though the bases for decision
among the ultimate coalition members differ. Moreover, this holds
true even though the predictability of the line-up from case to case
21 6
is not strong.
214See id.

tbl. 1.

215 See id.

(explaining that, to reveal a cycle, an institution must have a minimum

of three options and take as many pairwise contests-through formal or informal
means-as there are options).
216 While not essential to following the argument in the text, it might be helpful to consider the three-dimensional aspects of Figure Three, see supra text
accompanying note 199. Look again at Figure Three, this time imagining that the
diagonal line descending from the listed rights axis is coming toward you and that the
diagonal line descending from the identified rights axis is moving away from you.
Now imagine that the two vertical axes, representing the fundamental rights and
incorporation approaches, and the horizontal axis, representing the number of
justices, form a goal post. If you were to turn the goal post counterclockwise 90
degrees, such that the two vertical axes converge and form a single vertical line
directly in front of you, the two descending slopes would then form a tent, as
illustrated in Figure Five below.
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As the Court continued to shift toward the incorporationist
camp, however, the ability to define issues and predict outcomes
FIGURE 5
Listed or
Identified
Rights

Fundamental
Rights

Incorporated

Rights

Because the two diagonal lines exist along different planes, when the graphic image
is turned, they appear to form a tent rather than a valley as each descending line is
pivoted along the relevant vertical axis. Thus viewed, we can graphically depict a
particular claimed right that appears along only one relevant dimension or camp.
Figure Six, below, identifies a claimed incorporation right that attracts no cross-over
membership from the fundamental rights camp. As a result, only three justices vote
to vindicate the listed right and the result is nonincorporation. For a list of
unincorporated rights, see supra note 211.
FIGURE 6
Listed or
Identified

Rights

Fundamental
Rights

3 Incorporated
Rights
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substantially increased. 217 Once a sufficient number of incorporationist camp members emerged, they were able to ensure a
majority on any given claimed right, even if some members of the
camp defected. While Justice Frankfurter, for example, may have
disagreed with the rationale and outcome in a given case, his vote
no longer rendered the prevailing rationale for vindicating or
denying a particular claimed right uncertain.
As stated above, the difference between single-valley and multipeaked preferences is critical to the evolution of standing. If a
Court characterized by single-valley preferences is concerned with
achieving rational and stable outcomes, it has no need to create a
doctrine like standing. While the Court in this period was sharply
divided on how to approach the underlying issues, over time it was
increasingly able to predict the critical line-ups across the two major
camps. Moreover, as suggested above, the incorporationists were
increasingly able to rely solely on their own members to control case
outcomes. And because the relevant cases involved the rights of
criminal defendants and convicted criminals raising collateral
challenges, the Court was unable to avoid making law. 218 In the
end, therefore, both the majority and the minority could predict
with considerable certainty both how the issue would be defined, or
stated differently, what the relevant issue spectrum would look
like, 219 and where, along the defined spectrum, the Court's ruling
would likely fall.
The historical transition from a fundamental rights Court to an
incorporationist Court is largely consistent with the single-valley,
two-slope paradigm. While the New Deal Court had employed the
newly minted standing doctrine to stave off attacks against regulatory intrusions, neither it nor the successor Courts, which continued
to resolve the incorporationist/fundamental-rights controversy
through the Warren Court era, carried the standing doctrine into
the nonregulatory due process context. 22' The Court did not
avoid deciding those cases presenting the question of which rights
217Seesupranotes 191-92 (explaining the continuing dominance of the incorporationists).
218See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.A.
219See RIKER, supra note 52, at 126-28 (explaining political significance of
unipeaked preferences).
220 In fairness, appropriate cases testing this proposition are uncommon because

fewer ideological cases were presented during the New Deal than today. But that too
might be a product of the absence of a multipeaked Court that could not control the
outcome of its decisionmaking processes and that would have invited such litigation.
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were fundamental or which Bill of Rights provisions required
incorporation, either when the fundamental rights jurists were in
command or when they lost control to the incorporationists, in
large part because the relevant issues were presented in criminal
cases. More importantly, the Court's outcomes, even though
inconsistent on the governing methodology, remained stable over
time. This was true even though the Court was sharply divided on
one of the most critical jurisprudential issues of the day. The Court
reshaped the definition of the issue as the incorporationists
assumed supermajority status and, ultimately, formed a stable
equilibrium at the point where all but four substantive provisions in
the Bill of Rights were incorporated and applied to the states.
The final resolution of the incorporation controversy occurred
in the next major transitional period, that of the Warren Court.
The Warren Court, which invited, rather than resisted, cases testing
the outer limits of federal judicial power in protecting the rights of
racial minorities and the criminally accused, had little need to flirt
with standing and, if anything, predictably chose to relax the
doctrine at the margins in an effort to vindicate novel constitutional
challenges. 221 The Warren Court fundamentally redefined-at
least for a period-the role of the federal judiciary within our
constitutional scheme, eschewing traditional limiting principles of
originalism and textualism in favor of an overriding sense of
fundamental fairness. 222 The Warren Court further promoted the
notion that the judiciary--and especially the Supreme Court-was an
institution of last resort for those whose most ardent claims were
resisted in the political branches.
Perhaps not surprisingly,
therefore, the Warren Court's activism required it to issue the most
prominent reminder of the Court's role as constitutional expositor

"' Indeed, while the Warren Court maintained the essential standing framework
created in the New Deal Court, it, somewhat predictably, liberalized the doctrine at
the margins. See Joan Mahoney, A Sword As Well As a Shield: The Offensive Use of
CollateralEstoppel in Civil Rights Litigation, 69 IOwA L. REV. 469, 469 (1984) ("Many

of the decisions of the Warren Court were predicated on the belief that federal
constitutional issues ought to be tried, or at least finally resolved, in federal court.
To that end, concepts of standing were broadened... ."); Arthur H. Abel, Note, The
BurgerCourt's Unified Approach to Standingand Its Impact on CongressionalPlaintiffs, 60
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1985) (positing, based upon Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), that "[d]uring the Warren Court years, the standing requirement was
designed simply to ensure that plaintiffs pursued their claims vigorously").
I am not using the term fairness in its social choice sense in the preceding
sentence; instead, I am using it in the sense that the Warren Court understood it,
namely the use of courts to advance the interests of politically and economically
disadvantaged groups.
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With minor exceptions, 24 not since
since Marbury v. Madison.2 2
226
225
the early chestnuts of Marbury and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee
was the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's role in interpreting the
Constitution so seriously drawn into question in a direct legal
challenge to its authority as it was in Cooper v. Aaron. 227 The
Court made quick work, of course, of Governor Faubus's contention
that potential public disorder, which he was in large part responsible for inciting, provided a basis for defying the requirements of
228
Brown v. Board of Education.
Once again, a united Court stood firm and reaffirmed that,
whatever its jurisprudential tools, the Supreme Court's role remains
as it has since Marbury. It is not necessary to detail the history of
the Warren Court, which is amply documented elsewhere. 229 We
need only observe that the most controversial decisions issued by
the Warren Court were far more controversial outside than inside
the Supreme Court chambers. While the landmark opinions Mapp
v. Ohio230 and Miranda v. Arizona 211 were decided by narrow
majorities, other controversial cases, including Brown v. Board of
23 4
23
2 2
and Gideon v. Wainwright,
Cooper v. Aaron,
Education,
were issued with supermajority or unanimous support. While the
Warren Court obviously did not share the preferences of the
citizenry whose popular will it often thwarted, its members shared
a sufficiently common, and perhaps more enlightened, vision that

" See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (rejecting Governor Faubus's
contention that civil unrest provides a basis for failing to follow the dictates of Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and stating that Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), had established "the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the. exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system").
" For a discussion of statements by Presidents who challenged the Supreme
Court's role as ultimate expositor of the Constitution, see GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21-25 (12th ed. 1991) (discussing statements by Presidents
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
7 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

26

-8 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 193; WHITE, supra note 193.

- 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (six to three).

231 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (five to four).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (unanimous).
- 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (unanimous on result).
234 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (unanimous on result).
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enabled it to again predict with considerable certainty both how
critical case issues would be defined and resolved.
That vision, of course, is what was fundamentally lacking in the
transitional era typified by the Burger and early-Rehnquist Courts.
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts were divided in a fundamentally
different and far more debilitating manner than were the Courts of
the two principal eras that preceded them. Unlike the single-valley
Court attempting to resolve the fundamental rights/incorporation
debate, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts could not ensure with any
degree of certainty how relevant case issues would be defined, or
where along any given spectrum particular Court rulings would lie.
Because the Burger and Rehnquist Courts possessed multipeaked,
rather than single-valley preferences, the conditions were ripe for
the creation of a doctrine designed to prevent the inevitable
irrationality that arises when a collective decisionmaking body is
forced to decide issues in the absence of Condorcet-winning
preferences. Thus, while the New Deal Court imposed standing in
a united front against unwelcome challenges to favored New Deal
programs and to discipline recalcitrant lower federal courts, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts built on those early roots to transform
standing into something else entirely. In the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, standing became a necessary vehicle to prevent the
irrationality of the Court's own creation. Even an institution that
could not agree either on how to define or resolve divisive issues
could agree on one principle: Better not to decide, or to let lower
federal courts decide, the most difficult issues presented than to
condone outcomes no more predictable than a role of the dice. In
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the conditions were ripe for the
transformation of standing into its present form, set out below, and
for the elevation of standing to its present level of doctrinal and
practical significance. The next subsection will explain the origin
of the metaphors the Burger and Rehnquist Courts employedinjury in fact, causation, and redressability-in devising the modern
standing formulation.
B. Modern Standing: Evolution and Doctrine
Before analyzing the development of standing in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, we will need to consider briefly the doctrine's
statutory and judicial origins." 5 Any analysis of modern standing
2s" As stated above, much of the vocabulary that surrounds the development of
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law must begin with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
enacted in 1946, and the landmark 1970 Supreme Court decision,
Association of Data ProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp,23 6 which
infused the APA's standing provision, section 10(a), 3 7 and ultimately the Case or Controversy Clause of Article 111,238 with an
important and controversial substantive gloss. In the twenty-five
years since Data Processing was decided and despite the near
universal condemnation that the decision has generated among
academics, the Court has largely added layers of complexity to that
decision's basic approach.
In Data Processing, the Court announced that plaintiffs relying
for standing upon APA section 10(a) and a substantive federal
statute must satisfy a two-prong test: first, the plaintiff must allege
both that she falls within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by the relevant statute; and second, she must allege an
injury in fact.2 9 The origins of the injury-in-fact test are dubious,
at least to the extent that the Court purports to have based that test
upon the APA.2 4
The Data Processing Court further stated that
the injury-in-fact prong of its standing formulation was of constitutional dimension, 241 which petitioners conceded in the companion
case, 242 Barlow v. Collins. 24
In a 1987 case, Clarke v. Securities
Industry Association, 4 4 the Court observed that it has continued to
adhere to the essential division established in Data Processing by
requiring claimants who rely for standing upon the Constitution to
satisfy its injury-in-fact test, and the subsequently added causation

standing was derived from the earliest period of United States equity practice, carried
over from England. See supra note 176; see also Stearns, supra note 2, part I.C. For
our purposes, the critical point is that, whatever its early common law foundations,
the standing doctrine, as employed today, emerged in the New Deal and underwent
its most critical transformation during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
26 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
237 Ch. 324, § 10(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1988)).
211 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
239 See Data Processing,397 U.S. at 152-53.
240 For a discussion of the debate that led to the adoption of that test, see infra
part II.B.2.
241See Data Processing,397 U.S. at 151-52.
242 See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 257 (citing petitioner's briefs in Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
243 397 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1970) (relying on DataProcessingto grant tenant farmers
standing to challenge a Department of Agriculture regulation under the Food and
Agriculture Act of 1965 on the grounds that the farmers had alleged both injury in
fact and that they were within the zone of interests protected by the Act).
244 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
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and redressability tests,24 5 and by limiting the zone-of-interest test
to APA section 10(a) standing cases. 246 In any event, the Court
has continued, through its interpretation of Article III, to adhere to
the injury-in-fact requirement in virtually all cases-albeit in a
fashion that is much criticized as inconsistent-and it has gone
further, adding the two prongs identified above. In the process, the
Court has effectively metamorphosed three common law tort
analogies-injury in fact, causation, and redressability-to the level
247
of quasi-constitutional doctrine.
Many scholars have been quick to point out the conceptual and
practical difficulties inherent in both the original Data Processing
standing formulation, which requires that the plaintiff satisfy both
the zone-of-interest and injury-in-fact tests, and its modern
counterpart, which requires that the plaintiff satisfy a three-part
2s
test, including injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.
While the academic criticism is as voluminous as it is varied, three
common threads underlie much of the commentary. First, the
APA's statutory history strongly suggests that the standing provision,
section 10(a), was not intended to have independent substantive
content, either in the form of a zone-of-interest test or an injury-infact test. Instead, section 10(a) was largely intended as a conduit
through which plaintiffs would allege standing in accordance with
249
the underlying substantive statute or constitutional provision.
By itself, this erroneous gloss would seem no more problematic
than any other questionable exercise in Supreme Court statutory
interpretation. After all, Congress could presumably amend or
215

The causation prong was first mentioned in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.

614, 618 (1973) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish injury in fact because
enforcement of the statute would result injailing the child's father without necessarily
producing support payments), and was given constitutional status in Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (observing that "[the Art. IIIjudicial power exists only to
redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party").
246 See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16.
247 For an analysis of the tort metaphor in modern standing, see Stearns, supra
note 2, part I.0.
241 See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 176, at 1144-45 (positing that in adding the
redressability prong, the Court has failed to recognize that procedural rights created
by Congress are intended to alter incentives and not necessarily to facilitate particular
results); Cass R. Sunstein, Standingand the Privatizationof PublicLaw, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1432, 1463 (1988) (asserting that the conceptions underlying the Supreme
Court's three-part standing test "have no place in regimes in which the legal injury
is often of a different order" than that prevalent in the nineteenth century).
249 See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 255-59 ("The touchstone [of § 10(a)] is that
anyone whom a 'relevant statute' considers to be adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action has standing to seek review of the action under that statute.").
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supersede the APA in order to clarify its position on standing. In
fact, the Court has recently employed the injury-in-fact test
originated in Data Processingto invalidate an express congressional
grant of standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.25 The plaintiffs
in Lujan, who fell clearly within the ambit of the statute, were
denied standing based upon their inability to establish a legally
cognizable injury in fact,2 5' thus calling into question Congress's
ability to "cure" the Court's construction, or misconstruction, of
section 10(a). Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the DataProcessing
Court's conversion of the common law principle of injury into
quasi-constitutional doctrine was the Court's lack of precision.
While the Court has repeatedly emphasized that standing has both
constitutional and prudential underpinnings, 252 (the former
grounded in the Case or Controversy Clause of Article 111253 and
the latter grounded in the concept of judicial self-restraint25 4 ), the
Court has never clearly articulated standing's constitutional/
prudential boundary. 255 Nor have the standing cases been consis250 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992) (holding in part that "the public interest in proper

administration of the laws ... [cannot] be converted into an individual right by
statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens ... to sue").
251 See id. at 564.

252 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,468 (1992) (Scalia,J., dissenting)
(observing that standing consists of the constitutional requirements of Article III and
a set of prudential considerations); Franchise Tax Board v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd.,
493 U.S. 331, 335 (1990) ("We have treated standing as consisting of two related
components: the constitutional requirements of Article III and nonconstitutional
prudential considerations.").
253 See, e.g., Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of
Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297,2301 (1993) (noting that standing is an essential part of
the constitutional requirements of Article III); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct.
2767,2776 (1992) (requiring that plaintiffs establish standing in order to "invoke the
constitutional power of the federal courts and adjudicate a case or controversy under
Article III").
25 See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 119 (1979)
(discussing "prudential rules of self-restraint designed to bar from federal court those
parties who are ill-suited to litigate the claims they assert"); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (same).
25 For a recent student comment highlighting several inconsistencies in the
Court's constitutional/prudential boundary, see Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How
StandingHas Fallen: The Need to Separate Constitutionaland PrudentialConcerns, 142
U. PA. L. REv. 1063 (1994). Gottlieb would limit standing's constitutional underpinnings to the concern for zealous advocacy, relegating all other concerns, including
both federalism and separation of powers, to prudential status. See id. at 1071.
Gottlieb fails, however, to provide any compelling rationale for rejecting an Article
III foundation for federalism and separation-of-powers concerns, beyond noting
several inconsistencies in the cases and claiming that, if these other standing concerns
are provided constitutional footing, the Court will limit both its power and that of
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tent. In the current Court, that illusory doctrinal boundary has
created a profound schism between the so-called moderates who,
although generally skeptical of public interest litigation, would
largely defer to Congress's power to create novel causes of action
and their more conservative counterparts who, in Lujan, relied upon
standing to prevent Congress from delegating its authority to
private attorneys general to monitor executive agencies in federal
courts.256 If we assume, as the Court has repeatedly suggested,
that standing, in its constitutional and prudential dimensions, is
largely intended to preserve Congress's principal lawmaking
role, 257 Lujan appears questionable at best. In any event, despite
its dubious origins, as standing is presently formulated, the Court
requires that virtually all federal court plaintiffs satisfy the threeCongress. See id. at 1071-76. The difficulty with Gottlieb's thesis, however, is
twofold. First, his argument that constitutional standing limits judicial power is
premised upon an unstated normative baseline that eschews a more limited judicial
role. As these articles have demonstrated, however, there are profound structural
reasons, revealed by social choice, for the Supreme Court to seek to limit its lawmaking role, and those reasons are very closely tied to the constitutional concept of
separation of powers. Second, it is by no means clear, as Gottlieb appears to assume,
that resting constitutional standing upon a separation-of-powers basis limits
Congress's power to overcome, by statute, judicial denials of standing.
Grounding constitutional standing on separation of powers may signal the need
for an express federal statutory grant of standing to pursue claims of relief that have
no analogues at common law. In that sense, the separation-of-powers theory of
constitutional standing might limit the power of lower federal courts, which otherwise
might view prudence differently than does the Supreme Court, but not limit
Congress, at least in the same manner or to the same degree. If a federal statute
creates standing to pursue a claim for which the Constitution alone would not
support standing, there is no reason, consistent with a prior ruling that denied
standing to pursue the constitutional claim based upon separation of powers, to then
deny standing to pursue the statutory claim. Instead, the congressional determination
on the question of standing satisfies the separation-of-powers concern in its
constitutional,and not merely in its prudential, dimension. The same result might not
hold if a state legislature or a federal agency attempted to confer standing to raise the
same challenge.
That is critically different from imposing, as the Court appears to have done in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), a stringent injury-in-fact
requirement based upon Article III, on statutory, as well as constitutional, standing
claims. In that case, Congress, along with state legislatures and agencies, may be
powerless to supersede the ruling.
21 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573. In essence, the Lujan Court was divided on whether
the constitutional foundation was located exclusively in Article III or in both Articles
II and III. See id. For an analysis of Lujan, see infra part III.D.
2 7 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating that the idea of
separation of powers underlies the standing doctrine); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1975) (stating that standing defines the properly limited role of courts in a
democratic society).
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prong standing test, whether those plaintiffs rely for standing upon
the APA, the Constitution itself, or a direct congressional grant of
standing.
A second thread running through the standing literature is that
the Data Processing Court's injury-in-fact test, while apparently
intended as a neutral mechanism designed to limit the federal
judiciary to its proper and limited role, cannot be applied other
than in a highly normative manner. 258 In effect, every denial of
standing, while intended to prevent the Court from reaching the
merits of an underlying claim, can be recast as a substantive
holding, one that reveals the normative dimension of standing's
injury-in-fact inquiry. While Part III will demonstrate that the
modern standing doctrine forces upon the federal judiciary many of
the value judgments that it was presumably intended to prevent
federal courts from reaching, 25 it will also demonstrate that
recognizing the normative underpinnings of the Court's standing
determinations only begins the analysis. A standing denial is not
improper merely because it can be translated into a substantive
ruling. Instead, to determine the propriety of a standing denial, we
need to weigh the Court's potential alternative substantive rulings,
first, the inevitable substantive ruling that results from a standing
denial, and, second, the ruling on the merits of the underlying
claim-one that may be the irrational product of multipeaked
judicial preferences-that would result if standing were conferred.2 6 ° In short, while a standing denial is inevitably substan-

' This point has- been made most artfully by Professor William A. Fletcher.
Fletcher states:
I wish to show that the "injury in fact" requirement cannot be applied in a
non-normative way. There cannot be a merely factual determination
whether a plaintiff has been injured except in the relatively trivial sense of
determining whether plaintiffis telling the truth about her sense of injury.
If we put to one side people who lie about their states of mind, we
should concede that anyone who claims to be injured is, in fact, injured if
she can prove the allegations of her complaint. If this is so, there can be no
practical significance to the Court's "injury in fact" test because all people
sincerely claiming injury automatically satisfy it. This should be so because
to impose additional requirements under the guise of requiring an
allegation of "injury in fact" is not to require a neutral, "factual" showing,
but rather to impose standards of injury derived from some external
normative source.
Fletcher, supra note 171, at 231.
259See infra part III.
260 As

demonstrated infra part III.A., this approach differs from that offered by
William Fletcher and others who have criticized modern standing on the ground that
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tive, it is most often a very different substantive ruling, both in terms
of its content and its rationality, than that which results when the
Court grants standing and addresses the merits of the underlying
claim. A proper analysis therefore must go beyond the mere
recognition that standing determinations are substantive and instead
compare the two potential alternative substantive rulings in any
261
given standing case.
The final theme that runs through the standing literature is that

by infusing a judicially imposed injury-in-fact requirement upon
federal court claimants, the Supreme Court may have signaled an
unwelcome retreat from the long history of public litigation in
England and in the United States at the time of the Constitution's
framing. 262 Again, the Court, to the extent that it has sent this
signal, has not done so in a consistent fashion. 263 Thus, while the
Court has allowed, albeit in an inconsistent manner, housing market
testers and residents of communities who are afforded standing
under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to challenge discriminatory
residential real estate marketing practices, even though the litigants
themselves had no interest in securing housing, 264 the Court has
it contains an unstated normative component. See supra note 258.
261See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.B (describing shadow case analysis in which
standing cases are not directly compared, but, instead, the relationships between
standing cases and their shadow cases-those hypothetical cases in which litigants
could raise the same claims with no credible standing barrier-are compared).
262 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 148, at 177 (positing that "early English and
American practices give no support to the view" that injury in fact is a requirement
for Article III cases or controversies).
263 See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972)
(allowing "a generous construction" of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and holding that
any member of the housing unit who claimed injury from the owner's discriminatory
actions had standing to sue under the statute); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06
(1968) (holding that a taxpayer had standing to challenge the financing of religious
schools on Establishment Clause grounds).
264 See Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1982) (holding that a fair
housing organization consisting of one white member and one African-American
member had standing under the FHA to challenge the dissemination of untruthful
and discriminatory housing information, stating that the injury required by Article III
may exist by virtue of "'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing'" (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))); Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211-12 (upholding a Fair Housing Act provision granting standing
to plaintiffs who claimed that the defendants unlawfully denied them truthful housing
information because of their race, even though the plaintiffs were testers who were
not interested in actually securing housing, but instead were raising the claim on
behalf of others who failed to secure desired housing because of racial discrimination); see also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979)
(converting a third party standing claim of residents not attempting to secure housing
into a first party standing claim to enjoy the "social and professional benefits of living
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recently denied standing to environmental litigants in spite of their
invocation of a statute that expressly afforded them private attorney

general status. 26

Somewhat oddly, the "originalist" criticism of

the modern standing doctrine, which demands a stronger foundation for retreating from centuries of public interest litigation based
upon Article III, comes from the left. 266 The anomaly disappears,

however, when we recognize that, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
the Court used standing to prevent Congress from conferring upon
private attorneys general the power to monitor and prevent,

through federal court actions, executive-agency conduct that
potentially harms the habitats of endangered species abroad.
In any event, scholars have argued that neither Article III nor
section 10(a) of the APA were intended to reverse centuries of
precedents in which ideological plaintiffs have sought relief
in judicial fora.267
By superimposing standing's injury-in-fact
requirement onto cases in which plaintiffs rely upon federal
statutes, the Court has signaled a serious intrusion into Congress's
power to define newjudicially cognizable injuries. Again, this issue
is at the core of the present schism over standing in the Supreme
Court.268

What is missing from the existing literature on standing,
however, is a positive explanation for why, in spite of the obvious
incongruities within the Supreme Court's standing doctrine, the
Court has continued to develop and rely upon it. Any positive
analysis of standing must answer, or at least provide substantial
insights designed to explain, the following questions. First, why did
the Court, in spite of near unanimous criticism of the 1970 Data

in an integrated community"); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264 (1977) (conferring standing upon an African-American
in search of housing near his place of employment to challenge under the FHA the
town's refusal to rezone for reasons related to race, where the developer's proposal
created "substantial probability" that the project would be completed, even though
development was contingent upon uncertain federal housing subsidies). For a
thoughtful analysis of these and other FHA cases, see generally David A. Logan,
Standingto Sue: A Proposed Separationof Powers Analysis, 1984 WiS. L. REv. 37, 64-81.
26 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992).
96 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 148, at 166 (stating that the novel interpretation
that Article III forbids Congress from granting standing to citizens to bring suit is
"essentially an invention of federal judges . .. [and inconsistent with] the original
understanding of the Constitution").
267 For a discussion of the prevalence of these practices, see Stearns, supra note
2, Introduction subpart C.
2 See infra part III.D (analyzing the Lujan opinions).
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Processing decision, 269 retain and further develop that decision's
basic framework? Second, why did the Court superimpose the
injury-in-fact test first articulated in Data Processingonto Article III,
thus requiring that all federal court plaintiffs satisfy its inevitably
normative standing test? Third, why, if a liberal New Deal Court
created standing to stave off attacks against regulatory programs,
did an emerging conservative Court, in the 1970s and 1980s, expand
upon, rather than retreat from, standing in a renewed effort to
invite challenges to previously protected federal regulatory
programs? Fourth, why, if standing was created out of deference to
Congress, did it become a barrier to Congress's power to define
novel causes of action? Finally, why is the current Supreme Court
split on where (assuming any exist) the constitutional origins of
standing lie? By tracing the doctrinal evolution of standing and
tying it into the preceding analysis, the remainder of this Article will
address these critical questions.
1. Pre-Administrative Procedure Act Standing
To understand the Data Processing Court's transformation of
standing, it is first necessary to consider the pre-APA standing
doctrine. Scholars have divided the earliest standing cases, which
270
began during the New Deal, into three conceptual paradigms:
first, some federal statutes expressly denied standing to affected
claimants; 27 1 second, some statutes expressly conferred standing
upon affected claimants; 27 2 and, third, some statutes simply failed
to address the question of standing. 271 In the first two categories,
269Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
270The following summary, including several of the examples selected, is drawn
in significant part from the excellent discussion set out in Fletcher, supra note 171,
at 226-27.
17 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5,48 Stat. 8, 9 (precluding veterans from
challenging agency denials of benefits in federal court).
272See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934 § 402(b), 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (Supp.
V 1993)) (conferring standing upon "any ... person ... aggrieved or whose
interests are adversely affected by any order of the [Federal Communications]
Commission"); see also Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940) (granting standing to complainant even though
the claimed injury was not a factor which the Commission was legally obligated to
consider).

273 See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118,
137-38 (1939) (denying standing to challenge TVA's regulatory conduct absent an

allegation that the agency had invaded plaintiff's legal right, for example, one
grounded in property, contract, or tort); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464,
480 (1938) (denying standing to challenge federal loans and grants to competing
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where Congress specifically addressed the question of standing, the
pre-DataProcessing Court almost invariably deferred to Congress's
express will. Faced with congressional silence, on the other hand,
the Court devised an amalgam of standing presumptions drawn
274
from the common law of property, contract, or tort.
The concept of legal injury was central to this early approach to
standing. A plaintiff relying upon a federal statute that was silent
on the question of standing would be afforded standing if she
alleged an injury cognizable at common law. While the legal injury
doctrine did not prevent Congress from creating novel claims, it
had the practical consequence of allowing the federal judiciary,
including most notably the Supreme Court, to protect Congress in
its creation of New Deal programs at lower political cost than if
those courts reached the merits of every constitutional challenge to
a federal regulatory expansion. It also had three significant benefits
associated with judicial administrability: first, it had the effect of
reducing the number of such actions, thus conserving judicial
resources; second, by creating presumptive rules to govern the
determination of injury, grounded in common law principles with
which the lower federal courts were intimately familiar, 275 it
enabled the Supreme Court to promote a relatively consistent
application of its standing principles in lower federal courts; and,
finally, it helped to prevent recalcitrant lower federal courts from
addressing the merits of challenges to administrative agency
regulations, thereby decreasing the potential for circuit splits on
27 6
important questions of federal law.
The nearly simultaneous retreat from Lochnerian substantive
due process and the erection of a judicial standing barrier is no
coincidence; indeed, the two doctrinal developments are inextricably linked.277 The linkage of standing to a cognizable legal injury,

municipal utilities, holding that plaintiff had no right to be immune from lawful
municipal competition); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (directly linkingstanding inquiry to infringement of comparable
common law right); Fletcher, supra note 171, at 226-27 & n.37.
274 See supra note 273.
27 It is noteworthy that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which had the
effect of taking the lower federal courts out of the business of promulgating their
own parallel common law in diversity cases, was issued during the formative standing
period on the New Deal Court. For an analysis of Erie, and its connection to
standing, see infra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
276 See infra text accompanying note 283 (observing that, while FDR ultimately
packed the Supreme Court, albeit without increasing the number ofjustices, he did
not succeed in packing the lower federal courts).
277 Cf Sunstein, supra note 248, at 1438. Sunstein recognizes the linkage between
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grounded in the common law or a relevant statute, would not have
protected New Deal programs from attack in a regime that
recognized a fundamental right to contract and to own property
free of prospective governmental regulation. Curiously, however,
the linkage works in both directions: In a regime that rejected
Lochner and that allowed substantial governmental intrusion into
private orderings, a justiciability doctrine designed to stave off
the emergence of standing and the erosion of Lochnerian jurisprudence, stating:
The private-law model of standing... reflected a confluence of two
sets of ideas, both closely associated with the Lochner era and the New Deal
attack on the jurisprudence of Lochner. The first, prominent in Lochner
itself, was that thejudiciary existed largely to protect common-law interests
from governmental incursions. The common law formed the baseline from
which courts distinguished between government inaction and action or
neutrality and partisanship. For this reason, intrusions on common-law
rights, and not on other sorts of interests, served to triggerjudicial protection. The second idea-a reaction against Lochner on the part of those
hospitable to the administrative state-was that doctrines of justiciability,
including standing, should be designed to minimize the occasions for
judicial intervention into the regulatory process.
The advocates ofjudicial control, hostile to administrative regulation,
saw no need for judicial intervention in order to safeguard the interest in
regulatory protection. And in light of the recent history, those favorable to
regulation were highly suspicious of the courts. The idea that courts might
intervene to protect regulatory beneficiaries from a recalcitrant agency was
entirely foreign to their experience. As a result, there was a mutual agreement on the private-law model from those who believed in the need for a
continuing role for the legal system in supervising administrative regulation,
and those who thought that adjudicative controls were to a large degree
anachronistic.
Id. While Sunstein recognizes the linkage between the decline of Lochner and the
emergence of standing, his explanation of its significance differs from that in this
Article. For Sunstein, the decline of Lochner created a common interest in limiting
judicial regulatory intervention between the liberals and the conservatives. The
liberals, or "those who thought adjudicative controls ... anachronistic," never
thought that courts would protect agency regulation. Id. The conservatives, or those
"who believed in the need for a continuing role for the legal system in supervising
administrative regulation," were reticent to let the emerging liberal Court protect
programs that they opposed. Id.
The difficulty is that, whether or not prior Supreme Courts protected agency
regulation, there was little doubt that the entire mission of FDR's Court-packing plan
was to forge a Court that would protect his New Deal programs. Given that he
ultimately succeeded in replacing the entire Court, it is doubtful that the emerging
liberal majority was distrustful of its own power to preserve New Deal programs,
regardless of what their predecessors had done. The more likely explanation for the
confluence of standing and the demise of Lochner, as explained below, see infra text
accompanying notes 282-85, is that the emerging liberal Supreme Court needed a
vehicle to protect regulatory programs from attack in the conservative lower federal
courts.

396

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 309

unwelcome challenges to governmental regulation would appear
unnecessary, or at best, redundant. After all, without Lochner, the
very challenges that standing was intended to prevent would have
been denied on the merits. As demonstrated above,2 7' because
the New Deal justices shared substantially common preferences, at
least in their willingness to condone regulations that the Lochner
Court held off limits, they could predict with considerable certainty
the outcome of challenges to many regulatory programs. The
outcome would be to uphold many, or most, of the regulations that
the newly created standing doctrine protected from attack. Thus,
in a Court that is willing to provide Congress with broad authority
to regulate the economy directly and to establish agencies with the
power to regulate in accordance with the legislative will, it is
doubtful that standing's function is to protect the Court from
rulings that might thwart the preferences of a majority of the
Court's members or to prevent litigant path manipulation. In that
critical respect, New Deal standing differs from modern standing.
As demonstrated above, 279 path manipulation arises primarily
in courts whose members share widely divergent and multipeaked
preferences.
This requires no less than three jurisprudential
frameworks, none of which has majority support. Because President
Roosevelt succeeded, by force or threat of force, in forging a Court
willing to remove the then-perceived constitutional barriers to his
New Deal policies, the New Deal Court's preferences were closely
aligned on the most important doctrinal issue of the day, namely
whether his regulatory policies would withstand constitutional
attacks. And while forging a Court that willingly ratified New Deal
programs ultimately created a split on thejurisprudential interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause with respect
to noneconomic interests (with Justice Frankfurter championing a
fundamental rights jurisprudence and Justice Black championing
incorporationism)," ° standing was not a necessary vehicle to
prevent the divided Court from thwarting the will of a majority of
its members. Instead, because the Court had two slopes along
different dimensions that were of shifting, but unequal, size, it was
again able to produce stable outcomes and, over time, to predict
21 Seesupra notes 199-207 and accompanying text (noting that the two dominant
approaches ofthe New Deal Court, fundamental rights and incorporation, were both
consistent with the rejection of Lochner).
279 See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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with a considerable degree of accuracy both the definition of issues
and outcome resolution. Two obvious questions then arise: First,
why did the Court, for the first time, develop a self-conscious law of
standing during the New Deal?"' Second, what function did
standing serve on the New Deal Court?
In its earliest incarnation, standing served two dominant
purposes, both of which are critically different from the purposes
that standing serves on the modern Court. First, standing was a
low-cost mechanism that enabled the New Deal Court to stave off
unwelcome challenges to New Deal programs without having to
incur the political costs-or embarrassment-associated with
determinations on the merits that differed widely from those of a
recent era typified by Lochner.28 2 Second, standing provided a
281Cf Fletcher, supra note 171, at 225. The author states: "The creation of a
separately articulated and self-conscious law of standing can be traced to two overlapping developments in the last half-century: the growth of the administrative state and
an increase in litigation to articulate and enforce public, primarily constitutional,
values." Id. While these two events no doubt contributed to the development of
standing, it is critical that they be severed both conceptually and chronologically in
analyzing standing. Thus, while the rise of the administrative state during the New
Deal coincided with the creation of standing, standing took its present form substantially later, during the Burger and Rehnquist Court eras. In addition, ideological
litigation, without more, would appear an unlikely basis for the development of
modern standing. If, for example, those presenting ideological challenges share a
common jurisprudential vision with that of the prevailingjurists, as was often the case
in the Warren Court, such suits might be welcome. If, on the other hand, they do
not, the Court might still welcome the opportunity to defeat those challenges on the
merits, rather than, by failing to consider them based upon standing, leave open the
possibility to litigants to present those challenges in the future. As this Article
suggests, the better explanation for the development of standing into its present form
lies in the fact that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which were typified by
multipeaked preferences, were unable to predict with any reasonable degree of
certainty the outcome of ideologically driven cases on the merits because of voting
procedures unique to appellate courts. The very same inability to predict outcomes
encouraged rather than discouragedideological interest groups, dissatisfied with the
legislative silence or with legislative outcomes, to attempt to force non-Condorcetwinning preferences into lawjudicially. As this Article demonstrates, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts developed standing as a rational response to these litigant
incentives, as a means to prevent outcomes that arbitrarily and irrationally thwarted
the preferences of a majority of the Court's members.
" The standing cases, unlike rulings on the merits, possessed a technical, even
mechanical, quality that at least in the short term reduced the extent to which the
Court appeared to have done a doctrinal about-face on the question whether prospective economic regulation violates due process.
To be sure, even the very earliest standing cases were no less normative than are
their modern counterparts. A ruling that a plaintiff has no standing to challenge a
regulation that imposes costs on his business, for example, a minimum wage or
maximum hour law, is no different than a substantive legal ruling that a plaintiff has
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very useful mechanism for docket control in the Supreme Court,
and perhaps more importantly, in lower federal courts. These
points, while obviously related, remain distinct. While President
Roosevelt succeeded in forging a Court that shared his constitutional (and political) vision, the same was not true for the lower
federal courts, which having been packed in the three preceding
Republican administrations, were sympathetic to Lochner and hostile
2 83
to FDR's regulatory agenda.
It is no coincidence that the architects of the New Deal standing
doctrine, Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, were also the architects
of Erie

.R. v. Tompkins.2

4

As William Braverman explains:

The federal courts' domination by conservative judges andJustices
who opposed much of the progressive legislation that Frankfurter
and other liberal intellectuals and politicians supported ... helps
explain Frankfurter's antidiversity position. Through diversity
jurisdiction, cases that would otherwise have been in the state
courts found their way into the federal courts, where they were
heard by the type ofjudge whom Frankfurter and his progressive
28 5
colleagues opposed.

no right to conduct his business free from unwanted government regulation of wages
and hours. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 171. But unlike determinations on the merits,
denials of standing possessed a more mechanical quality, one that appeared at least
to prevent the Court from reaching the difficult policy questions associated with
substantive due process. Thus, while a series of substantive rulings, upholding each
New Deal program against attacks drawn from myriad constitutional provisions,
would have signaled that the Court, manipulated by FDR's force or threat of force,
had changed course, thereby undermining the Court's appearance of doctrinal
integrity, the erection of a standing barrier achieved the same objective with less
embarrassment. The Court could claim that the question of standing was new
because
the nature of legal rights claimed in the regulatory era was new.
2
83 See PETER H. IRONS, THE NEw DEAL LAwYERS 13 (1982) (observing that the
Hughes Court "shared with their lower-court brethren an equal commitment to the
precepts of constitutional fundamentalism and a similar 19th-century perspective");
Joseph L. Rauh,Jr., Lawyers and the Legislation of the Early New Deal, 96 HARV. L. REV.
947, 949 (1983) (book review) (observing that prior to the Roosevelt administration,
"three successive Republican administrations had stacked the lower federal courts
with judges hostile to federal action of almost any kind").
2- 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
285 William A. Braverman, Note, Janus Was Not a God ofJustice: Realignment of
Partiesin DiversityJurisdiction,68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1096 (1993) (citations omitted).
As early as 1925, Frankfurter and Brandeis, who authored Erie, began their analytic
assault on diversityjurisdiction, and most notably on Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1 (1842), which allowed federal judges to create their own Lochnerian common law
at the expense of progressive state regulatory programs. See Braverman, supra, at
1099 (collecting authorities).
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Absent standing, an ambitious, or contrarian, circuit could have
effectively forced the Supreme Court to address the merits of those
cases that standing was intended to prevent by distinguishing cases
in which the Court did rule on the merits, thus striking down
particular New Deal programs. The resulting circuit splits would
not afford the Supreme Court with the luxury of using a short-hand
vehicle to leave favored programs in place. But, through standing,
the Supreme Court could impose a greater degree of doctrinal
uniformity throughout the circuits, by preventing recalcitrant lower
courts from creating distasteful bait. In other words, standing, like
Erie, proved an essential tool in disciplining the lower federal
courts. Erie prevented the lower federal courts from interfering
with progressive state law programs, while standing prevented the
same courts from interfering with progressive federal programs.
The pre-Data ProcessingCourt's flexible approach to standing is
noteworthy in two additional respects. First, inherent in the
approach is a nearly complete deference to Congress, both in its
power to regulate the economy and in its power to confer upon
public and private parties the power to litigate in federal court."'
The degree of partnership, or kinship, between the New Deal
Congress and the New Deal Court, while repeated, albeit to a lesser
extent, during the Warren Court era, 287 was largely lacking during
much of the Burger and Rehnquist Court eras, when the modern
standing doctrine took its present shape. Second, by employing
common law analogies, the Court merely created a set of legal
presumptions. Presumptions are, of course, simply vehicles to be
deployed in the face of congressional silence and to be abandoned
in the event of congressional redirection. In that sense, the newly
erected standing barrier was neither unique nor unusual. In the
face of legislative silence or statutory ambiguity, federal courts
routinely resolve cases by filling gaps, often based upon common
law principles.
Those presumptions, however, are generally
abandoned when Congress enacts a statute expressing a contrary
intent. And while common law presumptions, when applied in an
26

" See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 226 (observing that "it is fairly clear that the
[APA's] reference to 'relevant statute' was intended... to continue the flexibility and
variation in response to particular statutory grants and purposes").
211 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(upholding the public accommodations provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act against

a challenge by the motel); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964)
(upholding the same provision against challenge by a restaurant).
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era typified by novel legislative intrusions into the marketplace,
might prevent many meritorious legal challenges, that is not
necessarily an undesirable result. After all, courts, unlike legislatures, lack the power of institutional inertia. To the extent that the
Court's members did not share like preferences during the New
Deal era (or to the extent that the New Deal Court's members
shared like preferences that differed from those of the population
at large, lower federal courts, or representatives in Congress),
standing enabled the Court, in the face of congressional silence, to
avoid being drawn into a lawmaking function that could result in
judicial codification of non-Condorcet-winning preferences.
But if the essence of the New Deal standing doctrine was to
allow the Court to defer to Congress in its adoption of New Deal
regulatory programs, a critical question arises: Why did the later
Burger or Rehnquist Courts, which were generally far more
skeptical of the power of government to improve the nation's
economy through regulation, continue to adhere to, and to
increasingly employ, the standing doctrine? As shown below, recent
standing case law suggests that, beginning in the Burger Court and
continuing in the Rehnquist Court, the doctrine served, and
continues to serve, a very different but no less valuable function
than it did during the New Deal. Rather than employing standing
as a vehicle to provide short-hand merits determinations at low
political cost and to discipline lower federal courts, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have employed standing to prevent high stakes
institutional dice rolls, in which no one, including a majority of the
Court's own members, are able to predict, or are likely to be
satisfied with, the resulting outcomes.
2. The Adoption and Interpretation of the APA
The second major chapter in standing law began in 1946, with
the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act.288 The APA
can fairly be characterized as an umbrella statute that was intended
to add uniformity to the already burgeoning field of administrative
law and procedure. The APA addressed the question of standing in
Section 10(a) provides standing to
somewhat cryptic terms.
"person[s] ... adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute. " 219 Since its adoption,
288 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706

(1988)).

289 Ch. 324, § 10(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
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academics have been sharply divided as to what section 10(a)
means.29 To the extent that a consensus has formed as to the
section's meaning, the consensus is largely contrary to prevailing
Supreme Court interpretation.2 9 1 Social choice theory is not
particularly helpful in explaining the Court's initial interpretive
error, but it is very helpful in explaining why the Court, despite two
and a half decades of academic condemnation, has continued to
adhere to it.
In the landmark 1970 Data Processing29 2 decision, the plaintiffs
sought standing to sue in federal court based upon section 10(a) of
the APA and upon two substantive statutes, section 4 of the Bank
Service Corporation Act293 and the National Bank Act. 294

In

conferring standing, the Supreme Court interpreted the APA to
require a federal court plaintiff to allege, first, that she suffered an
"injury in fact"295 and, second, that "the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant [be] arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 29 '
The Data Processing Court
further suggested that the injury-in-fact requirement is of constitutional dimension. 297 As a result, every federal court plaintiff,
whether relying upon the APA, the Constitution, or some independent statute, must satisfactorily demonstrate an injury in fact or be
denied standing.
Data Processing is noteworthy in that its two-part standing test
infused section 10(a) with substantive content despite strong
§ 702 (1988)).
o For a review of the early academic debate, dominated by Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis, who claimed that the APA required an injury in fact, and Professor Louis
Jaffe, who argued that the APA was not intended to alter prior standing law, see
Fletcher, supra note 171, at 256-57.
" See id. at 255 n.151 ("It is fairly clear from the legislative history, as well as

from the statutory text, that the APA was designed to preserve existing standing
law.").
' Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
3 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1988).
"9 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Data Processing,397 U.S. at 152.
296Id.
at 153.
2 97

See id. at 151-52. In the companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 357 U.S. 159
(1970), the petitioners conceded and the Court stated that the injury-in-fact prong

was a constitutional requirement. See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 257 (citing
petitioner's brief). In criticizing Data Processing,Professor Fletcher states: "[m]ore
damage to the intellectual structure of the law of standing can be traced to Data
Processingthan to any other single decision." Fletcher, supra note 171, at 229.
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298
statutory language and history suggesting a contrary intent.
While consensus within the standing literature is often elusive, one
area in which a considerable consensus has formed is in the
rejection of the Data Processing Court's interpretation of section
10(a).299 Modern commentators have expressed general agreement that section 10(a) was not intended to alter the flexible
approach to standing, set out above, that preceded the APA's
adoption. Instead, section 10(a) was intended to be a neutral
conduit.
The statutory history and language, while not conclusive on the
point, strongly suggest that, based upon section 10(a), federal court
plaintiffs would be afforded or denied standing on the same basis
as under existing federal statutes and case law. The confusion over
the substantive content of section 10(a) stems largely from a debate,
following the statute's adoption, between Professors Kenneth Culp
Davis and Louis L. Jaffe." °'
Professor Davis argued, based upon House and Senate Committee reports, that section 10(a) was intended to require, as a
prerequisite to standing, that plaintiffs allege an injury in fact."'1

s See supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, StandingforSolidarity, 88 YALE LJ. 1559, 1566-70
(1979) (book review) (describing the DataProcessingformulation as an "unredeemed
disaster"); Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 425 (observing
'sharp criticism" of the Data Processing decision); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G.
Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 480 (1995) (observing that "[t]he [Data
Processing] injury-in-fact test has come under intense scholarly criticism for lacking
coherent limitations and for failing to provide an objective test of standing divorced
from the 'merits' of whether the plaintiff's interests are legally protected").
Relying on language in Data Processing that suggests that injury need not be
economic for a federal court to confer standing, see Data Processing,397 U.S. at 154,
Cass Sunstein has expressed some support for the Data Processing standing
formulation as a "rejection of private property as the predicate forjudicial intervention in favor of an approach that calls on courts to ensure the identification and
implementation of public values." Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 893 (1987).
30o Compare 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.06, at 232
(1958) with LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-500
(1965). For scholars supportingJaffe's position, see Fletcher, supra note 171, at 231
(positing that Jaffe's position is stronger, as an historical matter, than is Davis's);
Sunstein, supra note 148, at 171-73 (arguing that English precedents common at the
framing of the Constitution support the argument that federal courts are empowered
to entertain public actions).
so' See 3 DAVIS, supra note 300, § 22.06, at 232. Professor Fletcher has observed
that, "given [Professor Davis's] eloquent and consistent pleas for clarity and simplicity
in the law of standing," it is ironic that Davis was partly at fault for standing's
"clouded and difficult... actual operation." See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 256.
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Professor Jaffe, in contrast, argued that section 10(a) was not
intended to prevent courts from continuing to hear public actions,
as they had done historically."0 2 Indeed, as recently as 1968, two
decades after the APA's adoption and just two years prior to Data
Processing, the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen... signaled strong
support for public actions based directly upon the Establishment
Clause. In Flast, the Court conferred standing upon a group of
taxpayers seeking to challenge government contributions to a
religious organization on Establishment Clause grounds. 30 4 Given
the ubiquity of taxpayer status, the Flast case bears striking
resemblance to qui tam actions prevalent in England and throughout
the United States at the time that the Constitution was proposed
and ratified."0 5 The Court, following Data Processing, chipped
away at Flast in the 1982 decision, Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 0 6 denying
taxpayer standing to claimants challenging a federal land grant to
a religious organization, also allegedly in violation of the Establishment Clause.
The transformation from Flast to Valley Forge, whether wellfounded or not, suggests that the nature of the Court's standing
analysis underwent a critical transformation in the aftermath of Data
Processing. Regardless of the origin of the legal right in question,
the Court was going to scrutinize with greater care whether a
claimant, even one relying upon the Constitution rather than a
federal statute, suffered an injury analogous to those recognized at
common law. While one might be inclined to rationalize Flast and
Valley Forge on the Court's own terms, accepting the proposition
that expenditures of tax dollars bear a closer nexus to taxpayer
status than do land grants and disregarding the obvious economic
equivalence of the two governmental actions,"' 7 the overall thrust
of the Court's standing decisions following Data Processing, as
demonstrated below,308 suggests that much more is going on. The
I SeeJAFFE, supra note 300, at 459-500 (1965) (arguing that federal courts had
historically entertained public actions); id. at 528-30 (arguing that § 10(a) of the APA
makes no mention of an injury-in-fact requirement).

03 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
For a more thorough analysis of Flast and of the later Valley Forge opinion,
which held that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge a land grant allegedly in
violation of the Establishment Clause, see id. part I.A.
305 See Stearns, supra note 2, Introduction subpart C.
'o 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
07
$04

See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A.

m See infra part III.

0 3

404

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 309

critical question addressed in the following part then is why, given
that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have tended in a substantially
more conservative direction than their New Deal predecessor, they
have continued to employ standing to stave off challenges to a wide
array of allegedly unlawful government actions by applying the
injury-in-fact test traceable to Data Processing.
III. STANDING IN THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS

Despite the dubious origins of the Data Processinginjury-in-fact
standing requirement, the modern Court has continued to adhere
to, and to further develop, the Data Processingframework. In Linda
R.S. v. Richard D.,3 °9 the Court first articulated two additional
standing requirements, causation and redressability,3 10 and in
Warth v. Seldin,s " it added these two prongs to its constitutional
standing test.312 As a result, under present Supreme Court
interpretation, the Article III Case or Controversy Clause imposes
as a precondition to standing for every federal court plaintiff that
she properly allege injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The
Court has imposed these requirements without regard to the
substantive basis of the underlying legal claim. While the Court has
not had the same difficulties in interpreting these additional prongs
as it has had in interpreting the injury-in-fact requirement, 313 it is
fair to say that incorporating these prongs has done little to clarify
the problems associated with constitutional standing. This section
will analyze many of the apparent incongruities within the standing
case law.
For ease of presentation, I will divide the modern constitutional
standing case law into three major groupings: (1) no right to
enforce the rights of others; (2) no right to prevent diffuse harms;
and (3) no right to an undistorted market. In describing the cases

s- 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
310 See id. at 617-18.
311 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
312

See id. at 504.
Winter, supra note 101, at 1379 ("From tort law, we would have assumed
that the necessary causal chins would vary as different policies and purposes are
implicated. Yet one of the oddities of standing law is that, in its treatment of the
sis Cf

issue of causation, a strange uniformity predominates instead." (footnotes omitted)).
Winter cites Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978),

in which the Court granted the claimants standing despite an arguably attenuated
causal link, as a counterexample to this proposition. In fact, when that case is
considered using the shadow case analysis suggested below, see infra part IILA, this

seeming anomaly is also removed.
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within each grouping, I will consider cases in which the claimants
rely for standing upon the Constitution and upon federal statutes,3 14 including section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 1 ' I will then revisit statutory standing conferrals in light of
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 16 This will help to explore the
difference between the standing doctrine's constitutional and
prudential foundations. Before describing the three groupings of
standing cases, it will be helpful to explain my choice of
headings.1 7
The first grouping, no right to enforce the rights of others, is
most commonly referred to in the literature as "no third-party
standing." My choice of heading is intended to emphasize two
features of these cases. First, as with other standing precedents, the
Court's denial of third-party standing invariably masks a substantive
legal ruling. For example, in Gilmore v. Utah,3 1 the Court, in
terminating the stay of execution it had previously entered,
effectively denied Mrs. Gilmore standing to raise the claims of her
son, Gary Gilmore. Furthermore, the Court made a substantive
determination that Mrs. Gilmore herself lacked the legal right to
prevent the state of Utah from convicting and executing a criminal
defendant in a manner that allegedly violated the Constitution, even
if the affected criminal defendant were her son. 31 9 Second, while

514

The most prominent recent statutory standing case is, of course, Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). It is fair to say that the principles that
underlie Lujan are difficult to square with the principles that underlie the constitutional standing cases and that the actual holding is difficult to square with prior
statutory standing precedents. As suggested below, however, social choice might help

to provide a positive explanation of the case. See infra part III.D (positing that the
Lujan standing denial might represent the Court's signal to Congress not to avoid
responsibility and shift blame for controversial policy results-those that might reflect
multipeaked preferences-through broad statutory standing provisions that effectively
delegate controversial policymaking powers to the federal judiciary).
'15Ch. 324, § 10(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1988)).
316 504 U.S. 555 (1992). This case is discussed below, see infra part III.D.
3"7 The headings I employ are noteworthy in two respects. First, they are stated
as substantive legal rules. Second, the heading for category three-no right to an

undistorted market-is new to the standing literature.

SI 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (order of the Court terminating stay of execution).
319

See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.B. Chief Justice Burger (joined by Justice

Powell) andJustice Stevens (joined byJustice Rehnquist) would have decided Gilmore
on standing grounds. See Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1013 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at
1017 (Stevens,J, concurring). The Court's order terminating the stay of execution,
which was joined (in addition to the four listed justices) by Justices Stewart,
was, instead, based on Gary Gilmore's "knowing and intelligent" decision to waive any
and all federal claims. Id. at 1013. One interesting aspect of Gilmoreis that it reflects
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the Court has generally prevented claimants from raising the legal
rights of others, it has not done so in all cases,3 20 and it has
generally allowed Congress to alter that presumption by creating a
right to enforce third-party interests by statute.3 21 In addition to
these features, scholars have pointed out that many standing cases
under other labels can readily be analyzed as third-party standing
cases.3 22 As demonstrated below, several cases that fall within the
third grouping, no right to an undistorted market, cannot readily be
characterized as no third-party standing cases.3 23
For present
purposes, the more critical point is that a major body of nonstanding case law, criminal procedure, provides a critical contrast in
3 24
analyzing third-party standing cases.
The second grouping, no right to prevent diffuse harms,
includes the general presumptive rule against taxpayer standing. In
the predecessor article, I analyzed the two principal cases, Flast and
Valley Forge at length3 25 and demonstrated that the incongruity
that those cases reveal may result from the very cycling phenome-

a liberal/conservative lineup against at least one, often critical, vote in the center,
Justice Stewart. Such a lineup is consistent with the predictions about standing drawn
from the social choice model.
S20 See; e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412-14 (1991) (allowing a white
defendant to raise Batson challenge on the ground that the defendant was effectively
raising the right of the potential African-American juror not to be excluded). For a
critical analysis of Powers, see infra text accompanying notes 381-86.
21 See supra note 264 and accompanying text; infra notes 361-66 and accompanying text.
32 See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 246 ("If we were so inclined, we could call
almost all cases in which standing is seriously contested third party standing cases.
That is, difficult standing cases are almost always third party standing cases in the
sense that the direct interests of the plaintiff are viewed as less important than the
interests of non-parties, and the plaintiffs are seen as seeking to serve not only their
own interests but those of others as well.").
323 See infra part III.C (explaining that cases within this grouping are not susceptible of third-party standing characterization). In addition to positing a category of
standing cases that defies the third-party standing label, this Article departs from
Professor Fletcher's analysis in arguing that "difficult standing cases" fall into the final
category, no right to an undistorted market, see infra part III.C, rather than into the
first category, no right to enforce the rights of others. This follows from the shadow
case analysis, see infra part III.A; see also Stearns, supra note 2, part 1I.B, which
resolves many apparent anomalies associated with third-party standing.
324 By comparing those cases in which convicted criminals have forced thejudicial
creation of positive law with those standing cases in which ideological plaintiffs have
been prevented from forcing judicial creation of positive law on the same, or on
similar, issues, we see the critical function that standing serves, especially on a
multipeaked Court. We also see that many of the apparent incongruities within this
body of case law lie at the periphery of so-called third-party standing.
325 See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A.
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non that standing--and stare decisis-were in large part designed to
eradicate.3 2
As with the presumptive rule against third-party
standing, the Court, until quite recently in any event, has permitted
Congress to define as individual rights, enforceable in federal
courts, those injuries that traditionally would have been viewed as
diffuse. 27 Most recently, in Lujan,328 the Court suggested that
standing, in its constitutional dimension, prevents Congress from
translating diffuse harms into individual rights, at least when
preventing such injuries requires that the federal courts monitor the
executive branch.
The third grouping, no right to an undistorted market, which
has been given the most novel heading, is intended to capture the
body of standing case law that is analytically the richest in many
121 See id. As I explained in that article, it is very important to keep distinct the
two levels of social choice analysis when viewing these cases. In these articles, I
demonstrate that standing itself serves to ameliorate, but not to remove, many of the
doctrinal anomalies that would result if litigants were provided unfettered control
over the path of Supreme Court decisionmaking. Because institutional cycling can
occur both at a single moment in a given case or over time across several cases, the
Court has developed decisional rules that prevent the requisite number of votes to
reveal cycles in both situations. Case-by-case voting prevents snapshot cycling, cycling
that would arise if the Court employed issue-by-issue voting when it has shifting
majorities. See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1256-57. It does not, however, prevent the
form of cycling that is the focus of this Article, namely cycling that occurs over time.
In response to the doctrinal difficulties that cycling poses, the Court has developed two decisional rules. The first, stare decisis, prevents the requisite number of
votes to reveal cycles that occur over time. See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.A. The
second, standing, prevents litigants from manipulating the substance of Supreme
Court precedent by controlling the path of case decisions. Together, these rules
enable the Court to satisfy its obligation to resolve cases in a fair manner even when
a cycle may be present. It does so by ensuring that all litigants play according to the
same ground rules.
But, of course, these very voting rules apply no less to the standing cases
themselves than to other substantive areas of Supreme Court case law. As a result,
we should expect the standing cases themselves to be affected by the very voting rules
that create the doctrinal irrationalities and incongruities that the doctrine is designed
to reduce. While this is unavoidable, it is also not a basis with which to condemn
standing. The relevant question when assessing any legal doctrine, including standing, is not whether the doctrine is invariably applied in a consistent or correct
manner. See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1230 n.33 (discussing the nirvana fallacy). It
is, instead, whether the objectives of the overall system of which the doctrine under
review is a part are likely to be furthered with or without that doctrine in place.
Despite the standing doctrine's apparent incongruities, which are due in significant
part to the aggregation problems that social choice reveals for all decisional bodies,
standing continues to serve important objectives that are not satisfied by other legal
doctrines.
s" See supra note 264 (describing the principal Fair Housing Act cases).
328 504 U.S. 555 (1992). For a critical analysis of Lujan, see infra part III.D.
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respects. As with the first grouping, these cases, in which the Court
has denied standing because the chain between the alleged
misconduct and the plaintiffs' claimed harm was attenuated, 29
invariably involve substantive legal determinations. When properly
analyzed, these standing cases, and their underlying substantive
determinations, reveal both the critical social choice and separationof-powers dimensions that underlie the modern standing case law.
It is worth noting that I have used the term "undistorted" rather
than "unregulated" in the heading. My choice of terminology is
intended to distinguish the standing cases from the cases that
marked the end of the Lochner era. In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish33 and its progeny, the Court held, in cases in which standing
was not seriously disputed,"' that the Constitution no longer
prevented prospective economic regulation that had been held off
limits under Lochner. West Coast Hotel effectively held that there is
no right to an unregulated market, at least as a matter of constitutional due process. In the standing cases, in contrast, plaintiffs are
not claiming that economic regulation is per se unconstitutional.
Instead, they are claiming that, if we assume that the regulation in
question violates some independent constitutional guarantee, most
commonly the Equal Protection Clause, or statute, then they have
a right to have the regulation struck down if striking that regulation
will ultimately inure to their benefit. Whereas West Coast Hotel held
that the Due Process Clause does not prevent market regulation, in
these standing cases, the Court has effectively ruled that plaintiffs
do not have the right to the benefits associated with removing
independently unconstitutional or otherwise illegal market distortions.
The heading also captures another important feature of these
cases. Some illegal market distortions can be superimposed upon

" See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984) (denying taxpayer-plaintiff
standing to challenge IRS procedures that afford tax-exempt status to certain racially
discriminatory schools); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,43-44
(1976) (denying plaintiff standing to challenge IRS ruling that allegedly encouraged
hospitals to deny services to indigent patients and declaring claim too speculative);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1975) (denying low-income plaintiffs standing
to challenge exclusionary zoning practices for failure to allege facts from which it
could reasonably be inferred that, absent the challenged practices, they would be able
to purchase or lease land).
- 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
131 While the defendant in West Coast Hotel raised the question whether plaintiff
had standing, see id. at 386, the Court did not address the standing issue in its
opinion, suggesting that standing was not seriously disputed.
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a regime that takes a set of legal regulations, instead of a state of
laissez faire, as its baseline. 3 2

Thus, in Allen v. Wright,333 the

plaintiffs alleged that the illegal market distortion resulted from the
conferral of tax-exempt status in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 34 and in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, the plaintiffs alleged that such a market distortion resulted
from the conferral of tax-exempt status in violation of the Internal
Revenue Code. 36 Again, the claimed right is not to a market that
is unregulated, but rather to a market, whether regulated or not,
that is not distorted by illegal means.
None of the three groupings is entirely distinct. And within
each grouping, which can perhaps be better thought of as a
presumptive doctrine, exceptions can be found. As stated above,
scholars writing about standing have relied upon the resulting
inconsistencies to challenge both the doctrine's foundations and
applications.
Much of that literature has been summarized
already.3 17 Because this Article differs from the existing standing
literature both in its starting point and in its method of analysis, it
...
The position in the text is not to be confused with Professor Sunstein's critique
of Lochner. Sunstein contends that the conceptual difficulty with Lochner was that it
took private orderings as its baseline without recognizing that allowing markets to
operate is a deliberate governmental decision. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697, 1718 (1984). While I have
previously criticized this thesis, see Stearns, supranote 12, at 1265 n.172, suffice to say
here that Sunstein's analysis, by conflating opposing baselines, renders difficult-if not
impossible-the task of meaningfully discussing regulatory policy. For a related
critique, see generally GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW (1991). Robinson states:
Cass Sunstein's criticism of Lochner seems to me unsound. Sunstein
criticizes Lochnerand "Lochner-like understandings" for taking as a baseline
from which to decide constitutional cases the unregulated market (the
market subject only to the standards of the common law). More generally
he criticizes the Court for assuming that the common law was inherently
"natural and inviolate," and [for accepting] this status quo as the basis for
determining a neutral principle. Of course, the Court took the status quo
as a baseline; what else could it take, where should it start if not from the
status quo? It is not correct to say the Court took the status quo to be
inviolate; it was only a starting point. One must start somewhere. It is
impossible to impose a burden of proof without some notion of what it is
that must be proved, which cannot be formulated without a further understanding of an accepted baseline.
Id. at 61-62.
133 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
4'See id. at 739.
335 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
'3 See id. at 28.
$37 See Stearns, supra note 2, Introduction subpart C.
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should not be surprising that, in finding a substantial justification
for the modern standing doctrine, the Article further differs from
that literature. I have started from the premise that, as with all
areas of substantive Supreme Court doctrine, we cannot expect
entirely consistent standing case law. 3 18 I have also started from
the premise that if we assume that Supreme Court justices, whatever
their individual tastes and preferences happen to be, can be
expected generally to behave rationally, we should be able to
understand why standing developed as it did when it did and what
functions that doctrine presently serves. I have already demonstrated the function that standing served on the New Deal Court,
and I have posited that that function has changed over time. By
analyzing the modern standing cases according to the groupings set
out above, the remainder of the Article will explain the modern
function, and durability, of this enigmatic doctrine.
A. No Right to Enforce the Rights of Others
This grouping, which is most commonly referred to as thirdparty standing, lies at the core of the modern standing doctrine. At
least one author has suggested, in fact, that virtually all standing
33 9
cases can be conceptually recast as cases within this grouping.
While I will demonstrate that it is in fact difficult to fit several of
the cases within the third grouping, no right to an undistorted
marketplace, in a third-party standing paradigm,3 4 1 the more
important point is that many cases that traditionally have been
treated apart from standing altogether are critical in understanding
why the Court, in crafting this standing rule, has created a substantive legal ruling that individuals presumptively lack the right to
enforce the rights of others. A proper analysis of these cases also
reveals the illusory nature of the claim by the Supreme Court and
some commentators that the third-party standing doctrine is
intended to promote zealous advocacy.3 41 In fact, the analysis

ss This was among the major insights ofJudge Easterbrook's provocative article,
Ways of Criticizingthe Court. See Easterbrook, supra note 34, at 813. For my analysis
and critique of Easterbrook's thesis, see Stearns, supra note 2, parts I.B-C.
3" See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 245.
340 See infra part III.C.
341 See, e.g., Secretary of State v.Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976); Gottlieb, supra note 255, at 1071 (arguing
that the only constitutional basis for standing is the need to promote zealous
advocacy); cf. Abel, supra note 221, at 1189 (observing that in the Warren Court, the
standing doctrine was largely grounded in the desire to promote vigorous advocacy).
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reveals that quite often the opposite is more nearly true; third-party
standing denials are designed to promote appropriate advocacy
rather than zealous advocacy.3 4 2 Ironically, perhaps, at least given
the Court's occasional reference to zealous advocacy to justify its
third-party standing requirement,'4 3 one of the features of appropriate advocacy is that it not be overly zealous.
As demonstrated above, 44 denying third-party standing is
invariably a substantive legal ruling. Two cases best illustrate this
paradigm. In the first, while not technically resolved on standing
grounds,-45 the Supreme Court effectively denied Mrs. Bessie
Gilmore standing to challenge the conviction and death sentence of
her son, Gary Gilmore, on constitutional grounds.3 46 In doing so,
the Court also held that Mrs. Gilmore lacked the substantive legal
right to prevent an allegedly unconstitutional conviction and
execution, even if the person to be executed were her son. In the
second case, the Supreme Court denied Mr. Adolph Lyons, a prior
Los Angeles Police Department chokehold victim, standing to
challenge the LAPD chokehold practice on behalf of potential
future victims. 3 47 In doing so, the Court effectively held that Mr.
Lyons, based upon the facts that he alleged, lacked the substantive
right to prevent allegedly unconstitutional chokeholds in his
community.
The question then arises why the Court, in the guise of a
technical determination on standing, intended to prevent a
substantive ruling on the merits of the underlying legal issue, has
issued an alternative substantive ruling limiting the claimant's legal
rights. To answer that question, we need to consider the choices
that the Court faced in these cases. In Gilmore, the Court had the
choice either to grant Mrs. Gilmore standing and to resolve the
merits of the constitutional challenges to Gary Gilmore's conviction
and death sentence, even though Gary Gilmore had not chosen to
press those claims, or to deny Mrs. Gilmore standing and hold, as
See infra text accompanying notes 381-86.
See supra note 341.
See supra text accompanying notes 256-61.
S45 See supratext accompanying note 319 (discussing the breakdown of the Gilmore
opinions
and votes).
s48 See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (terminating a stay of
execution on the grounds that Gary Gilmore "made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of all federal rights he might have asserted after the Utah trial court's sentence was
imposed").
4
" See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983).
S42
s
S44
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a matter of substantive law, that she lacked the power to challenge
a conviction and death sentence that she alleged violated the
Constitution. 4 ' There is no third option that would altogether
allow the Court to avoid making positive law. 49 And in Lyons, the
Court faced a similar choice: grant standing and resolve the
underlying constitutional challenge, or deny standing and wait until
a convicted victim of a chokehold challenges the practice as part of
his direct appeal or collateral attack."' 0 In each case, the Court
must choose between two alternatives, both of which involve the
judicial creation of positive law, and decide which is least bad
based upon whichever values the Court considers important. In the
standing context, I would suggest that the Court has viewed two
values as critically important when asked to make positive law.
First, the Court is concerned with the extent to which it is likely
to encroach upon Congress's lawmaking function, which includes
Congress's power not to address a given issue by statute unless and
until an appropriate legislative consensus has formed. 5 ' Second,
the Court is concerned with its own ability to aggregate preferences in a rational manner in those cases it does resolve on the
merits.a32

As demonstrated above, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
perhaps for the first time in the Court's history, were characterized
by multipeaked preferences. This multipeakedness, coupled with
decisional rules that prevented the requisite number of iterations to
reveal cycles, whether within a single case or over a group of cases,
prevented the Court from ensuring that if it addressed the merits
of a case, the disposition of which required a resolution of one or
more controversial issues, it would not thwart the preferences of a
present majority. In other words, with respect to those issues that
were likely to be controversial, the Court could not ensure with
any reasonable degree of accuracy that its substantive rulings
would be other than irrational and arbitrary.35 3 For the same

54

See 429 U.S. at 1014 (Burger, J., concurring).

H' This is because the Court must collectively resolve the case. See Stearns, supra
note 12, at 1258-71 (explaining why. appellate courts employ non-Condorcet voting
rules).

3-9 See 461 U.S. at 101-05.
-'1See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1259 (describing congressional power of inertia).
-11 See supra part II.A (demonstrating multipeakedness in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts).
" See supra part II.A (explaining that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, because

they each had three divergent ideological frameworks, none with majority support,
were multipeaked).
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reason that members of a multipeaked court are gun-shy when faced
with a controversial case, ideological litigants, when looking at a
Court that has multipeaked preferences, could not be more pleased.
After all, while such a Court by no means ensures success at
codifying a non-Condorcet preference into law, virtually any other
configuration (except, of course, a non-Condorcet preference in
the public with majority support on the Supreme Court) ensures
failure. If one takes enough shots at securing a favorable precedent,
given the value of path dependency, the chances of long-run success
increase.
One substantive body of case law that particularly tends to
attract ideological litigants involves the rights of the criminally
accused. Holding aside the merits of Gilmore and Lyons, we can
already begin to see why the Court, faced with the choice either to
grant standing and address the merits of issues over which its
preferences were multipeaked, or to deny standing and issue a
substantive ruling that the claimant lacked the general right to
prevent unconstitutional conduct in her community, would elect the
latter course. After all, if the Court had granted standing in these
cases, it would have invited ambitious interest groups to forage for
litigants who have chosen not to press their own constitutional
claims. Especially in the criminal procedure context, countless
claims exist at any given time, even though many or most of the
affected parties-the majority of whom are in jail-elect not to
pursue them.3 54 As a result, the government's arguably illegal
conduct often goes unpunished, and therefore undeterred, at least
until a convicted criminal chooses to challenge that conduct in an
appropriate proceeding. At first blush, this regime might appear
rather unattractive or, at the very least, no more attractive than a
tort regime that requires that a plaintiff be injured before suing a
tortfeasor 5 5 Both regimes ultimately rest upon a judicial definition of injury.

" Before I began to teach law, I represented two death row inmates. In both
cases, I benefitted from a public interest group that served as an information clearinghouse and produced a newsletter identifying potential claims and updates on related
precedents. While this organization reduced the cost of raising challenges in such
cases, the cost with standing in place remained higher than it would have been if
standing were abandoned. Without standing, the organization could have raised
constitutional challenges on behalf of those sentenced to death without having to
have found an attorney to represent a particular death row inmate who had a relevant
claim.
s5 See Stearns, supra note 2, Introduction subpart C (contrasting requirement of
injury in standing to requirement of injury in tort).
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In tort law, we could easily expand our definition of injury to
include a person who is disturbed when noninjurious negligence
goes unpunished."' 6 Similarly, in standing cases, we could expand
our definition of injury to include a person who is disturbed when
the government's illegal conduct goes unpunished."' 7 In fact, in
both contexts, the courts are propelled into action when the
consequences of a collective governmental decision, by either a
legislature or the courts, would be direct and significant to the
claimants before them for reasons that are unrelated to the desire
to make new law. Of course, the legislature cannot be forced to
respond, but, by filing a lawsuit in which appropriate claims are
raised, litigants can force the courts to act. Where no shadow casethat case in which the same claim can be presented with no credible
standing barrier35 -exists, judicial creation of positive law with
respect to underlying claims, for which the preferences of the
justices or lower court judges may be multipeaked, cannot be
avoided. Thus, for example, when a convicted criminal challenges
the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence in a proper appeal
or habeas proceeding in federal court, that court lacks the luxury of
delaying the creation of positive law. Courts cannot wait either
until an appropriate legislative consensus forms, or until the
Supreme Court's preferences coalesce around a dominant framework. In such cases, the federal courts cannot avoid shifting the
burden of congressional inertia. Without the presumption against
third-party standing, however, ambitious ideological litigants could
force the federal judiciary to do so at will, simply by locating an
affected party who has chosen not to enforce her own legal rights.
Such litigants could affect the path, and thus the substance, of legal
doctrine by controlling the order or timing of case presentations.
But in denying standing, the Court has not avoided making
positive law. Instead, it has determined as a matter of substantive
law that the third-party claimant lacks a substantive legal right to
pursue the underlying claim. 5 9 And, as demonstrated below, the
35 See id.
"' Cf Fletcher,

supra note 171, at 231 (arguing that standing's injury-in-fact
requirement has no meaning beyond ensuring that the claimant is truthful).
S5s See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.B (describing and demonstrating shadow case
analysis); infra text accompanying notes 367-78 (same).
s59 For a recent Supreme Court decision based upon third-party standing principles, see United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995). The Hays Court held that
residents in a congressional voting district, which was adjacent to a district that they
alleged was awkwardly drawn for racial reasons in violation of Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
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Court has not always applied third-party standing principles in a
consistent manner.S'
To a multipeaked Court, however, the
substantive legal ruling resulting from a denial of standing is often
likely to be more attractive than the alternative of granting standing
and addressing the underlying claim on the merits for two reasons.
First, the standing denial has a presumptive-rather than absolutecharacter. While there may be no general right to enforce the
rights of others, the federal courts often vindicate rights, even
constitutional rights, that are triggered by various sources of
positive law. Thus, for example, a violation of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions can attach even though there is no
"right" to the underlying largesse that is the subject of the constitutional claim.3 6' Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
Ct. 2816 (1993), lacked standing to challenge the race-based gerrymander. Hays
illustrates not only the difficulty with third-party standing, namely that such denials
are invariably substantive, but also serves as an apt prelude to some of the problems
that arise in the final standing category, no right to an undistorted market. See infra
part III.C. The Hays Court stated:
Where a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district ... the
plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the legislature's
reliance on racial criteria, and therefore has standing to challenge the
legislature's action. Voters in such districts may suffer the special
representational harms racial classifications can cause in the voting context.
On the other hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, he or
she does not suffer those special harms, and any inference that the plaintiff
has personally been subjected to a racial classification would not bejustified
absent specific evidence tending to support that inference.
115 S. Ct. at 2436 (citation omitted). The Court may have intuitively feared that, if
persons living outside a gerrymandered district were afforded standing to challenge
the gerrymandered district, it would invite ideological path manipulation. But by
redefining the injury to include the right to participate in a voting process unaffected
by racial gerrymandering, the Court could easily have identified a first-party injury.
In fact, the Court recognized the problem. See id. at 2437 ("Of course it may be true
that the racial composition of District"5 [in which the plaintiffs resided] would have
been different if the legislature had drawn District 4 in another way. But an
allegation to that effect does not allege a cognizable injury under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'). As in the final standing category, see infra part III.C, the Court may
also have intuited that path manipulation can result from claims premised upon an
asserted right to a market, whether for hospital services, schooling, or voting, that is
undistorted by a law that allegedly violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.
6
o See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 381-86 (discussing Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991)).
" This provides a useful method with which to explain the Supreme Court's
"right to counsel" cases, which otherwise appear inconsistent. In Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), the Supreme Court held that, while states are not required to
provide an appeals process in criminal cases, having done so, they cannot deny
transcripts to all indigent criminal appellants; otherwise the right to an appeal would
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for example, the Court has willingly vindicated under the Due
Process Clause rights that owe their creation to state law, but that
the state has doled out in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. 62 Similarly, in cases arising under the Fair Housing Act, 6 '
the Court has vindicated the right to nondiscriminatory dissemina-

be rendered illusory. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,357 (1963), the Supreme
Court struck down a California statute that conditioned access to appellate counsel
upon a finding that such counsel would be helpful to the criminal appellant or the
court. Finally, in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 619 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that, having complied with Griffin and Douglas,North Carolina did not violate equal
protection or due process in failing to provide counsel to indigents for discretionary
appeals or for petitions for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, in each case, employed an equal protection/fundamental rights
framework, largely in response to concerns that might have been raised had it instead
relied upon due process after the discredited Lochner era. In fact, the Court could
have achieved precisely the same results based upon due process without appearing
Lochnerian and without relying upon the equal protection/fundamental rights
methodology, which has itself been criticized as a subterfuge for vindicating what are
essentially substantive due process claims. See Helen Garfield, Privacy,Abortion, and
JudicialReview: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 303 (1986)
(describing the Court's reliance upon equal protection/fundamental rights as a
subterfuge for substantive due process); James A. Kushner, Substantive Equal

Protection: The Rehnquist Court and the Fourth Tier ofJudicialReview, 53 Mo. L. REV.
423, 427 (1988) (arguing that the Court has relied on "substantive equal protection"
analysis to "invalidate social and economic regulation with which it [has] disagreed");
Developments in the Law-EqualProtection,82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,1132 (1969) (positing
that equal protection/fuidamental
rights analysis "may be little more
than... substantive due process.., decked out in the trappings of equal protection").
The Court could have held that the transcript and direct appeals cases required
the state, having given its largesse to some criminal appellants, not to deny that
largesse to others through arbitrary and discriminatory (or essentially standardless)
means, see Douglas, or in an illusory manner, see Griffin. This would have allowed
the Court to achieve the result it achieved in Griffin and Douglas. Moreover, because
North Carolina had not provided state-funded counsel to anyone for either discretionary appeals or for Supreme Court certiorari petitions, the state's denial, based upon
this analysis, would not have violated due process. As a result, the Court also would
have produced the result it achieved in Ross. In all three cases, the Court could have
avoided identifying as fundamental the rights to a transcript on appeal, to appeals,
and to counsel for particular categories of appeals; instead, it could have left the
definition of the underlying rights to the state. The Court would then have
intervened only to ensure that the state, having created a right, properly allocated its
largesse among convicted criminals.
s62 For a recent book that analyzes the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993). While Professor Epstein
focuses primarily upon economic coercion as the principal state conduct that is
invalid under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the above discussion demonstrates that that same analysis can be used to strike noneconomic classifications
through which the state allocates its largesse in an arbitrary, discriminatory, or
illusory manner. See supra note 361.
36S 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988).
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don of residential real estate marketing information for housing
testers who were themselves not in the market for housing;3 64 for
residents not seeking housing but who wished to secure "the social
and professional advantages of living in an integrated community";... and for a multiracial fair housing organization, noting that
"[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist
solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing."'3 66 Presumably, had the claimants relied
upon the Equal Protection Clause rather than a federal statute for
their claims, the Court would have denied standing in these cases
based upon third-party standing principles.
Second, creating positive law through a denial of standing might
be more attractive to a multipeaked Supreme Court because the
standing denial tends to discourage future litigants from attempting
to force upon the Court cases presenting issues over which the
justices' preferences are multipeaked. In fact, one issue on which
sitting justices on a multipeaked Court can probably agree is that it
is better to wait for a case in which they have no choice but to rule
on a divisive issue than to allow ideological litigants to come in and
place their bets but force the Court to roll the dice.
These insights further explain why a proper analysis of thirdparty standing cases prevents fis from directly comparing case
results. To properly analyze these cases, we must instead ask, for
any given case in which standing was granted or denied, whether
there exists a "shadow" case in which another litigant could present
the same issue with no credible standing challenge. 67 When we
compare the relationships between the actual standing cases and
their shadow cases, rather than directly comparing the outcomes of
the standing cases themselves, many apparent incongruities
's See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972)
(finding a congressional intention to define standing under the Fair Housing Act as
broadly as is permitted by Article III). In analyzing Trafficante,David Logan explains:
"Because the Trafficanteplaintiffs had alleged that they were themselves injured [by
the inalility to live in an integrated community], the injury in fact requirement was
met even though the defendant's discriminatory practice was aimed at other persons
who were not parties to the suit." Logan, supra note 264, at 65.
"6Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 112 (1979) (relying on
Trafficante and a broad definition of standing under the Fair Housing Act to allow
housing testers who live within the target area to evade summary judgment).
's Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), and relying upon Gladstone, Realtors to find injury
in fact
67 and thus standing to sue for a housing tester).
' See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.B.
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disappear. For example, to understand why, in Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 6 ' Mr. Lyons, a chokehold victim, was not afforded standing
to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department's chokehold practice, 3 9 we need only consider the 1985 case, Tennessee v. Garner,3"' in which the Court addressed the same underlying legal
issue. In Garner,the Court was presented with the question whether
the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer, relying upon the
common law fleeing-felon doctrine, from detaining a suspected
criminal with deadly force absent probable cause that the suspect is
dangerous."7 ' In striking the seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court resolved the same substantive issue
presented in Lyons, but in a factual context that rendered the
judicial creation of positive law unavoidable, and therefore proper.
Similarly in Gilmore v. Utah,"7 2 in which the Supreme Court
terminated a stay of execution, thus effectively denying standing to
Gary Gilmore's mother in her effort to challenge the constitutionality of her son's conviction and planned execution,"' it is quite
easy to devise a shadow case: a direct appeal or collateral attack by
Gary Gilmore himself. Had Gary Gilmore pursued his own legal
remedies, he would have faced no credible standing barrier with
respect to the very claim that his mother had been denied standing
to raise. In both shadow cases, the judicial creation of positive law,
even in the face of multipeaked preferences, would have been
unavoidable.
The shadow case analysis further reveals that the Court has not
been altogether consistent in applying its third-party standing
doctrine. As early as Strauder v. West Virginia, 74 in which the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prevents the State, in
the criminal trial of an African-American defendant, from excluding
African-American jurors by law, the Court made clear that the
claimed right existed in the criminal defendant, rather than in the
prospective juror. 7 5 The Strauder case thus contained two critical

461 U.S. 95 (1983).
369 See id. at 105.

310 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that a statute that allowed a police officer to use
deadly force to arrest a fleeing suspect who was apparently unarmed and nondangerous violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
371 See id. at 12-13.
372 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
573 See supra text accompanying note 319 (explaining the procedural context of,
and voting line-up in, Gilmore).
374 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
" See id. at 305. In defining the defendant's claim, the Court stated:
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limitations: It did not hold that the prospective minority juror has
a right to serve on the jury and it did not hold that an AfricanAmerican criminal defendant has a right to have members of his
own race serve on the jury. Instead, the Court suggested that,
regardless of the composition of the ultimate jury, the defendant's
rights will be honored if African-Americans, as members of the
defendant's race, are not systematically excluded by law from the
jury venire from which" the grand and petit juries are drawn. 7 6
Given the statistical likelihood that the African-American draw
in any particular jury will be small, Strauder set the stage nearly a
century later for Batson v. Kentucky. 3 77 In Batson, an AfricanAmerican criminal defendant challenged the prosecutor's systematic
exercise of peremptory challenges against prospective AfricanAmerican jurors. In holding that the prosecutor must provide a
race-neutral explanation for the exclusion of African-American
jurors in a criminal trial of an African-American defendant, the
Court, while extending Strauder,adhered to its central premise that
the right exists in the defendant not to have members of his own
race systematically excluded from jury service, which now includes
race-based peremptory challenges. 7 ' And while the Supreme

It is to be observed that the first of these questions is not whether a colored
man, when an indictment has been preferred [sic] against him, has a right
to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his
own race or color, but it is whether, in the composition or selection of
jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of his race or color
may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or color, so that by no
possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury.
Id. (emphasis added). The italicized language reveals the limitations of the Strauder
Court's gloss on the defendant's claim. As defined by the Court, the defendant
claimed the right not to have persons of his race or color systematically excluded
from jury service. This suggests that persons of another race or color, contrary to
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that, under the Equal Protection
Clause, a white criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of AfricanAmerican jurors through peremptory challenges), have no right to challenge the
exclusion of a minorityjuror. Moreover, because a minority juror can be excluded
in the trial of a white defendant, the Court implied that a prospective minorityjuror
has no right to serve.
6
"~
See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
377 476 U.S. 79 (1986). For a case in which the Supreme Court denied standing
to raise many of the same issues raised in Batson, in a manner that is consistent with
this Article's shadow-case analysis, see O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)
(holding in a civil rights class action brought against a magistrate and a circuit court
judge for allegedly engaging in illegal bond-setting, sentencing, andjury-fee practices,
that the plaintiffs had failed to allege injury in fact and thus had not satisfied Article
III's case or controversy requirement for standing).
s71 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87. But see Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320,
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Court in Carter v. Jury Commission3 79 held that a juror excluded on
the basis of race could sue for a violation of his equal protection
rights,"' the Carter Court did not suggest that a criminal defendant could press the excluded juror's claim independently of a
Batson or Strauderclaim.
If we assume that the Strauder, Batson, and Carter Courts
correctly identified the substantive rights in question, then the next
case becomes quite difficult. In Powers v. Ohio,38 ' the Supreme
Court addressed the question whether a white criminal defendant
can raise a Batson challenge when the prosecutor has allegedly
employed race-based peremptory challenges to exclude AfricanAmericans from the jury."8 2 In vindicating that claimed right, the
Supreme Court essentially flipped Strauder, Batson, Carter and its
third-party standing analysis on their heads. In Powers, the Court
effectively redefined the injury articulated in Batson now to include
the prospective juror's Carter right not to be excluded on the basis
of race and conferred standing upon the defendant, who was white,
to litigate the excluded juror's claim. 83 And it did so in circumstances in which, under its third-party standing analysis, standing
would have been considered improper.
The difficulty in Powers is identifying whose equal protection
rights have been violated. If Powers had raised the same injury at
issue in Batson, namely the right of a minority not to have members
of his own race systematically excluded from jury service, then the
case would not have implicated standing principles at all. Instead,

329-30 (1970) (holding that individual jurors subject to racial exclusion have the right
to present in court equal protection challenges to that exclusion).
s79 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
's See id. at 329-30. The CarterCourt stated:
Defendants in criminal proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal
interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection. People excluded from juries
because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by
juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.
Id. at 529. The Carter plaintiffs did not challenge race-based peremptories, but rather
a set ofjury selection procedures that, while "devoid of any mention of race," id. at
536, operated in a manner that systematically excluded African-Americans from both
grand and petit juries. See id. 334-37. Thus, while Cartercut back on one of the
limiting principles of Strauder,namely that excluded minorityjurors have no right to
serve, it left Batson unaffected. Stated differently, an effective Batson challenge postCarterstill required that the state peremptorily strike members of the defendant's race
for nonneutral reasons.
1499 U.S. 400 (1991).
-"2See id. at 402.
'8 See id. at 423.
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Powers simply would not have raised a valid substantive legal claim.
Members of his race had not been systematically excluded from
service on the jury that convicted him. Powers argued, instead, that
the excluded African-American jurors' equal protection rights had
been denied and that, as a criminal defendant who was convicted by
the jury from which these African-Americans had been excluded, he
had standing to raise that claim."8 4 In accepting this argument,
the Court effectively perverted both the underlying legal claim and
its third-party standing analysis.
The Powers Court redefined the underlying legal claim, which it
had previously suggested rested with the criminal defendant, to rest
now with the excluded jurors.8 5 If we assume, however, that the
Powers Court properly defined the underlying injury, such that the
race-based peremptory challenge violated the juror's right under
Carter, rather than those of the criminal defendant under Batson,
then, based upon third-party standing principles, Powers should
have been denied standing to raise the claim.
To understand Powers, we need to recognize that the Court fell
victim to its own use of metaphor in analyzing the question of
standing. We also need to recognize that Powers lies at the outer
edge of an otherwise important doctrine. In most third-party
standing cases, the Court is concerned that if it allows ideological
litigants to identify and to rely upon the rights of others in forcing
the resolution of substantive legal issues, it will afford such litigants
with substantial power to manipulate the critical path that influences the substantive evolution of legal doctrine. The third-party
standing doctrine does not prevent path dependency, which is an
inevitable consequence of decisional rules that prevent the requisite
number of votes to reveal cycles. But, by ensuring that fortuity,
rather than advertent path manipulation, controls the order of case
decisions, the doctrine makes the outcome of its path dependent
voting procedures more fair. The Supreme Court has infused its
standing analysis with traditional notions borrowed from tort lawinjury in fact, causation, and redressability-not because those
features have any abstract significance to justiciability, but instead
because those features serve as apt metaphors for when the Court
is unable to avoid shifting the burden of congressional inertia. They
are apt because they are virtually always present when a convicted
criminal in a direct appeal or collateral attack alleges that her
3 See id. at 410-12.
' See id. at 415.

422

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 309

conviction or sentence was secured in violation of her constitutional
rights. In such cases, the courts, including the Supreme Court in a
case properly before it, do not have the luxury to abstain from
making positive law with respect to the convicted criminal's
underlying legal claims. Unless the courts address the claims on the
merits, the convicted criminal will incur the most severe consequences that the state or federal government can impose. Moreover, in such cases, the claimant is least likely to be concerned with
path manipulation; instead, she simply wants whatever relief a court
is willing to provide. Simply put, because there is no shadow case
in criminal appeals and habeas proceedings, courts are willing to
make law, even at the risk of producing results that defy the
Condorcet criterion.
The Powers Court implicitly construed its standing elements
literally, rather than metaphorically."8 6 It recognized that if Mr.
Powers had been convicted and sentenced in violation of the
Constitution, the government's illegal conduct could be said to have
caused him a concrete injury. But while that is true, it is also
circular. The government caused him a concrete injury only if we
assume that his constitutional rights, rather than someone else's, were
violated. If the jury exclusion violated the potential juror's rights
under Carter, rather than those of Mr. Powers under Batson, then
the exclusion caused the potential juror, but not Mr. Powers, a

s Thus, the Powers Court conferred third-party standing based upon a
determination that Powers would litigate the issue zealously and that the Court, if it
granted relief, would remedy whatever harm the race-based exclusion could be said
to have caused Powers. The Court stated:
This congruence of interests [between the defendant and the excluded
jurors] makes it necessary and appropriate for the defendant to raise the
rights of the juror. And, there can be no doubt that petitioner will be a
motivated, effective advocate for the excluded venirepersons' rights.
Petitioner has much at stake in proving that his jury was improperly
constituted due to an equal protection violation, for we have recognized that
discrimination in the jury selection process may lead to the reversal of a
conviction.
Id. at 414. While it is undoubtedly true that the defendant would press thejurors'
claims vigorously and that a favorable ruling would provide the defendant with the
desired relief, the Court's analysis begs the question whether any relief afforded the
defendant would flow from curing the violation of the defendant's rights or those of
someone else. Had the Court construed its standing metaphors of zealousness and
redressability as proxies for when to shift the burden of legislative inertia, rather than
as justiciability criteria with independent content, it would have recognized the
anomaly that Powers had deployed all the trappings of a criminal appeal to stress the
urgency ofjudicial creation of positive law in a context more appropriately suited to
nonurgent civil litigation brought by someone else or not at all.
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concrete injury. The Court further recognized that if it reversed
Mr. Powers's conviction and sentence, it would redress any injury
that he might have suffered. But that too is circular. If we assume
that Mr. Powers, as opposed to the prospective juror, had no injury,
there was nothing for the Court to redress. By implicitly viewing
injury in fact, causation, and redressability as abstract elements of
justiciability with independent content, rather than as metaphors
designed to limit the Court's lawmaking powers except when
absolutely necessary, the Court effectively conferred upon Mr.
Powers third-party standing to raise an excluded juror's substantive
legal claim, even though it had stated repeatedly that third-party
standing was presumptively improper.
Commentators criticizing the third-party standing doctrine have
focused largely on two other cases that lie along the doctrine's

periphery, Sierra Club v. Morton'"7 and United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures."'8 Given the common
teaching technique of starting at the outer edge of a legal doctrine
and working toward the middle to explain its purpose, this
temptation is easy to understand. But such an approach tends to
obfuscate the analysis nonetheless. The Sierra Club, an organization
which described itself as having "a special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks,""8 9 brought
suit to challenge the construction of a recreational area in a national
park. In denying standing, the Court observed that the plaintiffs
had failed to allege that their members had actually used the
national park in question."' 0 The Court stated that while "aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational" harms could satisfy standing's
injury requirement, 9 1 it was unwilling to abandon the requirement that the claimant herself suffer such an injury. 92
The Sierra Club decision is ironic in that the Court, in its thirdparty standing decisions, has on occasion linked the requirement of
injury to the promotion of zealous advocacy. 33 At the very least,
387

405 U.S. 727 (1972).

- 412 U.S. 669 (1973).

8s9 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8 (quoting paragraph three of the complaint).
-1o See id. at 735.
'91 See id. at 738.
39 See id.

'" See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414 (1991) (positing that "there can be
no doubt that petitioner will be a motivated, effective advocate for the excluded
persons' rights"); Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956
(1984) (finding that, "[w]here practical obstacles prevent a party from asserting rights
on behalf of itself," a court should consider whether the party can be expected to
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this case appears to render that justification quite dubious.
Certainly the Sierra Club would have been an effective and zealous
advocate on conservation matters. In fact, zealousness, like the
more formalized standing requirements, has been employed largely
as a catch phrase, or metaphor, intended to capture a very different
concern. 9 4 Zealousness, like injury in fact, causation, and redressability, is closely correlated with those cases in which the Court
cannot avoid shifting the burden of congressional inertia. But, in
fact, the zealous advocacy metaphor may be less apt than the other
standing metaphors. 95 The Court actually has denied third-party
standing because the advocates in question would litigate too
zealously rather than not zealously enough. Certainly, the Gilmore
and Sierra Club claimants would have litigated as ambitiously as the
parties whose interests they sought to vindicate. 9 6
Ironically, the difficulty with the Sierra Club was not the lack of
zealousness, but too much zealousness. Because the Sierra Club
stated that its goal was to promote "conservation and the sound
maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the
country, regularly serving as a responsible representative of persons
similarly interested,"39 7 it was likely to present its case in a
broader manner than would litigants seeking to ensure that their
particular uses of the park were not harmed. While the same might

present the issues "with the necessary adversarial zeal"); Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
194 (1976) (noting that, because questions had been presented "vigorously" and
"cogently," the denial of standing would "serve no functional purpose"). It is worth
noting that, while commentators have focused on the zealousness justification for
standing, see, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 255, at 1071; Abel, supra note 221, at 1189, the
Court has only occasionally expressly recognized this rationale for the doctrine. The
argument in the text might help to explain the Court's apparent reluctance to ground
standing in the desire to promote zealous advocacy.
s- But see Gottlieb, supra note 255, at 1071 (arguing that the concern for zealous
advocacy is the only standing requirement with a legitimate constitutional basis). For
my criticism of the Gottlieb thesis, see supra note 255.
...
See supra note 393 and accompanying text (observing the Court's reluctance to
endorse fully the zealousness criterion).
s There can be little doubt that Mrs. Gilmore would actually have been more
zealous than her son in pursuing his legal claims, given that Gary Gilmore elected not
to pursue his legal remedies at all. Similarly, the Sierra Club would, without doubt,
have litigated the legality of the proposed recreation facility as ambitiously as those
who used the affected national park. On the other hand, no criminal defendant is
ever thrown out of court-or summarily convicted-for not vigorously pursuing his
claims. The state retains the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt even if the
defendant puts on no defense at all. In short, zealousness, like the other standing
elements
or proxies, has no independent doctrinal significance to justiciability.
397 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8 (quoting the complaint).
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not hold true of Mrs. Gilmore, it might be true of other ideological
litigants concerned with the rights of the criminally accused, who
might have been encouraged if Mrs. Gilmore had been given
standing. Thus, while a particular convicted criminal is generally
only concerned with securing whatever relief she believes she is
entitled to, the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, if
given standing to press the rights of all criminals who sit on their
rights, might have a very different and, presumably, much broader,
agenda. The ACLU might, for example, attempt to raise cases in
the most favorable order, and it might choose to vary the breadth
of particular claims with the ultimate objective of affording
maximum reach to the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights.
I certainly do not intend to attack that agenda; instead, I intend to
demonstrate that the labels or metaphors that the Court has
employed in devising standing are often ill-chosen. That alone
would be no more cause for concern than is bad poetry, which
although unpleasing, causes relatively little damage. The problem
is that the Court has tended to lose sight of the purposes underlying
its own metaphors and instead has raised them to the level of quasiconstitutional doctrine. More importantly, while we can decline to
read bad poetry, potential federal court litigants cannot avoid the
Supreme Court's standing precedents."' 8
The same analysis reveals that the third-party standing doctrine
is critical in preserving the power of legislative inertia. Without
the presumptive rule against third-party standing, interest groups
and other ideological litigants could routinely subvert congressional
inertia by forcing decisions in the federal courts, even in the
absence of a Condorcet-winning preference. Because Congress,
unlike federal appellate courts, is relatively well-equipped to
enact Condorcet-winning preferences, a contrary standing rule
would enable ideological litigants to supplant the status quo, which
might be a prior Condorcet-winning rule, with a desired nonCondorcet rule. If the purpose of third-party standing is to
preserve Congress's power of inertia, we need to consider what
happens when Congress affords ideological litigants the authority to
pursue the claims of others in federal court. We have already seen
that in the housing context, the Court has allowed Congress to
rebut its presumptive rule that individuals lack the right to enforce
the rights of others by statute.3 99 Such cases have led commenta...
In fact, as demonstrated below, see infra part III.D, Congress may also no
longer be able to avoid the Supreme Court's standing precedents either.

'" See supra note 264.
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tors to conclude that this doctrine is largely prudential in
nature. 40 0 As such, Congress would appear to have the power to
override it.
That insight might help to reconcile the denial of standing in
Sierra Club with the conferral of standing in the frequently contrasted case, United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency
Procedures.4' In SCRAP, a group of law students and an environmental interest group challenged the failure of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to suspend a railroad rate increase.
They claimed that the new rate structure would increase the cost of
recyclable goods relative to nonrecyclable goods, which in turn
would both increase the use of natural resources and the disposal
of waste in and around Washington, D.C.4"2 Despite this unusually
attenuated, and rather dubious, causal chain, the claimants could
credibly argue that they had Congress's imprimatur. Thus, the
plaintiffs argued that the ICC, in denying the suspension, failed to
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which
required a "detailed environmental impact statement" before a rate
increase could be approved.40 3
While NEPA was silent on the
question of standing, the statute's substantive provisions provided
at least a credible basis upon which to maintain that Congress
intended standing to be conferred broadly." 4 At the very least,
congressional silence on the question of standing would have meant
that in denying standing, the Court would have had to construe the
requirement of an environmental impact statement in NEPA as not
intended to protect the interests of the claimants. In essence, the
Court interpreted NEPA's requirement of an environmental policy
statement as intended to protect individuals' "aesthetic and

"' See infra note 513 and accompanying text.
U.S. 669 (1973).
02 The Court described the "attenuated line of causation" as follows:
a general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of nonrecyclable
commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus resulting in the need to
use more natural resources to produce such goods, some of which resources
might be taken from the Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that
might be discarded in national parks in the Washington area.
id. at 688.
4s See id. at 679.
..See Fletcher, supranote 171, at 258-60 ("A perfectly plausible-and I believe the
best-reading of NEPA is that anyone who can make a colorable claim... should have
standing.").
401 412
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environmental well-being," 4 5 no less than their financial wellbeing. 40 6
In contrast, the Sierra Club plaintiffs principally relied for
standing upon section 10(a) of the APA. While the Sierra Club
apparently cited a number of substantive statutes in its complaint,
the Supreme Court only noted these statutory arguments in a
footnote 40 7 and in the text stated that "[t]he Sierra Club relies
[for standing] upon § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)."4 °8 The Court's treatment of the Sierra Club's statutory
claims suggests that they were sufficiently attenuated on standing
that the Court did not need to resolve those standing claims on the
merits. This position may well have been bolstered by the nature of
the substantive statutory provisions on which the Sierra Club relied.
With the exception of the Sierra Club's claim that the Forest Service
and the Department of the Interior failed to hold public hearings in
violation of their own regulations, 40 9 none of the statutory claims,
in contrast with those raised in SCRAP, appeared to suggest a right
of public enforcement. Moreover, the public hearing provisions
were not created by statute, but rather by administrative regulation.
The cost of denying standing, therefore, may well have been lower
in Sierra Club than in SCRAP because the plaintiffs in the latter case
had relied upon a federal statute that was at least arguably susceptible to a construction affording them protection. Denying standing
when faced with such a statute would be tantamount to holding that
" Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
406 See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686.
407 See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 730 n.2. The Court stated:

As analyzed by the District Court, the complaint alleged violations of law
falling into four categories. First, it claimed that the special-use permit for
construction of the resort exceeded the maximum acreage limitation placed
upon such permits by 16 U.S.C. § 497, and that issuance of a "revocable"
use permit was beyond the authority of the Forest Service. Second, it
challenged the proposed permit for the highway through Sequoia National
Park on the grounds that the highway would not serve any of the purposes
of the park, in alleged violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1, and that it would destroy
timber and other natural resources protected by 16 U.S.C. §§ 41 and 43.
Third, it claimed that the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior
had violated their own regulations by failing to hold adequate public hearings on the proposed project. Finally, the complaint asserted that 16 U.S.C.
§ 45c requires specific congressional authorization of a permit for construction of a power transmission line within the limits of a national park.
40

4

8 Id. at 732.

1

See id. at 730 n.2.
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Congress did not intend the statute under review to protect
plaintiffs claimed interests.
In distinguishing Sierra Club, the SCRAP Court spoke largely in
terms of third-party standing, claiming that the difficulty in Sierra
Club, which was overcome in SCRAP, was that the plaintiffs had
failed to allege that they were adversely affected by the government's
conduct.4 10 The Court's distinction, if adhered to, would appear
to relegate the third-party standing doctrine to the status of an
empty pleading requirement. After all, the Sierra Club certainly has
sufficient resources with which to secure as a member users of
virtually every national park or to send one of its members to every
national park that is the subject of its planned litigation. The
Court's third-party standing language notwithstanding, applying the
shadow-case analysis to these cases reveals that something greater
may have been at stake.
In SCRAP, the litigants alleged that the ICC failed to comply
with a particular federal statute, the language of which suggested a
right of public enforcement. 4 11 In Sierra Club, the plaintiffs
presented statutory and regulatory challenges that, with the possible
exception of the regulatory public hearing provisions, they claimed
harmed others. 4 12 Aside from the public hearing provision,
denying standing in Sierra Club did not, therefore, require the Court
to determine whether Congress intended to confer standing upon
individuals directly harmed by the statutory violations that the
Sierra Club alleged. Instead, by holding that the Sierra Club did
not have the right to enforce the rights of persons who may be
harmed in the future, the Court allowed itself to wait for a proper
shadow case before construing the cited statutes. In a proper
shadow case, someone who used the park could force the Court to
determine whether the particular statute on which the Sierra Club
relied was intended to confer standing to a park user.
In contrast, in SCRAP, given that the plaintiffs alleged that they
themselves were harmed, there was no obvious shadow case.
Denying standing in SCRAP would necessarily have meant that, as
410 See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686-87. The Court explained: "In Sierra Club, .. . we
went on to stress the importance of demonstrating that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured .... No such specific injury was alleged in Sierra Club."
Id. at 687.
41 See Fletcher, supra note 171, at 260-63 (arguing that the different outcomes in
SCRAP and Sierra Club may turn on whether Congress intended that the underlying
statutes protect the plaintiffs' claimed rights).
412 See supra note 407.
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a matter of substantive statutory interpretation, the requirement of
an environmental impact statement under section 102(2)(C) of
NEPA was not intended to protect individuals whose use of public
recreational areas might be adversely affected by the resulting
government activity.413 Alternatively stated, a denial of standing
413While not discussing standing directly, then-Professor Frank Easterbrook has
offered a very different analysis from that set out in the text. See generally Frank H.
Easterbrook, supra note 119. Easterbrook posits that because of the collective
aggregation problems that Arrow's Theorem poses, courts have no legitimate basis
for "construing" statutes beyond their express wording. Id. at 547. He argues that
when faced with a set of facts that are not directly embraced by the statute that a
party cites as the basis for reliefjudges should, instead of construing the statute and
making a determination on the merits whether it affords relief, refrain from
construing the statute at all. See id. at 544-51. In other words, Easterbrook rejects
the prevalent assumption that parties to a case, by citing a statute as a basis for relief,
are thereby entitled to a judicial construction of that statute. At the outset of his
article, Easterbrook acknowledges that some would argue that the decision not to
construe a statute is tantamount to an act of construction, and that, as a result, he is
"talking nonsense." Id. at 534-35. In fact, if the analysis presented in the text is
correct, Easterbrook's argument, although certainly not nonsense, is nonetheless
flawed.
When a party cites a statute that fairly obviously does ndt cover the facts of a
given case-to useJudge Easterbrook's example, when a municipality claims that a dog
leashing law requires the leashing of a cat-the court has two options: (1) it can
construe the statute, holding that a cat is not a dog under the statute, and thereby
deny relief on the merits; or (2) it can simply decline to construe the statute at all.
But, because the party has cited the dog leashing law, the court, in its opinion, will,
if it takes Easterbrook's preferred second option, state something to the effect of:
"We decline to construe the dog leashing law because it has no application in this
case involving an unleashed cat." In contrast, the traditional approach, option one,
would result in the following ruling: "We decline to afford relief based upon the dog
leashing law because a cat is not a dog." From the standpoint of future litigants and
future courts construing the announced precedent, the two rulings are identical.
With a minor exception noted below, which is analogous to the foregoing
analysis of Sierra Club and SCRAP, the above analysis must be distinguished from that
of standing in constitutional cases. When the basis for a claim that would require the
Supreme Court or the lower federal courts to make new law is derived from a
constitutional clause, as opposed to a statute, the Court can avoid substantively
construing the cited constitutional provision by holding that the claimant lacks
standing. The denial of standing satisfies the Court's obligation to resolve the case,
while, at the same time, it leaves open the underlying substantive issue either for
Congress to resolve or for itself to resolve in a case in which it cannot avoid making
law, for example in a criminal appeal or collateral attack, because there is no shadow
case. See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.B (describing shadow case analysis). But when
the basis for a claim is a federal statute, a determination that the claimant lacks
standing necessarily means that, on the case facts, the statute does not afford relief.
A denial of standing in the statutory context-or, alternatively, Judge Easterbrook's
rule of nonconstruction, which is essentially the same thing-is an assessment of the
merits of the underlying claim. At the very least, this means that the cost of denying
standing in a case in which the claimant relies upon a federal statute (independent
of § 10(a) of the APA) is higher than the cost of denying standing in a case in which
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in SCRAP would have meant that, as a matter of substantive law, the
plaintiffs did not fall within the relevant zone of interest of NEPA's
procedural provisions. But because the SCRAP plaintiffs claimed to
be using public lands that would be harmed by the rate increase, the
obvious question such a ruling would raise is whom that provision
was intended to protect. 4 14 In contrast, in Sierra Club, because the
plaintiffs failed to allege that they themselves were harmed, the
standing denial did not require the Court to issue a substantive
determination on the scope of the underlying statutes for purposes
of standing. An alternative ruling in Sierra Club might have invited
future litigation aimed at testing the standing limits of federal
statutes, the violations of which did not affect claimants. This result
would reintroduce the very path manipulation that standing was
intended to prevent. In other words, while the distinction between
Sierra Club and SCRAP appears illusory, the value of that distinction
is restored when we consider the impact of a contrary ruling in
Sierra Club on future ideological litigants.
Moreover, in cases in which the plaintiffs rely for standing upon
a substantive federal statute, independent of section 10(a) of the
APA, the violation of which they contend causes them direct harm,
a standing denial is inevitably the same as a holding that the
plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interest of the statute under
review. Because the Sierra Club did not make such an allegation,

the claimant relies upon the Constitution. This may explain why the Burger Court
more frequently denied standing in constitutional than in statutory cases. See Logan,
supra note 264, at 48 (observing that "[a] review of the major Burger Court standing
decisions suggests that a plaintiff asserting a constitutional rather than a statutory
claim is far more likely to be denied standing," and collecting cases).
It is important to note a minor exception, which follows from the analysis of
Sierra Club and SCRAP, to the above analysis. If one person attempts to vindicate a
statutory right of a third party, for example, ifa person who dislikes cats but was not
harmed by the unleashed cat in question were to bring suit against the cat's owner,
relying upon the dog leash law, the court could effectively deny standing without
construing the statute. That is the situation in Sierra Club. A court could hold that,
the merits of the statutory claim aside, this claimant has no right to force the resolution of whether the dog leash law covers a cat. At that point, the statutory standing
denial parallels a constitutional standing denial. In short, a court might decide not
to allow this form of pet manipulation. In SCRAP, however, a standing denial
necessarily would have meant that the particular claimants, on the case facts, lacked
a claim under the statute that they cited. It is not surprising that, because nonconstruction in that case would have been tantamount to construction, the Court
afforded the claimants standing.
414 Cf. Fletcher, supra note 171, at 258-60 (arguing that the SCRAP Court properly
focused on the question whether Congress intended the NEPA to protect the
claimants).
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the standing denial in Sierra Club was less costly in terms of judicial
creation of positive law than a standing denial in SCRAP would have
been.

415

This discussion has illustrated two important points underlying
the presumptive rule against enforcing the rights of others. First,
the rule's purpose is neither to ensure zealous advocacy nor to
ensure concreteness of injury at some abstract level. Instead, the
rule is intended to preserve the autonomy of the legislature to
make, or not to make, positive law unless and until an appropriate
consensus is formed. This concern is especially acute on a multipeaked Court because such a Court cannot ensure with any
reasonable degree of accuracy that its rulings will be other than
415

For a more recent and hairsplitting standing opinion, which, although not

based upon the inability to enforce the rights of others, aptly illustrates the same
proposition, consider International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of
Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991). In that case, the Court held that the
plaintiffs, challenging experiments on primates, had standing to challenge the removal
of their action from state to federal court, even though they lacked standing to
pursue their underlying legal claim. See id. at 76-78. To understand the holding,
consider the purpose of the underlying removal statute. The plaintiffs argued that
the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), was intended to allow only federal
officials, and not federal agencies, such as the defendant, the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), to remove suits filed in state court to federal court that would have had
proper jurisdiction in the first instance. See id. at 76. The Court agreed on the
merits and determined that, even though the plaintiffs would not have had standing
to pursue the underlying claim in federal court, they did have the right to have that
claim presented (and probably dismissed) in the Louisiana court in which they filed.
See id. at 87-89. The Court rejected the NIH's argument that the plaintiffs' lack of
standing to press the merits of their underlying claim rendered futile the proposed
remand to state court. See id. at 88-89 (observing that state court standing
requirements might differ from federal court standing requirements). In short,
whatever the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim, following an improper removal
there can be no question that the plaintiffs fall within the removal statute's relevant

zone of interest.
In Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517 (1991), in contrast, the Court denied standing to the plaintiffs, postal workers
who were challenging an exception to the postal monopoly, on the ground that the
postal monopoly had not been created for the benefit of the postal workers. See id.
at 524-26. Again, because the plaintiffs relied for standingupon a federal statute, this
time a federal statute that created the United States Postal Service, the Court, in

ruling on the question of standing, could not avoid ruling on whether the plaintiffs
fell within that statute's zone of interest. In contrast with Easterbrook's analysis, see
supra note 413, the standing denial, which appears to be an act of nonconstruction,
is identical to an act of construction because the plaintiffs relied upon a statute.
While there is no obvious shadow case in which an alternative party could have
brought the same suit in a future action without a credible standing threat, the fact
remains that the Court hadto make a substantive determination as to whether, in
creating the postal service and affording it monopoly status, Congress intended to
protect United States postal employees.
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arbitrary and irrational in thwarting the will of a present majority of
its members. Second, because third-party standing rests, ultimately,
on separation-of-powers concerns, the doctrine, however it is
formally characterized, is necessarily presumptive, or prudential, in
16
nature, at least with respect to Congress.
This analysis suggests that the Court should be less inclined to
dismiss on standing grounds cases in which plaintiffs rely upon a
federal statute the violation of which harms them, than cases in
which plaintiffs rely for such claims upon the Constitution or
section 10(a) of the APA. In addition, the Court should be less
inclined to dismiss on standing grounds cases in which plaintiffs rely
upon statutes, the violation of which harms third parties. In
nonstatutory standing cases, the Court, relying upon such metaphors as zealousness and injury in fact, considers whether it should
shift the burden of legislative inertia. In statutory standing cases in
which plaintiffs claimed to have been harmed, in contrast, the
Court's standing determination is inevitably a substantive ruling on
whether plaintiffs fall within the relevant zone of interest of the
statute under review. At the very least, denying standing when a
plaintiff advances a direct claim of injury based upon a federal
statutory violation is, therefore, a more costly judicial endeavor. As
the next two sections will demonstrate, additional complexities arise
when plaintiffs rely upon the Constitution for standing outside the
criminal procedure context.
B. No Right to Prevent Diffuse Harms
Because interest groups can manipulate the path of case law in
more than one way, a presumptive prohibition against enforcing the
rights of others is not alone sufficient to prevent advertent path
manipulation by ideological, non-Condorcet interests. Not only can
such interest groups try to locate a claimant sitting on her rights,
416 This analysis is different from that offered by Craig Gottlieb, see Gottlieb, supra

note 255, at 1071 (classifying, inter alia, separation of powers as a prudential, rather
than constitutional, underpinning of standing). While Gottlieb contends that
separation of powers is not a legitimate constitutional concern in standing cases, I am
instead suggesting that separation of powers, whether characterized as a constitutional
or prudential element of standing, is intended to protect Congress's power to legislate
or not to legislate as it sees fit. As such, separation of powers is the critical underpinning of modern standing. While the concern might prevent federal agencies and
lower federal courts from conferring standing on constitutional grounds, it would
subvert the doctrine's intent to prevent Congress from conferring third-party standing
by statute.
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but also they can claim a right that, while affecting members, does
so in an indirect and highly attenuated manner. In the prior
article,"' I outlined in detail the principal cases in this category.
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor the Separation
of Church and State, Inc.,4 1 for example, the Supreme Court denied
the claimant standing to challenge a land grant to a sectarian
college. The ruling in Valley Forge, as with any denial of standing,
can readily be transformed into a substantive ruling: Plaintiffs lack
the right to prevent the government from transferring real property,
owned by the citizenry at large, to a sectarian college allegedly in
violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause, because the
resulting harm to any particular taxpayer is too small. Flast v.
Cohen,4 1 which preceded Valley Forge, represents a nearly opposite
substantive holding. In allowing the plaintiffs to challenge the grant
of tax revenues to a church on Establishment Clause grounds, the
FlastCourt held that individuals do have the right to prevent federal
tax dollars from being spent to benefit a church.42 The Court
reasoned that, while the resulting injury to any particular taxpayer
may be small, there is a peculiar nexus between the expenditure of
tax dollars and the First Amendment Establishment Clause. As
demonstrated below, when plaintiffs seek standing based upon the
Constitution to prevent a generalized harm, Valley Forge more
closely represents the rule and Flast, the exception. As the prior
section suggests, the interesting, and as yet unanswered question,
lies in the extent of Congress's power to transform otherwise
generalized harms, by statute, into individual rights.4" 1
The two most widely noted cases in this grouping are Schlesinger
v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War'22 and United States v. Richardson.'23 In Schlesinger, the Court denied standing to an organization attempting to unseat members of Congress who were members
of the military, based upon the Article I Incompatibility Clause,
which provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance
417

See Stearns, supra note 2, part I.B.

418

454 U.S. 464 (1982).

419

392 U.S. 83 (1968).

420See
421 See

(1992)).

id. at 88.
infra part III.D (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

418 U.S. 208 (1974).
4- 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
4-
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in Office." 424 The Court reasoned that because all citizens were
injured equally by Congress's allowing these Representatives to be
seated, plaintiffs injury was not sufficiently concrete for standing
In a similar holding, issued the same term, the
purposes.425
Richardson Court denied standing to a taxpayer who claimed that
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, by providing that
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expenditures not be made public,
violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, which provides, "a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time. " 426 The Court
specifically rejected as a basis for conferring standing the plaintiff's
argument that, if he were denied standing, no one would have the
power to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. 427 The
Court concluded that the Framers had not set up an "Athenian
democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct
of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal
courts."4 28 Instead, the Court noted, our representative form of
government, while slow to action, provides alternative means of
429
redress to dissatisfied citizens, namely the political process.
More important to the social choice analysis is Justice Powell's
observation in his Richardson concurrence:
Due to what many have regarded as the unresponsiveness of the
Federal Government to recognized needs or serious inequities in
our society, recourse to the federal courts has attained an
unprecedented popularity in recent decades. Those courts have
often acted as a major instrument of social reform. But this has
not always been the case, as experiences under the New Deal
430
illustrate.
While he went on to discuss the difficulties that the Lochner era
posed for New Deal programs, Justice Powell would soon become
a central figure in another critical lesson illustrating the problems
that arise when the federal judiciary becomes the linchpin of social
reform.
By threat and force, President Roosevelt eventually
transformed a Lochnerian Court into an institution that willingly
ratified his New Deal programs. In the New Deal Court, standing

424U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
42' See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 226-27.
426 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 168 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7).
427See id. at 179.
428 Id.

41 See id. at 177.
420 Id. at 191 (Powell, J., concurring).
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was a device used by a united front to keep lower federal courts in
line.' 1 But Justice Powell would soon become well aware, and
perhaps in Richardson the lessons were already starting to register,
that standing could be used to serve a very different, but no less
important, purpose. That purpose was to prevent the irrationality
of a fractionalized and multipeaked Court's own creation. Stated
differently, the Burger Court began to use standing not to discipline
others, and specifically lower federal courts, but rather, to discipline
itself by lowering the incidence of non-Condorcet rulings, and to
discipline ideological litigants who sought to manipulate the agenda
of a multipeaked Court.
As with the presumptive prohibition against enforcing the rights
of others, however, Congress's power to rebut that presumption,
thus converting generalized rights into individual rights enforceable in court by statute has long been assumed. Perhaps the best
noted examples illustrating this proposition are the Freedom of
Information Act,4 2 which transforms government accountability
433
into the status of individual right; the Fair Housing Act cases,
in which the Court has affirmed Congress's power to confer upon
individuals the right to have housing information disseminated fairly
and without regard to race; 43 4 and cases that have upheld the
broad-based standing provisions contained in several federal
environmental statutes, 43 5 again affirming Congress's power to
transform a generalized interest in the environment into an
individual right.43 6
Without repeating the analysis set out in the prior sections, it is
fair to state that these cases and statutes strongly suggest that the
4"1 See supra text accompanying notes 282-83.
4325 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
43
1 See supra note 264.

4" For the principal cases construing the FHA, see supra note 264 and accom-

panying text.
01 See, e.g., National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1248
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiffs had standing, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988), to challenge
Environmental Protection Agency guidelines for government procurement of certain
products); Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1322
(7th Cir. 1992) (finding that plaintiffs had standing under RCRA to oppose a landfill
that had at least potential to cause them harm). For other federal environmental

statutes with broad-based standing provisions, see Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2619 (1988 &Supp. V 1993); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1988).
4- For a more extensive list of federal statutes that contain generalized standing
provisions, see Logan, supra note 264, at 60 n.96.

436

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 309

principal basis for standing has, until quite recently in any
event, 4 7 rested primarily on the Article III Case or Controversy
Clause and the desire of the federal courts to protect the power of
Congress to make or not to make law as it deems appropriate.
Thus, when Congress chooses to make law, even by converting the
rights of others or generalized rights into individual rights for
standing purposes, the Court has generally not limited that exercise
of legislative power through the imposition of an abstract standing
requirement or otherwise. 43 ' But, as the final subsection of Part
III will demonstrate, 439 Congress's power to afford standing to
citizens to present otherwise generalized claims has recently been
drawn into question. Before revisiting the question of congressional
grants of standing, however, it will be helpful to consider the final
standing case category, which helps to explore further the separation-of-powers and social choice dimensions of this important
doctrine.
C. No Right to an UndistortedMarket
As demonstrated in the prior subparts of this Part, the Supreme
Court often employs technical language in its standing cases to give
those rulings with a procedural rather than substantive gloss. A
careful analysis of the standing cases, therefore, requires that we
pierce the language to identify the underlying substantive legal
rulings that the standing denials represent. The point is perhaps
best illustrated by comparing three actual standing cases, in which
the Supreme Court ultimately held that the plaintiff has no right to
the benefits of a market that is undistorted by an unconstitutional
regulatory practice, even if she credibly alleges that removing an
unconstitutional market distortion will ultimately inure to her
benefit. In two cases, the Court appears to have issued opposite
rulings. These cases will further illustrate the social choice and
separation-of-powers dimensions that underlie the Supreme Court's
standing precedents.
437

See infra part III.D (discussing Lujan).
Perhaps the Court's clearest articulation of this principle isjustice Marshall's
statement in Linda R.S. v. Richard D. that "Congress may enact statutes creating legal
rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist
without the statute." 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973).
4S9

See infra part III.D.
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In Allen v. Wright,440 the parents of African-American school
children, who were attending public schools throughout the United
States, alleged that, absent an illegal Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
tax policy that based the tax status of private schools on the status
of the umbrella organization of which they were a part, rather than
on their individual merits, their children would have had a greater
44
likelihood of receiving an integrated public school education. 1
The Allen plaintiffs alleged that, based upon this tax policy, the IRS
had afforded tax-exempt status to numerous private schools
engaging in racially discriminatory practices throughout the United
States. 44 The plaintiffs did not allege that any of their children
had applied to, or had been denied admission into, the private
schools that had been given tax-exempt status.44 3 In fact, all of
the plaintiffs' children attended public schools.4 44 Instead, the
plaintiffs alleged that, if the tax policy were struck down on Equal
Protection Clause grounds, their children would have had a greater
likelihood of receiving an integrated public school education. 445
The Allen Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, observing
that the number of links in the causal chain between the allegedly
unconstitutional tax policy and the students' denial of an integrated
education was too attenuated to satisfy the Court's causation
test. 446 Extending the analysis used in the prior section on thirdparty standing, we can translate the denial of standing in Allen into
a substantive legal ruling. The Allen Court effectively ruled that
parents of African-American school children attending public
schools have no legal right to a public and private education
marketplace that is undistorted by allegedly unconstitutional tax
incentives, even where plaintiffs allege that removing the market
447
distortion would ultimately inure to their children's benefit.
440

468 U.S. 737 (1984).

441 See id. at 746.
442

See id. at 744.

44. See id. at 746.
444 See id.

445 See id.
446 See id. at 759.
447Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Allen is closest to the characterization
of the plaintiffs' claim offered in the text:
[The Court's] causation analysis is nothing more than a restatement of
elementary economics: -when something becomes more expensive, less of
it will be purchased.... If racially discriminatory private schools lose the
"cash grants" that flow from the operation of the statutes, the education
they provide will become more expensive and hence less of their services

438

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 309

The Court had employed a similar causal-chain analysis to deny
standing in two earlier cases, Warth v. Seldin,448 and Simon v.
44 9
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.
In Warth, the
Supreme Court denied standing to a group of residents and
organizations in Rochester, New York, who alleged that a zoning
ordinance in the neighboring town of Penfield prevented them from
securing housing in Penfield, thus discriminating against them in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause on
the basis of their income and racial minority status. The plaintiffs
alleged that as a result, their property taxes in neighboring
Rochester had increased.45 ° As in Allen, the plaintiffs did not
allege that, had the zoning ordinance been struck down, they would
have necessarily been successful in their efforts to secure low- or
moderate-income housing in Penfield. 45 ' They did claim, however,
that the zoning ordinance caused them to secure less desirable, and
more expensive, housing elsewhere. Again, piercing the Court's
analysis of the plaintiffs' alleged injury in fact reveals that the Court,
in denying standing to the Warth claimants, engaged in an important substantive legal determination, rather than a merely technical
procedural ruling. In effect, the Court held that the plaintiffs do
not have the right to a housing market that is not distorted by an
allegedly unconstitutional zoning ordinance. Alternatively stated,
the Court held that, even if we were to assume that Penfield's
ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause and that the housing market might improve for the plaintiffs

will be purchased.
Id. at 788.
448 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
+-9426 U.S. 26 (1976).
450 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 496.
451 Thus, the Warth Court, per Justice Powell, stated:
We find the record devoid of the necessary allegations.... [N]one of these
petitioners has a present interest in any Penfield property; none is himself
subject to the ordinance's strictures; and none has ever been denied a
variance or permit by respondent officials.... Instead, petitioners claim
that respondents' enforcement of the ordinance against third parties-developers, builders, and the like-has had the consequence of precluding the
construction of housing suitable to their needs at prices they might be able
to afford. The fact that the harm to petitioners may have resulted indirectly
does not in itself preclude standing.... But it may make it substantially
more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III: to establish
that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants'
actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm.
Id. at 504-05 (citation omitted).
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if the ordinance
were struck down, the plaintiffs suffered no legal
452
injury.
Finally, in Simon, the Court denied standing to a group of
indigents challenging an IRS tax policy affording tax-exempt status
to hospitals that provided only emergency medical services to the
poor, allegedly in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 As
in both Allen and Warth, the plaintiffs did not allege that if the IRS
policy were struck down, they would necessarily have secured
medical services in the private hospitals that were afforded taxexempt status. 45 4

Instead, they alleged that if the tax-exempt

status were removed, and that if conferring tax-exempt status were
conditioned upon providing indigents with medical services, more
medical services might become available to them in the future.455
In denying standing, the Court again focused on third-party links in
the causal chain, including hospitals not party to the lawsuit, and
concluded that, even if the tax-exempt status were removed, there
would have been no guarantee that the hospitals in question would
provide more medical services to the poor. 5 Again, stating this
as a substantive ruling rather than a standing determination, the
Simon Court held that plaintiffs have no legal right to a market for
medical services for the poor that is undistorted by tax incentives
created by IRS operating policies in violation of the Internal
Revenue Code.45
By transforming each of these standing determinations into a
substantive legal rule, I do not intend to suggest that any of them
are necessarily incorrect. In fact, each of the rulings might be very
well-grounded. In the absence of a judicial ruling striking the IRS
452 Or, as this subsection's heading states, plaintiffs have no right to a housing
market that is undistorted by an ordinance that violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the
45 Fourteenth Amendment.
See Simon, 426 U.S. at 28. While the Simon claimants relied upon a federal

statute, rather than a constitutional provision, the analysis suggests that given the
breadth of the tax code and the potential range of litigants that a contrary standing
determination would have invited to challenge IRS policies in violation of the Code,
Simon, no less than Allen and Warth, is intended to reduce advertent litigant pathmanipulation.
4" The Court, perJustice Powell, offered an analysis similar to that in Allen and
in Warth. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-46.
4S See id. at 43.
4- See id. at 45-46.
""Applying the zone-of-interest analysis introduced, suprapart III.A, the Court's
holding can also be translated as follows: The Simon plaintiffs do not fall within the
zone of interest of the Code provisions that the IRS's operating policies allegedly
violate.
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tax provisions and the Penfield zoning ordinance, the question
remains where such lawmaking responsibility properly rests. The
most obvious place, of course, is in Congress. This is especially true
in the Allen and Simon cases, where the allegedly illegal rule is an
IRS tax policy, which. Congress has full authority to reverse by
statute. While less obvious, Congress also has the authority to
expand the substantive reach of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause to include claims that the Supreme Court has
denied.45
To that extent, these cases can be readily contrasted
with the landmark decision Marbury v. Madison.459 While Chief
Justice Marshall did not speak in these terms, the Marbury Court
effectively held that where Congress acts by statute in a manner that
violates the Constitution, the Supreme Court will, in a proper case,
invalidate that congressional action by striking the statute.4 6
In
contrast, Allen and Simon, and, to a lesser extent, Warth, held that
where Congress fails to act and where its failure to act allegedly
results in a constitutional violation, the Court generally will not
invalidate the congressional inaction, thereby creating positive law
on Congress's behalf.4 6
Instead, the Court, unless forced to
create positive law in a case where it cannot decline to do so, will
prefer to wait for an appropriate consensus to form in Congress.
Because the Court is unable to ensure that its rulings will implement Condorcet-winning preferences, its reluctance to overcome
4
See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (upholding Congress's
power to expand the reach of the Equal Protection Clause in a manner that the Court
had expressly rejected in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360
U.S. 45 (1959)). Thus, while the Court has repeatedly held that wealth is not a
suspect classification for equal protection purposes, Congress presumably could
define wealth as a suspect classification, thus creating a stronger basis with which to
challenge Penfield's zoning ordinance. However, the most recent Supreme Court
term's equal protection cases might suggest some limit on Congress's power to
expand the reach of equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (imposing
strict scrutiny for federal affirmative action programs and overruling Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 497 U.S. 547 (1990),
which had upheld an FCC affirmative action program based on intermediate
scrutiny); see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2490 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny in evaluating a racially gerrymandered congressional district drawn to satisfy
Department ofJustice administrative preclearance under the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1972bb-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
"" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). I suggested a preliminary analysis along the lines
offered in the text in Stearns, supra note 12, at 1261-62 n.158.
460 See Stearns, supra note 12, at 1261 n.158.
461 See id.
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congressional inertia, except when absolutely necessary, is easy to
understand.
Finally, it is worth noting that, while William Fletcher has argued
that all standing cases can be recast in third-party standing
terms, 46 2 the above analysis demonstrates the distinction between
the cases in these two groupings. Denials of third-party standing
are premised on the existence of a shadow case in which some other
potential litigant can raise the identical claim without a credible
standing barrier. These cases, in contrast, are premised on the
notion that, with slightly altered facts, these claimants would be
better situated to present a more judicially cognizable claim. In
Allen, for example, the plaintiffs would have been able to present a
more cognizable claim challenging the IRS policy if their children
had applied to and been rejected from the discriminatory private
schools receiving favorable tax treatment. Similarly, in Warth, the
plaintiffs would have been able to present a more cognizable claim
challenging the Penfield ordinance if they had themselves applied
for a variance and been denied that variance based upon race or
upon a wealth classification." 3 Finally, in Simon, the plaintiffs
would have been able to present a more cognizable claim challenging the IRS policy if a hospital with tax-exempt status, as party to
the suit, admitted that it would change its indigent access policy if
it lost that status. The Court did not deny standing in these cases
because the plaintiffs were less well-suited than some other person;
it denied standing because the underlying legal issue would be
better presented in a case with different facts.
These results, of course, raise the question as to why the Court
viewed the facts alleged in these cases as deficient for standing
purposes. If the analysis in these articles is persuasive, the Court is
seeking facts that appear closer to the traditional bipolar litigation
end of the spectrum than to the interest group path manipulation
end of the spectrum, which is typified in the third-party standing
and diffuse-harms categories. 6 4
But because the Court has
employed metaphors that capture only part of the relevant standing
image, it has rendered decisions that appear inconsistent. As set
out belo*, the inconsistency arises because the cases in this third
462See Fletcher, supra note 171, at

245.

463 That is not to suggest that the plaintiffs would necessarily have prevailed had

the facts differed as suggested in the text. It is only to suggest that they would more
likely have been afforded standing.
4' See supra part III.A-B.
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category in which standing is either granted or denied are distinguishable, not in kind, but in degree. Superimposing ill-fitting
metaphors to categorize these cases, therefore, creates the anomaly
revealed below" 5 that, with little work, the language in a case in
which standing was granted can be used to recharacterize the case
such that standing should have been denied; and the reverse holds
true as well.
The Allen, Simon, and Warth cases undoubtedly appear troublesome to many readers. In these cases, the Court has used standing
to deny seemingly powerful legal claims related to the integration
of public schools, the provision of medical services, and the
availability of housing for minorities and the poor. The cases seem
particularly troublesome when they are contrasted with those cases
in which the Court, notwithstanding congressional silence, has
willingly created very detailed and code-like interpretations of
broad-based constitutional clauses, including the Equal Protection
Clause, which was at issue in these cases.4 66 Why, then, did the
Court decline to make positive law on the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause when faced with congressional inertia on issues
as important as those presented in these cases? And why did it
decline to address the underlying legal claims when, in the very act
of denying standing, the Court inevitably made an alternative
substantive legal ruling, namely that plaintiffs have no right to the
benefits of a market that is undistorted by allegedly unconstitutional
laws? Again, to understand the anomaly, we need to consider the
options that the Allen and Simon Courts faced.
The Allen and Simon Courts faced two alternatives. First, those
Courts could have allowed the litigants to force the federal judiciary
to monitor the IRS's internal operating policies, even though that
is generally a function of Congress and even though the Courts
could not guarantee that in doing so it would issue a rational ruling
that did not thwart the present will of a majority of the Court's own
members. Second, those Courts could have issued a more modest
substantive ruling, on which a majority of justices could agree, that
claimants do not have the right to come into court to have removed
4 For illustrations, see infra text accompanying notes 467-76.
466Thus,

in its criminal procedure, busing, and privacy cases, for example, the

Court willingly thwarted congressional silence on the meaning and scope of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See Stearns, supra
note 2, part II.A.
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an allegedly illegal market distortion. The latter option does not
prevent the underlying issues from ever reaching the Court. If, for
example, the parents of an applicant to a private school who was
rejected based upon race brought suit seeking to strike the taxexempt status, the Court would presumably address the merits of
the underlying claim. Using the Court's own metaphors, this
hypothetical case, like the traditional case in which the Court
resolves the legal claims of a convicted criminal on appeal, possesses
those qualities that resemble the tort elements of injury, causation,
and redressability. The hypothetical case does not resemble an
attempt by an ideological litigant to shift the burden of legislative
inertia onto the federal courts. Neither of the options that the
Court faced was ideal, but the standing denial more closely accords
with limiting judicial lawmaking to ad hoc and as-needed decision46 7

making.

While the Court, in effect, chose what it considered to be the
least bad of two imperfect options in these cases, the inconsistency
with which it applied its standing analysis makes it difficult to
predict how the Court will rule in any given case. Consider, for
example, the following two standing cases issued within two days of
each other, Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmental Study Group,
Inc.46 and Board of Regents v. Bakke.469 In Duke Power, the plaintiffs, residents of a neighborhood adjacent to a proposed nuclear
power plant and an environmental interest group, challenged the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, which set a $560 million
liability cap for nuclear accidents. 470 The plaintiffs did not allege
that if the Act's liability limit were struck down, the proposed
construction would not proceed.4 71 Instead, the plaintiffs alleged
a substantial likelihood that the construction might not proceed if
the potential cost of nuclear accidents had not been artificially
reduced by the liability cap, which, they further alleged violated
their due process rights by preventing full recoveries in the event of
a nuclear accident. 472 As in the previous cases, the plaintiffs
sought to have the Court remove an allegedly unconstitutional
467 See id.

4469

438 U.S. 59 (1978).

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

417See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 67.
471 See id. at 74-75 (referring to the findings of the district court in Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 219
(W.D.N.C.
1977)).
4
72 See id. at 69.
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market distortion. Unlike the Courts in Allen, Simon, and Warth,
however, the Duke Power Court, focusing on both the imminent
nature of the potential reduction in the value of the plaintiffs'
homes, and the much greater potential damage that would result in
473
the event of a nuclear accident, granted standing.
Similarly, the Bakke Court granted the plaintiff, a white medical
school applicant who had twice been rejected from medical school,
standing, even though he did not allege that had he been allowed
to compete for all of the seats (including the sixteen seats that had
been set aside for minority applicants), he would have been
admitted. 474 To justify the grant of standing, the Court defined
Mr. Bakke's injury narrowly. Rather than characterizing the injury
as the denial of admission into the medical school, the Court determined that Mr. Bakke was injured in his exclusion from competition
for all one hundred medical school seats and that this amounted to
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 475 The difficulty is that
the very same reasoning could have been used to achieve a contrary
result in both Allen and Simon.
If the Allen Court, for example, had defined the plaintiffs'
injury, not as the denial of an integrated education (an assertion
which the plaintiffs could not support because of the attenuated
causal chain), but rather, as the denial of appropriate market
incentives to foster integration-which the plaintiffs claimed-the
plaintiffs' injury would be no less concrete than that in Bakke. The
same analysis applies in Simon, where, if the Court had defined the
relevant injury, not as the right to receive medical services (an
assertion which, again, the plaintiffs could not support because of
473 See id. at 72-81.
41 See Board of Regents v. Bakke,

438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978). The California
Supreme Court ordered Bakke's admission before the case reached the Supreme
Court, analogizing the equal protection claim to one arising under Title VII and thus

shifting the burden to the state to prove that, absent the minority admissions programs, Mr. Bakke would not have been admitted. On petition for rehearing before
the Supreme Court, the California Board of Regents conceded that they could not
meet that burden. See id. at 280-81.
4' See id. For a recent example of a case in which the Court granted standing
despite an attenuated causal chain, see Northeastern Fla. Gen. Contractors v.Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297,2301 (1993) (conferring standing upon a contractor challenging
a racial set-aside program using Bakke-style analysis in which injury is defined as the
ability to compete rather than the ability to obtain a contract); see also Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977)
(conferring standing to challenge an alleged racially motivated denial of a variance
even though the requested relief would not guarantee that the project would be
built).
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the attenuated causal chain), but instead as the right to a market for
indigent medical services that is undistorted by illegal tax incentives,
the causal chain would again be no less attenuated than that in
Bakke. Flipping the analysis around and broadening Mr. Bakke's
claimed injury reveals the same doctrinal incongruity. Had the
Bakke Court focused on the requisite links in the causal chain before
Mr. Bakke would have been admitted to medical school, it might
have found, as it did in Allen and Simon, that his alleged injury was
476
insufficient to support standing.
Why, then, did the Court grant standing to the Duke Power
plaintiffs and to Mr. Bakke when it denied standing to the Allen and
Simon plaintiffs? Again, we need to consider the options that the
These cases are best viewed as points along a
Court faced.
spectrum; they are not different in kind, but they are different in
degree. Differences in degree, however, can be both comprehensible and important. The Duke Power Court could have denied
standing, ruling that the homeowners and environmental groups
have no right to a marketplace unaffected by an arguably illegal
distortion-the Price-Anderson Act's liability cap-even if, without
that cap, the proposed construction might not proceed. Similarly,
the Bakke Court could have ruled that Mr. Bakke has no right to an
education market that is undistorted by a state's arguably unconstitutional selection criterion, even if he might benefit by the removal
of that criterion.
To understand the cases above, we must disregard the Court's
rhetoric on such matters as injury in fact, causation, and redressability, and focus instead on what these catch phrases are intended
to capture. The social choice analysis reveals that these terms are
metaphors intended to capture those circumstances in which
plaintiffs have adequately alleged the need for the Court to consider
shifting the burden of congressional inertia and to make positive
law, even when the Court's preferences are multipeaked. Applying
this analysis, we can place these cases, in their factual contexts,
along a spectrum that will help to explain the seemingly disparate
results. As demonstrated in Part III.A, third-party standing operates
as a presumptive rule that prevents ideological litigants from forcing
favorable precedents through path manipulation by locating
476 The reader is free to "flip" the Duke Power analysis. While the social choice
analysis does not remove these anomalies, it provides a substantially stronger basis
for explaining them than has been offered in the literature thus far. See infra text
accompanying notes 480-82.

446

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 144: 309

someone who has been sitting on her rights."' While such cases
as SCRAP and Sierra Club, which lie at the doctrine's outer edge,
might obfuscate the doctrine's purpose, the purpose is restored
when we consider those cases at the core, namely those in which
convicted criminals, who are only interested in securing relief on
their own behalf with no larger agenda, seek favorable rulings.
When these convicted criminals raise constitutional challenges, the
federal courts cannot avoid shifting the burden of legislative inertia
and addressing the claims on the merits.
Thus viewed, SCRAP and Sierra Club might be viewed as
representing the opposite extreme, that is, as efforts to secure
favorable precedents where the justification for shifting the burden
of legislative inertia is rather weak. Given the absence of concrete
injuries and the ideological nature of the claims involved in SCRAP
and Sierra Club, the political process seemed adequate to the task of
resolving the issues presented. Moreover, congressional resolution
of these issues is less susceptible to path manipulation than is
judicial resolution. The cases presented in this subsection fall along
a spectrum between those two extremes.
While it is true that in Duke Power relief on the merits, which
was ultimately denied, would not guarantee that the proposed
construction would cease, no shadow case existed in which the
challenge could be raised in a sufficiently timely manner to protect
the plaintiffs' interests. Moreover, the very fact that a nuclear
power plant was being proposed for construction near the plaintiffs'
homes created a present injury in the form of reduced property
values. If the construction ultimately proceeded, the reduction in
value was likely to be severe. Thus viewed, this case appears closer
to those cases in which convicted criminals are attempting to force
judicial creation of positive law to secure relief than it does to those
in which the plaintiffs are attempting to manipulate the substantive
evolution of legal doctrine by controlling the order of precedent.
Similarly, while the conferral of standing in Bakke would not
have ensured that Mr. Bakke would be admitted to medical school,
a contrary ruling on standing would certainly have prevented
him from being admitted into medical school. The Bakke Court
might have ruled as it did because Mr. Bakke, having twice applied
and having twice been denied admission into medical school, was
unlikely to study medicine if the Court did not address the
"" See supra part III.A.
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merits of his claim. Again, applying the Court's own metaphors,
Mr. Bakke's claim contained traditional notions of injury, causation, and redressability, thus justifying the Court's decision to
consider shifting the burden of congressional inertia. Thus viewed,
Duke Power and Bakke are hybrids between the criminal procedure
cases, in which a convicted criminal challenges her conviction
and sentence on appeal, and the SCRAP and Sierra Club cases, in
which a claimant files a generalized claim knowing that relief is
more likely to issue from a multipeaked Court. While these cases
contain elements of both extremes along the spectrum, the Court
likely viewed them as closer in kind to those involving criminal
appeals.
In contrast, the Allen, Simon, and Warth decisions appear
somewhat closer to the other end of the spectrum in which
ideological litigants are pressing generalized grievances because the
chance of a favorable, non-Condorcet ruling is greater in the federal
courts. This is partly reflected by the fact that the Allen and Simon
plaintiffs, who were not seeking particular educational or medical
benefits, were spread throughout the nation. I do not intend to
suggest, in any way, that Mr. Bakke's claim or the Duke Power
plaintiffs' claim was more important than the claims of the Allen,
Simon, or Warth plaintiffs. In fact, in characterizing the injuries at
stake in these cases, many would conclude that the rights to an
integrated public school education, to the provision of medical
services, and to the fair marketing of housing are more important,
and perhaps more concrete, than the rights not to have property
values diminished or to study medicine. That is the point; concreteness of injury is not an abstract inquiry. Instead, it is a metaphor,
intended to capture a single but complex concept, namely the
circumstances in which a litigant has provided a sufficiently
compelling set of facts to justify forcing a multipeaked court to shift
the burden of legislative inertia.
At the opening of this Article, I set out a fairly difficult test for
evaluating my social choice theory of standing.4 7 While one more
major case remains to be discussed,4" 9 it is now appropriate to
revisit that test in light of the preceding historical and case
evidence. To justify replacing the existing models of standingincluding political explanations-with my social-choice-based theory,
478 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

See infra part III.D (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555

(1992)).
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40
my theory would have to account for more, and more varied, 1
data. This data includes the history surrounding the adoption and
transformation of standing, and the cases themselves. Usually
political explanations are irrefutable because in response to an
apparent inconsistency, one need only say that "it's all political." 48 1 But here, even the political explanation of standing is
weaker than that which I offer. The political explanation fails to
place standing within a broader spectrum that includes other bodies
of case law, including constitutional criminal procedure. It is also
not terribly robust in explaining the nuances of the cases themselves.
I have not tried to prove that no inconsistencies in the cases
exist, but I have used the shadow-case analysis to demonstrate that
the inconsistencies are less pronounced than most academics admit
and that some of the inconsistencies can be meaningfully modeled
and evaluated. If the social choice theory of standing accounts for
more dots than the next available theory, my model of standing is
well worth considering. It is my position that the social choice
model of standing better captures three critical sets of data: (1) the
historical context in which the New Deal standing emerged and in
which that doctrine was critically transformed during the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts; (2) the jurisprudential independence of
standing from related justiciability doctrines and the question of
whether a plaintiff has a cause of action;8. and (3) most importantly, the standing and nonstandingcases themselves. I believe that
these two articles demonstrate that the social choice model of
standing meets this stringent test.
Before revisiting congressional grants of standing, it is worth
considering one plausible political explanation of standing. When
teaching these cases in my introductory course in constitutional law,
a bright student observed that one could readily tell the following
alternative story: The Court, which is composed of mostly upper or
upper-middle class white males, is more sympathetic to the plights
of a medical school applicant denied admission because of so-called
"reverse discrimination" or a property owner whose property value
is threatened, than to those of parents of African-American public

480 See OLSON, supra note 72, at 13.
481Of course, the same feature undermines the scientific merit of political theories
because the theories cannot be falsified. See POPPER, supra note 1, at 3.
48 See Stearns, supra note 2, part II.B (discussing the second prong listed in the
text). The first and third prongs were the focus of the current Article.
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school children or of indigents seeking either housing or medical
services. At the very least, the former claims would appear to have
a greater possibility of affecting the justices or those close to them
than would the latter claims. While such a political explanation of
the Court's standing decisions-if we accept certain assumptions
about the impact of background on judicial bias-may have intuitive
appeal, it fails the test of accounting for as many dots, or cases, as
does my proposed model. Applying a political model, we would not
expect members of the Court to be particularly sympathetic to
convicted criminals or even to criminal defendants. And yet, the
Court routinely allows convicted criminals to bring to federal court
countless-often frivolous-constitutional claims, which quite often
require the Court to make new law. The analysis in these articles
accounts not only for the cases that were the subject of the student's
comment, but also for the voluminous body of case law under the
general heading of constitutional criminal procedure. 48 3 I do not
intend to suggest that there is no possibility that bias played a role
in these cases, but I am suggesting that the standing-is-politics
explanation is substantially less robust than the social choice model
of standing offered in these articles.
Nor do I intend to suggest that each of the cases discussed in
Part III of this Article was correctly decided. Instead, I am
suggesting that the correctness or lack thereof of these rulings does
not depend upon whether they satisfy the requirements of concreteness of injury, causation, or redressability, at some abstract level.
If we, instead, view these cases as lying along a spectrum representing the circumstances in which shifting the burden of congressional
inertia is or is not compelled, it becomes easier to reconcile more
standing cases and to understand the role that standing plays in our
constitutional scheme.
D. CongressionalGrants of Standing Revisited:

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
If I am correct in asserting that the standing inquiry is about the
question of when the plaintiff has adequately demonstrated the
need for federal courts to shift the burden of legislative inertia, one
question naturally arises: What happens when Congress, by statute,
attempts to shift onto the federal courts the burden of its own
...For a summary of this rich body of case law, see Stearns, supra note 2, part
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inertia? Stated differently, what happens when Congress, by statute,
tries to convert what was once a generalized grievance into an
individual right? This Subpart will answer that question.
Contrasting Allen with the recent Supreme Court decision, Lujan
v.

Defenders of Wildltfe,4" 4

reveals

the current

tension in

the

Supreme Court's constitutional standing analysis. Allen suggests
that in choosing between two alternative rulings, the Court will be
affected by which option best preserves Congress's future decisionmaking authority, thus resting the constitutional dimension of
standing on Article III. Lujan suggests instead that standing,
effectively resting upon Articles II and III, prevents Congress from
creating private attorney general statutes as a means to monitor
executive branch conduct in federal court.
In Lujan, the Supreme Court invalidated, at least as applied, the
citizen-suit provisions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).485
Under the ESA, which divides the responsibilities for protecting
endangered species between the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce, federal agencies whose activities might
endanger such species are required to consult with the Secretary of
8 6
the Interior."
Reversing a prior joint regulation, which required
interagency consultation for all agency activities that might
jeopardize endangered species in the United States, on the high
seas, and in foreign nations, the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce issued a revised joint rule reinterpreting the
ESA and limiting the geographic scope of the statute for purposes
of interagency consultation to those activities within the borders of
the United States or on the high seas."8 7 The plaintiffs, environmental organizations and a group of citizens interested in preserving the habitats of particular endangered species abroad, sued the
Secretary of the Interior, claiming that federal agencies were
funding projects that jeopardized the habitats of particular endangered species abroad without having first consulted the Secretary of
the Interior."' s The plaintiffs claimed that the revised joint rule,
which did not require such consultation, given that the threatened
habitats were within foreign nations, violated the ESA's substantive
provisions on interagency consultation."8 9 They relied for stand414 504 U.S.
41 See id. at
48 See id. at
417

555 (1992).
571-73.
558.
See id. at 558-59.

48 See id. at 559.
489See id.
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ing upon the following citizen-suit provision contained in the ESA:
"[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to
enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency.., who is alleged to be in
490
violation of any provision of this chapter."
In denying the plaintiffs standing, Justice Scalia, writing in part
for a majority and in part for a plurality of four, determined that
the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy both the injury and redressability
prongs of the Court's standing formulation. 491 The majority
rejected each of three injury theories: first, actual injury grounded
in the plaintiffs' interest in the species whose habitats were
endangered by projects that received partial funding from federal
agencies; 492 second, procedural injury resulting from the failure
of the relevant agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior,
as required by statute; 493 and third, three nexus theories under
which individuals with interests in endangered species, or who use
any part of a contiguous ecosystem, are afforded standing when the
habitats of those species or any part of the ecosystems are endangered. 49 4 The plurality, which rejected the plaintiffs' showing of
redressability, 495 did not employ the causation language that was
the focus of the preceding subsection. 4 6 As shown below, however, the distinction between causation and redressability is largely
semantic.497
"' Id. at 571-72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §
491 See id. at 557, 568.
49 See id. at 562-64.
411 See id. at 571-72.
41 See id. at 565-67.

15 4

0(g) (1988)).

495 See id. at 568-71.
41 See supra part III.C.
497
The Court has attempted, without much success, to distinguish the causationor fair traceability-prong from the redressability prong. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737 (1984), Justice O'Connor explained:
The "fairly traceable" and "redressability" components of the constitutional
standing inquiry were initially articulated by this Court as "two facets of a
single causation requirement."... To the extent there is a difference, it is
that the former examines the causal connection between the assertedly
unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the
causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief
requested. Cases such as this, in which the relief requested goes well
beyond the violation of law alleged, illustrate why it is important to keep the
inquiries separate if the "redressability" component is to focus on the
requested relief. Even if the relief respondents request might have a substantial effect on the desegregation of public schools, whatever deficiencies
exist in the opportunities for desegregated education for respondents'
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Joyce Kelly, one of the petitioners, averred by affidavit that she
had traveled to Egypt in 1986, where she "observed the traditional
habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile," and that, although she
did not see the crocodiie directly, she hoped to do so when she next
traveled to Egypt.498 However, Ms. Kelly admitted that she had no
specific plans to return. 9
Amy Skilbred, another petitioner,
averred that she had traveled to Sri Lanka, where she observed the
habitat of the Asian elephant and the leopard, which she alleged was
threatened by a project that the Agency for International Development (AID), a federal agency, funded."' In a subsequent deposition, Ms. Skilbred admitted that, although she hoped to return to
Sri Lanka, she had no specific plans because that country was
engaged in a civil war.5" Both plaintiffs alleged that the failure
of the agencies funding the programs abroad to consult with the
Secretary of the Interior, as required by statute, had injured them.
Writing for a majority, Justice Scalia stated that, even assuming,
which he found questionable, that "these affidavits contain facts
showing that certain agency-funded projects threaten listed

children might not be traceable to IRS violations of law--grants of tax
exemptions to racially discriminatory schools in respondents' communities.
Id. at 753 n.19 (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor suggests that causation involves
the relationship between the illegal activity and the asserted injury and that
redressability involves the relationship between the asserted injury and the desired
remedy. One might assume, however, that any particular remedy is likely to be effective precisely to the extent that the asserted injury has been caused by the illegal
conduct that the claimants seek to have corrected. Thus, while it is true that
reversing the IRS tax exemption might not entirely integrate the public schools, it
will, by definition, change the conduct of those private schools and parents of private
school children, whose conduct is on the margin. The schools that are on the margin
will alter their discriminatory policies if the tax policy is changed, and the parents
who are on the margin, if faced with a school's decision to raise its tuition rather than
to change its discriminatory policies after the tax exemption is removed, will send
their children to public schools. How many schools and parents are on the margin
is an empirical question, but it is one that is not necessary for the Court to resolve.
The point is that, in striking the IRS tax exemption for discriminatory private schools,
those schools and parents who are on the margin will predictably alter their conduct.
Whatever the overall effect upon the integration of public schools, one can characterize it equally in terms of causation and redressability. Thus, one could say that the
IRS tax exemption improperly caused the schools and parents on the margin to engage in conduct that tended to inhibit public school desegregation, or, that the IRS
tax exemption, once struck, redressed the plaintiffs' injury to the extent that it
encouraged schools and parents on the margin to alter their conduct, which had
inhibited
public school desegregation.
49
8 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
499 See id. at 563-64.

' See id. at 563.
See id. at 563-64.
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species," 50 2 the petitioners lacked the requisite injury to justify
granting them standing under the statute. Justice Scalia held for the
Court that "'some day' intentions-without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury that our cases require."5"' Justice Scalia also rejected the
petitioners' claim that the citizen-suit provision of the ESA created
in all persons a right to challenge the failure of a funding agency to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior, thereby rejecting the
analysis used by the Eighth Circuit to deny the government's motion
for summary judgment on standing." 4 Because Justice Scalia's
characterization of this argument for the majority is critical for the
analysis to follow, I will quote it in full:
To understand the remarkable nature of [the Eighth Circuit
holding] one must be clear about what it does not rest upon: This
is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural
requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate
concrete interest of theirs (e.g., the procedural requirement for a
hearing prior to a denial of their license application, or the
procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement
before a federal facility is constructed next door to them). Nor is
it simply a case where concrete injury has been suffered by many
persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations. Nor, finally, is
it the unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete
private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for
the Government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the
victorious plaintiff.[5 5 ] Rather, the court held that the injury-infact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral
upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental
"right" to have the Executive observe the procedures required by
law. We reject this view.50 6
This characterization is critical to understanding the present rift
within the Supreme Court over identifying standing's constitutional
underpinnings. In criticizing the portion of the majority opinion
"0

Id. at 564.

Ms Id.
See id. at 572.
Relying upon the preceding sentence, Professor Sunstein has argued that, by
creating a modest bounty for successful environmental plaintiffs (and other plaintiffs
relying upon a federal statute to vindicate similarly generalized injuries), Congress
might readily circumvent the difficulties that Lujan creates. See Sunstein, supra note
148, at 232-33.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-73.
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quoted above, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor (who
authored the Allen decision), stated:
The Court expresses concern that allowingjudicial enforcement of

"agencies' observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed
procedure" would "tiansfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3."... In fact, the
principal effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of such
procedures is to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at
the expense-not of the courts-but of Congress, from which that
power originates and emanates." 7

If, as Justices Blackmun and O'Connor suggest, the constitutional basis of standing lies in the Court's desire to protect
Congress's power to monitor the executive branch, it follows that
courts should treat a claim of standing based upon a constitutional
provision differently from a claim of standing based upon a federal
statute. By conferring standing to enforce claimed substantive
rights based upon broad constitutional provisions, the Court
effectively shifts the burden of congressional inertia. In doing so,
it may effectively prevent Congress, to the extent that the underlying ruling is grounded in constitutional interpretation, from acting
in the future, should a Condorcet-winning legislative preference
arise. In contrast, when faced with a federal statute that confers
standing to press an otherwise generalized grievance against the
executive branch, that is no longer a concern. Superimposing an
abstract injury-in-fact requirement as a precondition to congressional grants of standing, ironically, has the effect of protecting
Congress's power to enact Condorcet-winning statutes by striking

" Id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As if these two positions were not
confusing enough, Justice Kennedy has offered a third:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a contrary
view.... In exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least
identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit.
Id. at 580 (KennedyJ., concurring). While Kennedy tries to strike a middle ground
between the Scalia and Blackmun opinions, his suggestion would appear to render
Lujan fairly inconsequential because Congress could avoid the result by simply
defining injured persons as including those who intend to travel to locations in which
federal agency funding, in violation of the ESA, threatens the habitats of endangered
species. Fairly read, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court does not appear to
countenance this form of subterfuge for its more rigid injury requirement, based
upon analogues from the common law.
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Condorcet-winning statutes. If that sounds nonsensical, that is the
point.
Thus viewed, Justice Scalia's assertion that "there is absolutely
no basis for making the Article III inquiry [on injury in fact] turn on
the source of the asserted right""' flips the Supreme Court's
standing analysis on its head. If the constitutional foundation of
standing lies in the desire to protect Congress's power to legislate,
the source of the asserted right is critical to the standing inquiry,
and the Lujan result is troublesome. If, instead, the constitutional
foundation of standing somehow rests upon the desire to protect
the executive's power to execute the laws, then whole bodies of
constitutional precedent become difficult to comprehend. Thus,
while Justice Scalia relied upon Marbury v. Madison" 9 for the
proposition that "[t]he province of the court... is, solely, to decide
on the rights of individuals,"5 10 he neglected to note the passage
that appears in the following paragraph of the same case:
if it be no intermeddling with a subject, over which the executive
can be considered as having exercised any control; what is there
in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a citizen from
asserting, in a. court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid a
court to listen to the claim; or to issue a mandamus, directing the
performance of a duty, not depending on executive discretion, but
on particular acts of congress, and the general principles of
law?511
Since Marbury, the Court's power in a proper case to invalidate
executive branch actions that violate the Constitution or federal
statutes has been assumed. As the quoted language demonstrates,
the Marbury Court itself observed that, if the conferral of the
original power in the Supreme Court to grant mandamus had not
violated Article III, Marbury, because it involved a ministerial, rather
than a political act, would have been a proper case to compel the
executive to comply with the law.512 One might be inclined to
distinguish the right claimed in Lujan from that asserted in Marbuy
on the ground that Marbury's right to a commission was concrete.
5

' Id. at 576.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
'oLujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170).
511Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
5

512 For a much more recent case demonstrating the Court's willingness to compel
executive conduct as required by law, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702
(1974) (ordering President Nixon to release tapes that he withheld in response to a
properly issued subpoena).
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That of course begs the question whether Congress has the power
to transform otherwise abstract injuries into cognizable individual
claims, thus rendering those injuries concrete, at least as a matter
of law. But whether or not Congress has that power, which I-and
others51 s-would suggest it does, should not turn on whether
judicial enforcement of an otherwise constitutional statute requires
courts to intrude upon executive enforcement of the laws. In any
event, the greatest difficulty with Lujan lies not so much in its
constraining Congress's power to define new claims of injury as it
does in its utter confusion as to the constitutional underpinnings of
standing. That confusion, while troublesome, is not difficult to
comprehend. The Court again fell victim to its own language,
transforming what was intended as a metaphor into a rigid
constitutional requirement.
The injury-in-fact requirement of the Supreme Court's standing
doctrine is intended to protect Congress's power to govern. Critical
to that power, as social choice reveals, is the power not to make law
unless and until an appropriate consensus forms. Because the
federal courts, unlike. Congress, lack the power of institutional
inertia, they invite challenges by litigants who are dissatisfied with
the outcomes of this important congressional power.
This is
especially true when courts, including the Supreme Court, signal
that less than majority support is sometimes adequate to force
favorable judicial outcomes. Because the Court cannot guarantee
a rational result when there is no Condorcet winner, its decisions,
precisely because they thwart the will of a present majority, invite
ideologically driven litigation.
In fact, the generality of this
invitation, coupled with path dependent voting procedures,
promotes what could fairly be termed a "race to the bottom" in
which ideological litigants, on all sides of any given issue, seek to
prevent fortuity-or opponents-from determining the critical path.
Rather than permit this form of litigant free-for-all, the Court, at a

513 See, e.g., Logan, supranote 264, at 42 (positing that "[ifn the statutory context,
the Court should uniformly follow the approach it has used in a series of cases
construing the Fair Housing Act, one which accords great deference to Congress'
power to provide judicial redress to parties asserting even novel claims with
attenuated causal relationships"); Pierce, supra note 148, at 1181 (observing that
Justices Kennedy and Souter, in their concurrences in Lujan, "recognize that regulatory regimes often createjudicially enforceable statutory rights that differ from traditional common law rights")y Sunstein, supra note 148, at 177-78 (asserting that
"[tihere is absolutely no affirmative evidence that Article III was intended to limit
congressional power to create standing").
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time when it mattered most and when it was least able to control
the outcomes of its pkecedents," 4 elevated standing to a critical
status. This doctrine serves to discourage advertent litigant path
manipulation. At the same time, by preventing litigants from
forcing cases upon the federal courts that would require them to
supplant the status quo with judicially created positive law, it
preserves the power of Congress to govern. Such phrases as injury
in fact, causation, and redressability played a role in this process,
but-contrary to Scalia's Lujan analysis-not because they are
requirements with independent jurisprudential significance.
Instead, they played a role because those cases in which the Court
is unable to avoid creating positive law correlate with claims that
satisfy these traditional tort principles that emerged in the context
of traditional bipolar litigation.
Until Lujan, it was assumed that while these metaphoric terms
limited the power of litigants to force judicial creation of positive
law, they did so to protect Congress's ability to govern. Even the
Court's teeter-totter on the question whether standing rests upon
prudential or constitutional bases was not terribly problematic as
long as the relevant constitutional basis rested solely upon the
requirements of Article III. By giving these terms an alternative,
and previously unasserted, constitutional status, 515 the Lujan
Court flipped the object of these metaphors-the circumstances in
which parties have alleged appropriate facts to justify forcing the
courts to shift the burden of legislative inertia-on its head. Even
so, the social choice framework, used to criticize Lujan, might
provide insights to explain it.
While public-choice literature has frequently noted the extent to
which Congress delegates in order to take credit for legislative
successes at relatively low cost, 516 no one thus far has analyzed the

effect of multipeaked judicial preferences on congressional
delegation to private attorneys general. A Congress wishing to take
5" See supra part II.A.
515

The only time that an Article II justification for standing has been seriously
advanced prior to Lujan was in an article written by Scalia in 1983. See Scalia, supra
note 4, at 893-94 n.58 (positing that "congressional approval and even encouragement
[of relaxed standing] cannot validatejudicial disregard of the boundary between the
second and third branches").
516 See Aranson et al., supra note 185, at 56 ("[D]elegation reduces the legislator's
marginal cost of private-good production, which, ceterisparibus,yields more legislation
and more public-sector private-goods production."). See generally Lowi, supra note

184 (examining the political consequences of delegating power to administrative
agencies).
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credit for a legislative success at low cost might view a multipeaked
Supreme Court no less favorably than our hypothetical ideological
plaintiff, who seeks to force a non-Condorcet-winning preference
into law. The creation of something as technical as standing to
litigate in federal court is precisely the sort of policymaking by
obfuscation that promotes both credit taking and blame passing.5 1
If the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court,
reaches a favorable outcome, Congress takes the credit for having
created the vehicle for that result. If the judiciary does not reach
a favorable outcome, it, rather than Congress, is likely to be the
object of attack.
Thus viewed, Lujan might properly be seen as a limited revival
of the nondelegation doctrine, this time with the federal judiciary,
rather than federal agencies, as the feared regulatory object. In
short, Lujan may have been the Court's warning signal to prevent

Congress from continuing down the path of delegation through
broad conferrals of citizen standing in cases requiring executive
monitoring with respect to divisive policy issues. Whether or not
such a ruling is wise, it might be no more harmful, or lasting, than
the now moribund nondelegation doctrine.5 18
If so, Lujan is
grounded not so much on Congress's power-or lack thereof-to
define novel causes of action, as many critics have warned, 5 9 but

51 For a discussion of the delegation-as-avoidance technique in the public choice

literature, see MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS 108 (1981); THEODORE LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 59 (1979);
see also Aranson et al., supranote 185, at 63-67 (advocating revising the nondelegation
doctrine based upon teachings of public choice, including those discussed in this
Article).
5-8 For an alternative public choice spin on Lujan, see Pierce, supra note 148, at
1193-95. The author posits:
The dissenting Justices [in Lujan] accused Justice Scalia of mounting "a
slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing." In
one sense, that characterization understates the potential significance of his
opinion.
Id. at 1173. For Professor Pierce, the deeper significance lies in the fact that, by
imposing the same stringent three-prong standing test in statutory standing cases as
in nonstatutory standing cases, the Lujan Court may be signaling to regulatory
agencies that only regulated entities, those parties whose "injuries" parallel injuries
as defined at common law, will have power to challenge agency conduct in federal
court. See id. at 1193-95. The effect, in turn, is to promote agency capture by the
very entities that such agencies were intended to regulate, even in the face of a direct
and contrary legislative intent. See id.
519 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 148, at 222-23 (stating that, once it was
determined that Congress had granted standing, "[tihere was no need to start with
injury in fact and redressability, or even to address the issues at all").
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rather, on concerns over congressional-abdication of its lawmakirig
function to the federal courts.
In short, Lujan obfuscates the critical, and delicate, linkage
between standing and separation of powers and muddies the socalled constitutional/prudential boundary that underlies modem
standing. Thus, for example, while the Supreme Court has
employed a strong presumption against third-party standing to
prevent ideological litigants from raising claims better raised by
parties who suffer an actual injury,5 20 it has affirmed Congress's
power to confer standing upon ideological litigants notwithstanding
an obvious hypothetical case in which a future first party could raise
the same legal issue in a case that involves a concrete injury.52 1
And yet, the Lujan Court denied Congress the power to define as
injured persons those concerned about government activities that
posed a threat to the habitats of endangered species abroad. While
Allen v. Wright,122 for example, suggests that, to the extent that
standing, in its constitutional dimension, rests upon the Article III
concern that Congress is the appropriate branch to monitor
executive agency action, the Lujan Court employed standing to
trump a federal statute that Congress designed to allow private
attorneys general to monitor the executive branch in federal court.
If standing rests upon Article III, Lujan appears ironic; the Court
invalidated a congressional grant of standing to secure Congress's
power to monitor the executive branch. Ultimately, whether the
Court correctly decided Lujan turns upon whether Congress has the
power to define abstract injuries as individual rights enforceable in
federal court. Until Lujan, the answer seemed to be yes.
CONCLUSION
Professors often say that the law is a seamless web and that in
any course, students cannot fully understand the materials covered
at the beginning until they study those at the end. But the reverse

also holds, and we all must start somewhere. For many professors
52 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (stating that
the plaintiff must show direct injury or immediate danger of such an injury).
521 See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972)
(upholding a Fair Housing Act provision granting standing to plaintiffs who claimed
that defendants unlawfully denied them truthful housing information because of their
race, even though the plaintiffs were testers who were not interested in actually
securing housing but were instead raising claims .on behalf of others who failed to
secure desired housing because of such discrimination).
5- 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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of constitutional law, standing comes at the beginning, if for no
other reason, than that several casebook authors have put it
there. 52 3 For this constitutional law professor, however, that
placement has a logical foundation. Standing is a limiting principle
on the power of judicial review, and that power, in all its dimensions, lies at the core of constitutional law.
In explaining the graph depicting a group with multipeaked
preferences,5 24 I suggested that cutting out the rectangular image,
rolling it into a tube, and taping the ends together would provide
the graphic, and the cycles that it is intended to illustrate, with a'
greater visual quality. It might be helpful now to imagine treating
the materials that a constitutional law class covers in the same
manner. If that voluminous body of materials were properly cut,
rolled, and taped, standing would occupy its proper place, at both
the beginning and the end of the course.
Perhaps that explains why standing is likely to forever remain
among the most enigmatic of Supreme Court doctrines. A doctrine
that, perhaps uniquely, can only be characterized by metaphor is
bound to become confused when the object of the metaphor
changes over time. A united New Deal Court created standing to
stave off unwelcome challenges to favored regulatory programs,
primarily in the lower federal courts. Because that Court shared a
common doctrinal foundation, or, in social choice, was unipeaked,
at least with respect to the day's most pressing and controversial
issues, the Court used standing not to avoid reaching the merits of
difficult cases, but rather to keep lower federal courts, which had a
different jurisprudential vision than that of the Supreme Court, in
tow. Even in later Courts marked by shifts from one stable power
center to another, standing remained on the sidelines. As long as
a stable power center existed somewhere in the Court, the Court's
523 In fact, casebook authors are split on whether standing should appear at the

beginning or toward the end. For early placements, see WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 94-116 (4th ed. 1993);

STONE ET AL., supra note 190, at 87-106; TRIBE, supra note 79, §§ 3-14 to -21, at 10755. For late placements, see DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 1045-77 (1993); GUNTHER, supra
note 224, at 1598-1629; RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES

AND NOTES 1088-1127 (4th ed. 1993). Without, in any sense, criticizing all of these
excellent introductory texts, I hope that this Article demonstrates that on the narrow
issue of where standing belongs in an introductory constitutional law textbook, the
authors in the first group have the better intuition.
524 See supra note 17.
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members were able to predict, with considerable certainty, the
outcomes of divisive cases that they chose to address on the merits.
Standing has undergone its most powerful metamorphosis
during the Burger and Rehnquist Court eras. On those Courts, the
object of the metaphors underlying the standing doctrine fundamentally changed. There was no longer a stable center of power.
As a result, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which consisted of
shifting coalitions, generated outcomes that sometimes, and with
increasing frequency, appeared to thwart the will of present
majorities. This phenomenon, when coupled with the Court's
prominent policymaking role beginning in the Warren Court era,
which tended to promote ideologically driven litigation, possessed
a synergistic quality. The Court's multipeakedness tended to invite,
rather than inhibit, further ideologically driven federal court
litigation, which in turn tended to increase unpredictable and
irrational outcomes.
The cycles continued, both literally and
figuratively.
No single doctrine can render the Supreme Court an entirely
rational decisionmaking body. In fact, I would argue that if any
could, we should fight against its adoption. Arrow's Theorem
demonstrates that, at bottom, the objectives of fairness and
rationality are inevitably at odds in any given collective decisionmaking body. While stare decisis, by preventing the requisite
number of votes to reveal intertemporal cycles, renders Supreme
Court decisionmaking substantially more rational, standing, by
ensuring that all litigants play essentially by the same ground rules
and that fortuity, rather than path manipulation, presumptively
governs the path affecting the substantive evolution of legal
doctrine, makes Supreme Court decisionmaking substantially more
fair. With both doctrines in place the Supreme Court remains an
imperfect institution. But perfection cannot be the test.52 5 This
Article has demonstrated the value of these doctrines, based upon
a more modest test: The Supreme Court's decisional processes are
both more rational and more fair with them in place than they
would be without them.
What of the future of standing? The Supreme Court has been
transformed many times in this nation's history, and we should
expect that process to continue. A recently emerging "centrist"
bloc, consisting of Justices O'Connor, Souter, Kennedy, Ginsburg,
525 See supra note

80 (describing the nirvana fallacy).
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and Breyer, appears to be assuming, or at least poised to assume,
majority status. At the same time, to the extent that there have
been defections, the conservative bloc is gaining strength. Perhaps
if a sufficiently large coalition forms in the middle or right of the
now-multipeaked Court, the Court will again have confidence in its
ability to aggregate rationally its preferences when deciding difficult
cases. If so, the order in which cases are presented for review will
become less important to the substantive evolution of legal doctrine
than it has been in recent decades, and ideological litigants, at least
those who are not in sync with the controlling bloc, will find the
Supreme Court a less inviting forum for the resolution of divisive
policy matters.
We might then expect the Court to relegate
standing to a less prominent role. Should that happen, it might be
fun to take a few steps back and have a good look.

